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Chapter One
Introduction

Introduction: December 1907 and Beyond
At 10:30 a.m. on December 6, 1907, there was a massive explosion at the
interconnected No. 6 and No. 8 mines of the Fairmont Coal Company in Monongah,
West Virginia. The explosion spread rapidly through the two mines and was heard up to
eight miles away. Hundreds of men and boys were burned alive, crushed by rubble, or
asphyxiated by the lethal quantities of methane gas, or “black damp,” released by the
blast. As the rescue operation started, grief-stricken families and relatives congregated at
the entrance to the mines. The methane gas hindered rescuers’ efforts to find survivors by
limiting the time they could stay underground to fifteen-minute intervals. Even working
in relay teams, many of the rescue workers became ill or died as a result of entering the
mines. On December 8, the Washington Post reported, “A score of men of the rescuing
parties are in critical condition tonight from inhaling black damp. Several of them are
expected to die. One of these men, John Gabber, was carried from the mine tonight
almost a raving maniac. His lungs were filled with black damp, which produced a
delirium, and the services of four men were necessary to hold Gabbert while doctors
attended him.”1 In the days that followed the disaster, the rescue workers recovered sixtysix burned and mutilated bodies, many in such bad condition that immediate burial was
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Washington Post, December 8, 1907, 1.
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necessary. They found only one survivor, a Polish immigrant named Peter Urban, who
was sitting on top of the body of his twin brother.2
There has been considerable debate over exactly how many people died in the
Monongah disaster. The official death toll was 372, but evidence suggests that more than
500 miners lost their lives. The Fairmont Coal Company, a subsidiary of the
Consolidation Coal Company, did not keep accurate records of its workforce, particularly
the ‘unofficial workers,’ such as mule drivers and trapper boys.3 The exact cause of the
disaster also remains unclear, although investigators concluded that the most likely
explanation was that a blown fuse caused the “black damp” to ignite the combustible coal
dust in the mine.
Five days before the Monongah disaster, thirty-four miners died in an explosion at
the Naomi mine in Fayette City, Pennsylvania. Later in the month, on December 19, a
methane explosion killed 239 men and boys at the Darr coal mine in Jacob’s Creek,
Pennyslvania. The blast was so powerful that many of the bodies recovered from the
2

For extensive coverage of the Monongah mining disaster, see New York Times,
December 7, 1907, 1; New York Times, December 9, 1907, 3; New York Times, December
10, 1907, 2; New York Times, December 11, 1907, 7; New York Times, December 12,
1907, 1; New York Times, December 13, 1907, 18; Washington Post, December 7, 1907,
1 and 3; Washington Post, December 8, 1907, 1 and 8; Washington Post, December 9,
1907, 1 and 3; Washington Post, December 10, 1907, 5; Washington Post, December 11,
1907, 5; Washington Post, December 12, 1907, 5. For an extensive account of
community, culture, and the mining economy in Monongah see Davitt McAteer,
Monongah: The Tragic Story of the 1907 Monongah Mining Disaster, the Worst
Industrial Accident in U.S. History (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2007).
An extensive discussion the Monongah disaster in the larger context of workplace safety
in the Progressive Era can be found in William Graebner, Coal Mine Health and Safety in
the Progressive Era: The Political Economy of Reform (Lexington: The University Press
of Kentucky, 1976).
3

For a complete discussion of the debate surrounding the Monongah death toll, see
McAteer, Monongah, especially 218-241.
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mine were headless or burned beyond recognition. In addition, hundreds of other miners
died in isolated accidents throughout 1907. That year, there were over three thousand
fatalities in the coal mines of the United States.4 In response to the Monongah disaster,
the federal government created an agency called the Bureau of Mines to provide safety
recommendations to the coal industry and carry out research, while many state
legislatures revised their mining codes with the intention of reducing the hazards that
miners faced on the job. The United Mine Workers of America, the largest union in the
coalfields, mostly engaged in retroactive policies, by campaigning for improved workers’
compensation and hospital care for miners.
The events of 1907 emphasized the dangers of coal mine labor. Historian Price
Fishback notes that coal mining was one of the most dangerous jobs ever devised.5
Miners faced a wide range of safety hazards in their work. They labored deep
underground in near total darkness. They were at constant risk of being crushed to death,
with tons of shifting rock overhead supported only by fragile wooden timbers.
Throughout the twentieth century, roof collapses were the most common cause of death
in underground mines. Coal miners also faced the constant threat of being injured or
killed in an explosion, as they worked with explosives in an atmosphere filled with
methane and other ignitable gases. Miners were often responsible for making their own
4

For coverage of the Naomi disaster, see New York Times, December 3, 1907, 1;
Washington Post, December 2, 1907, 1; Washington Post, December 3, 1907, 1. For a
detailed account of the Darr mine disaster, see New York Times, December 20, 1907, 1
and 2; New York Times, December 21, 1907, 8; New York Times, December 22, 1907, 4;
Washington Post, December 20, 1907, 1 and 2; Washington Post, December 21, 1907, 1.
5

Price Fishback, “The Miner’s Work Environment: Safety and Company Towns in the
Early 1900s,” The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity?,
edited by John Laslett (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1996), 201.
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explosive devices, and were frequently involved in accidents as a result of overloading
the explosives or going back to a device after it had been lit. The cars that hauled coal
through the mines also posed a significant risk. Miners were often killed by runaway cars
or as a result of falling off the ‘mantrip’ that transported workers through the mine. With
the advent of electrification in the mines, the wires that powered cars and lighting were
often exposed. Miners frequently died of electrocution when they brushed against the
wires. 6
As the twentieth century progressed, coal miners faced new hazards in their
working environment. The mechanized loading machine gradually replaced miners who
loaded coal onto cars by hand. The loading machine forced miners to work more quickly,
increasing the chance that they would cause an accident through error or carelessness.
When production demands were especially high, miners often neglected to carry out roof
control procedures. Moreover, the loading machines generated more methane gas and
higher quantities of coal dust.

7

This not only made explosions more likely, but also

greatly increased miners’ chances of developing pneumoconiosis, or ‘black lung,’ a
debilitating, work-related respiratory disease. Coal operators increasingly mechanized
their operations after World War II. Consequently, black lung disease became more
prevalent among miners, causing long-term chronic suffering and early death for the men
who labored underground. In the coal industry, there was a distinct connection between
6

Fishback, “The Miner’s Work Environment,” 201-203. For a more thorough account,
see Price Fishback, Soft Coal, Hard Choices: The Economic Welfare of Bituminous Coal
Miners, 1890-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
7

Keith Dix, “Mechanization, Workplace Control, and the End of the Handloading Era,”
United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity?, edited by John
Laslett (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1996), 176.
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the safety hazards that caused immediate injury or death and the health hazards that
resulted in ‘black lung’ and other long-term occupational diseases. The coal dust that
permeated the atmosphere in underground mines both caused explosions and led to
crippling occupational lung disease in miners.
The federal government’s creation of the Bureau of Mines in the aftermath of the
Monongah disaster emphasized that legislative change in the coal industry was driven by
the public outcry resulting from large-scale disasters. The routine hazards that miners
faced, and the thousands of deaths that occurred from isolated accidents such as roof falls
and mechanical failures, typically did not influence the federal government and state
legislatures to improve health and safety regulations. During the twentieth century, each
major reform of mining legislation in the United States occurred as a result of the
widespread publicity and research efforts generated by major disasters. In 1941, the
Franklin Roosevelt administration passed the Federal Coal Mine Inspection and
Investigation Act, which enacted limited safety measures for the coal industry.8 The
passage of the 1941 legislation followed two major disasters the previous year. On
January 10, 1940, ninety-one miners perished in an explosion at the Pond Creek No. 1
mine in Bartley, West Virginia.9 Two months later, on March 16, seventy-two miners lost

8

For details of the 1940 Inspection and Investigation Act, which was part of a larger
federal appropriations program for the Department of the Interior, see U.S. Statutes 54
(1939-41): 441-445.
9

For a full account of the Bartley disaster, see New York Times, January 11, 1940, 1; New
York Times, January 12, 1940, 11; New York Times, January 13, 1940, 1 and 16; New
York Times, January 14, 1940; 3; New York Times, January 15, 1940, 3; Washington Post,
January 11, 1940, 1; Washington Post, January 12, 1940, 1 and 5; Washington Post,
January 13, 1940, 1.
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their lives in an explosion in the Willow Grove No. 10 mine at St. Clairsville, Ohio.10
Similarly, the next major legislative development in mine health and safety occurred as a
result of a major coal mine disaster. The Harry Truman administration passed the Federal
Coal Mine Safety Act in 1952 after a massive explosion at the Orient No. 2 mine in
Frankfort, Illinois, in 1951, killed 112 miners.11 The 1941 and 1952 legislative acts are
discussed later in this chapter. Most notably, the Richard Nixon administration passed the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 following a major coal mine disaster in
Farmington, West Virginia in 1968, which claimed the lives of seventy-eight miners. The
1969 Federal Mine Act mandated strong enforcement measures, as well as compensation
for black lung victims. Nixon strengthened the terms of the 1969 Federal Mine Act by
signing the Black Lung Benefits Act in 1972. Further emphasizing the link between
safety and health, the congressional debate that preceded the passage of the Federal Mine
Act of 1969 incorporated both issues into a single legislative bill. The Farmington
disaster also led to changes in West Virginia’s worker compensation laws.12

10

For a full account of the St. Clairsville disaster, see New York Times, March 17, 1940,
3; New York Times, March 18, 1940, 10; New York Times, March 19, 1940, 26;
Washington Post, March 17, 1940, 1; Washington Post, March 18, 1940, 1; Washington
Post, March 19, 1940, 3.
11

For the full text of the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952, see Federal Coal Mine
Safety Act of 1952. U.S. Statutes At Large 66 (1952): 692-710. For a full account of the
Frankfort mine disaster, see Chicago Tribune, December 22, 1951, 1; Chicago Tribune,
December 23, 1951, 3; Chicago Tribune, December 24, 1951, 1; Chicago Tribune,
December 26, 1951, 20; New York Times, December 22, 1951, 1 and 30; New York
Times, December 23, 1951, 1 and 16; New York Times, December 24, 1951, 1 and 7; New
York Times, December 25, 1951, 1 and 24; New York Times, December 26, 1951, 40.
12

The Farmington disaster and its political and legislative implications, particularly the
emergence of the West Virginia Black Lung Association, are discussed in detail in
chapter two. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 is the main focus of
chapter three, while the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 is covered in chapter six.
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It is ironic that the most significant advances in coal mine health and safety
legislation in the twentieth century occurred during the Richard Nixon administration.
Nixon was a Republican president whose political philosophy opposed government
regulation of economic enterprise and favored corporate interests over those of labor and
the environment. Nixon decided to sign the Federal Mine Act of 1969 and the Black
Lung Benefits Act of 1972, both passed by a Democratic-controlled Congress, for two
key reasons. First, he sought to strengthen his blue-collar support for the 1972
presidential election and, second, he wanted to secure the Democrats’ approval for his
defense and foreign policy objectives.13 Yet other factors also influenced Nixon’s
decision to sign the legislation. To a large extent, he was responding to the Farmington
disaster and the grassroots protest that spread through the coalfields in its aftermath.
In this dissertation, I show that the Farmington disaster gave rise to a generation
of coal mine health and safety advocacy and legislation. Coal miners used the Farmington
disaster to convince distant and hostile elected officials of the need for stronger health
and safety and compensation laws, at both the state and federal levels. I argue that miners
and their supporters achieved substantial legislative change through community-driven
activism. A large number of rank and file miners rejected the national leadership of their
union, the United Mine Workers of America (UMW), which was corrupt and inattentive
to their concerns, and instead used local branches of the union and grassroots
13

Nixon’s efforts to win blue-collar support and to court the Democrats for his defense
and foreign policy aims are discussed in chapter three. Jefferson Cowie has researched
Nixon’s efforts to win blue-collar support for the 1972 election in great detail. See, for
example, Jefferson Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle: Romancing the New Right Worker,
1969-1973,” Labor History 43 (2002); Jefferson Cowie, “Vigorously Left, Right, and
Center: The Crosscurrents of Working Class America in the 1970s,” America in the
Seventies, edited by Beth Bailey and David Farber (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2004).
.
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organizations as the foundation for challenging weak coal mine laws. Supported by their
families, miners’ widows, retired and disabled coal miners, and local volunteers, as well
as politicians and medical physicians, the miners’ campaign for legislative change was
rooted in the community of the Appalachian coalfields.
The support from the wider community was the most important dimension in the
miners’ campaign. While many elected officials were hostile to reform, a small minority
provided crucial support for the miners’ cause. In particular, Representative Ken Hechler
(D-WV) and Representative Phil Burton (D-CA) exerted considerable pressure on the
U.S. Congress to adopt strong preventative health and safety measures and compensation
provisions, which were embodied in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969. Dissenting members of the medical establishment also contributed to the miners’
campaign. Dr. Isidore Buff, Dr. Hawey Wells, and Dr. Donald Rasmussen rejected their
peers’ claim that miners’ lung disease was the result of cigarette smoking. Instead, they
linked miners’ lung ailments directly to the inhalation of coal dust. They formed the
Black Lung Association (BLA), which initiated grassroots protest across the West
Virginia coalfields by organizing miners, their families, and local communities. The
Black Lung Association’s campaign persuaded the state legislature to provide workers’
compensation to the victims of black lung disease in 1969. Furthermore, the physicians’
testimony on the impact of coal dust on miners’ lungs influenced the passage of the
Federal Mine Act that year.
Miners and their supporters continued to engage in community-driven, grassroots
protest when they realized that their legislative achievements were being undermined by
an inefficient and industry-orientated federal bureaucracy, represented by the U.S.
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Bureau of Mines and the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Bureau of Mines
failed to enforce the health and safety legislation in the Federal Mine Act of 1969, while
the SSA denied compensation to tens of thousands of miners who were suffering from
black lung disease. Rank and file miners and local and district union leaders protested
against the Bureau of Mines by sending letters to their Congressman and the UMW
national leadership. They highlighted the Bureau’s lax enforcement policies and its
neglect of non-union mines. While the letters did not significantly influence the Bureau’s
policies, they showed that the miners were conscious, determined protestors who actively
protested the federal government’s failure to enforce health and safety. The Black Lung
Association, which expanded beyond its West Virginia origins into several other states,
launched a sustained campaign of lobbying and protesting against the Social Security
Administration. The campaign resulted in significant changes to the federal black lung
compensation program in 1972.
Miners also believed that the corrupt national leadership of the United Mine
Workers, fronted by President Tony Boyle, was an obstacle to safe working conditions in
the coalfields. When Jock Yablonski, Boyle’s opponent in the 1969 union presidential
election, was murdered, a small group of rank and file miners formed Miners for
Democracy. Convinced that the national leadership was behind Yablonski’s death, they
sought to make the UMW more democratic and attentive to health and safety issues.
The success of community activism in the coalfields in the early 1970s was
undermined by the energy crisis, which prompted coal operators to prioritize higher
production ahead of safe working conditions. While President Jimmy Carter signed
legislative acts in 1977 to improve mine health and safety and regulate the environmental
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abuses of the coal industry, the activists’ achievements were further undermined by the
deregulatory policies of the Ronald Reagan administration.
To undertake this study, I conducted research at several archival institutions. The
Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs at Wayne State University, which
contains many valuable materials on coal mine health and safety, was particularly useful.
I examined documents in the Richard J. Jensen Collection, John Herling Collection and,
most significantly, the Miners for Democracy Collection, which contains the papers of
the grassroots organization of the same name that seized control of the United Mine
Workers in 1972. I also undertook research in the Special Collections Library at
Pennsylvania State University, which holds the extensive Safety Division Office Files of
the United Mine Workers. At the West Virginia State Archives, I researched reports,
documents, and studies pertaining specifically to coal miners in that state. Elsewhere in
West Virginia, I consulted materials in the Historical Collection of the Mine Enforcement
and Safety Administration in Beckley and UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund papers in
the West Virginia Collection at West Virginia University. As well as carrying out
research in archival institutions, I conducted several oral history interviews and studied a
range of periodicals, magazines, and national and regional newspapers. During a trip to
the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., I conducted research using regional
newspapers from Kentucky. Finally, I expanded my primary research with government
reports, the U.S. Congressional Record, and the minutes of legislative hearings before
Congressional committees and subcommittees.

.
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The Historiography of Coal Mine Health and Safety, 1968-1988
While this study diverges from the existing literature, it is necessary to place it in
the context of the larger historiography. Several historians and writers have addressed the
issue of coal mine health and safety in the United States, most notably labor historian
Alan Derickson, whose book, Black Lung: Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster, is the
definitive work on the cultural, political and social evolution of black lung disease from
the late nineteenth century to 1969. In Black Lung, Derickson argues that social
movements were key to the gradual recognition of miners’ lung disease. He also contends
that the real tragedy of black lung was the failure of operators, physicians, and legislators
to address the disease in the late nineteenth century, even though they possessed enough
knowledge to do so.14 Derickson concludes his study by explaining that the passage of
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 represented the culmination of
activism in the coalfields. Aside from a few brief paragraphs, he does not assess the
effectiveness of the act in addressing black lung disease among coal miners, nor does he
carry the story forward to incorporate the burgeoning activism in the coalfields in the
early 1970s.
Derickson also addresses ‘black lung,’ or pneumoconiosis, in several articles,
most notably, “Down Solid: The Origins and Development of the Black Lung
Insurgency,” in which he argues that West Virginia miners did not abandon their union,
the United Mine Workers of America (UMW), in pursuit of state black lung
compensation legislation in early 1969, but rather used local union branches as the

14

Alan Derickson, Black Lung: Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1998), xii-xiii.
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foundation of their activism.15 In “The United Mine Workers of America and the
Recognition of Occupational Respiratory Diseases, 1902-1968,” Derickson argues that
the UMW played a crucial role in advancing recognition of miners’ lung disease,
particularly through the dissemination of information by its Welfare and Retirement Fund
in the 1950s and 1960s.16
In Digging Our Own Graves: Coal Miners and the Struggle Over Black Lung
Disease, Barbara Smith also focuses on black lung disease. She argues that miners gained
recognition of occupational lung disease by emphasizing their personal experience of the
disease and engaging in collective action. Smith’s study is supported by an extensive
number of oral history interviews with coal miners, activists, and politicians. The book
ends in 1977, with the passage of amendments to federal black lung legislation during the
Carter administration. In her coverage of events from 1969 onwards, however, Smith
neglects to analyze the federal agencies responsible for health and safety enforcement.
She focuses mostly on black lung activists’ campaign for legislative amendments and the
change in leadership of the United Mine Workers in 1972.17
Bennett M. Judkins examines the Black Lung Association, especially its
organizing activities in its pursuit of amendments to the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety of 1969. In his dissertation, “The Black Lung Association: A Case Study of a
15

Alan Derickson, “Down Solid: The Origins and Development of the Black Lung
Insurgency,” Journal of Public Health Policy 4 (1983), 25-44.
16

Alan Derickson, “The United Mine Workers of America and the Recognition of
Occupational Respiratory Diseases, 1902-1968,” American Journal of Public Health 86
(June 1991), 782-90.
17

Barbara Smith, Digging Our Own Graves: Coal Miners and the Struggle Over Black
Lung Disease (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).
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Modern Social Movement,” Judkins focuses on the internal dynamics of the Black Lung
Association (BLA), particularly the role of central leaders in guiding BLA policies and
the relationship between different local chapters.18 Judkins develops his work on the
black lung movement in his book, We Offer Ourselves As Evidence: Towards Workers’
Control of Occupational Health, which focuses on the politics of two specific diseases,
coal miners’ lung disease and ‘brown lung,’ a lung disorder affecting textile workers.19
He argues that retired and disabled miners and textile workers played a crucial role in the
advancement of occupational health laws. By looking beyond the role of active workers
in the campaign for legislative reform, Judkins makes an important contribution to the
historiographical debate on coal mine health and safety. Again, however, the focus of his
research is limited to black lung disease, rather than a broader analysis of safety and
health. Two additional articles by Judkins provide a detailed examination of black lung
disease and the black lung movement.20
Other books discuss coal mine health and safety from the perspective of the
United Mine Workers of America, the main labor union in America’s coalfields. Brit
Hume’s Death and the Mines: Rebellion and Murder in the UMW examines the decline

18

Bennett Mallory Judkins, “The Black Lung Association: A Case Study of a Modern
Social Movement (Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee, 1975).
19

Bennett M. Judkins, We Offer Ourselves As Evidence: Towards Workers’ Control of
Occupational Health (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).

20

Bennett M. Judkins, “Mobilization of Membership: The Black and Brown Lung
Movements,” Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies, edited by Jo Freeman (New
York: Longman, 1983), 35-51; Bennett M. Judkins, “”The People’s Respirator: Coalition
Building and the Black Lung Association,” Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of
Resistance and Change, edited by Stephen L. Fisher (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1993), 225-241.
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of the UMW, giving particular focus to the period from 1968 to 1971.21 Much of the book
covers the union’s neglect of health and safety under W. Anthony “Tony” Boyle, who
assumed the UMW presidency in 1963. Published in 1971, Hume’s book is a
contemporary expose of the union, not a historical monograph. Furthermore, Hume’s
background as a journalist means the book should be treated with caution. It does not list
citations or a bibliography, and his arguments are largely based on his observations and
investigations. Yet, even accounting for such limitations, Death in the Mines is rich in
detail, and its content is verifiable through other primary and secondary sources. In The
Corrupt Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of the United Mine Workers, labor lawyer Joseph E.
Finley provides a general history of the union, devoting substantial focus to its health and
safety policies. Finley traces the history of the UMW until 1972, the year the book was
published, emphasizing internal corruption and the decline of coal mine health and safety
under Boyle.22 Both monographs are limited in that they do not provide a long-range
perspective of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Act.
Published in 1973, J. Davitt McAteer’s Coal Mine Health and Safety: The Case of
West Virginia is perhaps the most comprehensive account of coal mine health and safety
in a single coal mining state. Based on an earlier study conducted by McAteer and a team
of graduate students working for consumer advocate Ralph Nader, the book examines
health and safety from the perspectives of the miners, the UMW, the coal operators, the
federal government, and the West Virginia state government. McAteer depicts the
21

Brit Hume, Death in the Mines: Murder and Rebellion in the United Mine Workers
(New York: Grossman, 1971).
22

Joseph E. Finley, The Corrupt Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of the United Mine
Workers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972).
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residents of the coalfields as victims of the mining operators, who exploit West Virginia’s
mineral resources and evade payment of local taxes. McAteer’s analysis shows that
institutions such as the U.S. Bureau of Mines and the West Virginia state government
perpetuated the status of coal miners as victims.23

Defining Miners’ Occupational Lung Disease
To understand the struggle over coal mine health and safety from 1968 to 1988, it
is necessary to examine the key participants, as well as the significant issues, from the
late nineteenth century. One of the central issues has been the conflict over the definition
of pneumoconiosis, or ‘black lung,’ a debilitating work-related disease afflicting coal
miners. Despite miners’ insistence that coal dust impaired their breathing, physicians and
coal operators minimized the severity of the disease by classifying it as miners’ asthma,
thus preventing the passage of preventative legislation until the late 1960s.
By the turn of the century, American coal miners suffered from a range of chronic
occupational illnesses, including miners’ asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema. ‘Miners’
asthma,’ now more commonly known as pneumoconiosis or ‘black lung disease,’ was the
contemporary name given to lung disease caused by the inhalation of coal dust. In his
post-mortem examinations of coal miners in the late nineteenth century, Dr. John O.
Malley, of Scranton, Pennsylvania, frequently discovered that their lungs had absorbed
excessive quantities of fine coal dust particles.”24 Coal operators, nor the United Mine

23

J. Davitt McAteer, Coal Mine Health and Safety: The Case of West Virginia (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).
24

Alan Derickson, “The Role of the United Mine Workers in the Prevention of
Respiratory Disease,” The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial
.
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Workers, and certainly not the federal and state governments made significant efforts to
address miners’ lung disease. Beginning around 1910, operators typically followed
engineers’ recommendations of using mechanical fans or spraying water, but such
techniques did not significantly reduce the quantities of airborne coal dust. The limited
political and economic power of the United Mine Workers restricted its efforts to obtain
preventative measures for occupational disease, so it focused more on providing
compensation for the victims. In contract negotiations, however, the union opted to push
for wages to renumerate miners for the dangers they faced.25
In 1902, miners in the Pennsylvania anthracite coalfields went on strike for higher
wages and a shorter working week.26 The Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, created by
President Theodore Roosevelt in response to the strike, arbitrated a settlement between
the United Mine Workers and the coal operators that provided the miners with limited
concessions, including a ten percent wage increase and reduced working hours. After the
strike, physicians, engineers, and industry representatives started to deny that coal dust
was harmful to miners, in what Alan Derickson refers to as “an amazing reversal.”27
Many denied that anthracosis, or black lung, was a legitimate disease, while several
investigators, disregarding miners’ black spit, argued that blackened lung tissue was
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nothing more than “a harmless discoloration.” In 1924, British physician Thomas Oliver
maintained that miners’ coughing up of black fluid was beneficial, as it cleaned the lungs
of coal dust. Most notably, an increasing number of physicians argued that miners could
protect themselves from tuberculosis by inhaling coal dust. Anthracite coal operators had
tried to convince the 1902 strike commission of the “antiseptic properties” of carbon dust,
and they had argued that hard coal dust was “more than ordinarily healthful,” but without
success.28 In the years following the strike, the argument that coal dust was beneficial to
miners became increasingly widespread. Physicians’ claims about coal dust contrasted
with the prevailing medical logic on silica dusts, such as marble, slate, and flint, which
were found in some coal seams and other hard rock mines, and regarded as a key cause of
tuberculosis and lung diseases.29
Edgar Collis, a British scientist, conflated pneumoconiosis with silicosis, a
disease that afflicted hard rock miners. He argued that if miners had lung disease, then
they must have inhaled rock dust. He further maintained that coal dust was “not
injurious” and that miners who breathed it were less susceptible to tuberculosis. For
Collis, tuberculosis was primarily caused by silica dust.30 In a lecture before the British
Medical Association, he emphasized, “Some dusts, such as coal… not only appear to
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have no power of producing pneumonoconioses, but even may possess some inhibitory
influence on phthisis.”31
Similarly, medical researchers Eugene Pendergrass and Henry Pancoast used
radiology to dismiss the threat posed by coal dust. They argued that X-rays clearly
showed the effects of silica, in the form of nodules on the lungs, but they downplayed the
shadows that indicated deposits of coal dust. They pointed to the large number of elderly,
seemingly healthy miners who had such X-rays. In using X-rays to dismiss the severity of
coal miners’ asthma, they ignored the physical symptoms caused by the inhalation of coal
dust, including miners’ struggle to breathe and their expectoration of thick, black sputum,
a process commonly referred to as melanoptysis. Like Collis, Pendergrass and Pancoast
used the terms ‘silicosis’ and ‘pneumoconiosis’ interchangeably to describe lung disease
caused by the inhalation of silica dust. Yet, in their study, Pneumoconiosis [Silicosis],
Pendergrass and Pancoast mentioned, but failed to account for, the high incidence of
pneumoconiosis among locomotive firemen, who were not exposed to rock dust in their
work.32
By 1920, medical professionals and researchers, supported by the coal operators,
were widely extolling the benefits of coal dust. They dismissed anthracosis as nothing
more than a slight discoloration of the lungs. A minority of critics continued to argue that
coal dust was harmful to miners’ long-term health. Miners disputed the claim that they
were not suffering from a disease specific to the coal industry. For almost half a century,
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there was little change in this dispute. Great Britain, meanwhile, recognized the health
implications of coal dust by passing a black lung compensation law in 1943.33

The Federal Response: The U. S. Bureau of Mines and (Ineffective) Safety Laws
As noted above, the federal government only engaged in legislative change in
response to large-scale disasters. The Monongah disaster of 1907 prompted the federal
government to examine the issue of coal mine health and safety more closely. In the first
three years after the Monongah disaster, Congress provided funds for the Technologic
Branch of the Geological Survey to carry out scientific research and provide educational
programs on safe mining practices. Because these functions stretched beyond the
Geological Survey’s mandate, Congress sought an alternative means of improving health
and safety. It created a new agency, the Bureau of Mines, located in the Department of
the Interior, and appointed the head of the Technologic Branch, Joseph A. Holmes, as its
first director.34 Holmes had been advocating a national mining agency since becoming
head of the Technologic Branch in 1905. Formerly a professor of geology and natural
history at the University of North Carolina, and the head of the department of mining and
metallurgy at the 1903 Louisiana Purchase Exposition, Holmes had long sought to
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improve the efficiency of mineral production and the conditions of the men who labored
underground.35
The Bureau’s key functions were conducting scientific research and making
recommendations on mine safety. In its early years, it did not have the authority to
inspect mines or to formally enact the recommendations it made, nor could it investigate
the social and legal aspects of mining companies’ operations. For instance, the Bureau
proposed reducing coal dust in underground mines through the use of rock dusting, a
practice that involved spraying the walls and roof with a substance containing limestone
and silica, but most companies resisted this measure. It did not become mandatory. The
Bureau also had little success in encouraging coal operators to avoid using types of
equipment it identified as liable to cause explosions. The Bureau did, however,
successfully facilitate the creation of mine safety stations, but only because the federal
government assumed the cost. The United Mine Workers attacked the Bureau because it
focused principally on responding to disasters and not preventing them.36 The UMW also
condemned Joseph A. Holmes, because he gave the impression of being more concerned
with production than safety.37
The Bureau’s role remained unchanged for thirty years until Congress passed the
Coal Mine Inspection and Investigation Act in 1941. The act gave the Bureau the
authority to inspect mines and write reports concerning safety recommendations. The
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Bureau, however, still had no powers of enforcement, and operators were not legally
bound to follow its recommendations. The 1941 act stipulated that only state
governments had the authority to enforce safety measures in the coal industry. Without
the ability to enforce its recommendations, the Bureau was powerless to stop operators
from using equipment that was liable to cause explosions. In the following nine years,
835 miners died in coal explosions across the United States, and half of those explosions
resulted from faults in electrical devices that the Bureau had identified as dangerous or, in
its own language, “non-permissible.”38
The Federal Coal Mine Safety of Act of 1952, signed into law by President Harry
Truman, extended the Bureau’s role beyond an advisory capacity by giving Bureau
inspectors the power to issue violation citations to operators who committed safety
violations or, where conditions posed an immediate risk to miners, to close down mines.39
However, the act did little to regulate operators’ use of hazardous equipment. It contained
a clause that permitted mining operators to use non-permissible equipment for an
indefinite period if they had owned it before the legislation came into force. Several years
later, in 1967, the Bureau carried out an investigation and found that 150 mines still
owned non-permissible equipment.40 The 1952 Federal Mine Safety Act also perpetuated
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the states’ responsibility for the actual enforcement of safety in underground coal
mines.41

State Legislation and Workers’ Compensation
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state legislatures generally did
not adopt specific health and safety laws for the coal industry. Pennsylvania did,
however, enact minor provisions for coal miners. In 1893, it passed a law stipulating that
“gassy” mines should provide 100 feet of cubic air per employee per minute, although its
main objective was to reduce the threat of methane explosions.42 In 1903, working with
the United Mine Workers, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a law that provided
Miners’ Homes for old, sick, and injured former mine workers over the age of 60,
including those suffering from ‘miners’ asthma.’ The institutions were financed by
deductions from miners’ wages and tonnage royalty payments from the coal operators.
Some UMW representatives hoped to extend Miners’ Homes to all states. At the union’s
1905 convention, however, delegates voted against this plan, because they felt that the
state governments should provide miners with pensions instead.43
The states’ lack of regulation for coal mines reflected the absence of health and
safety laws for other sectors of industry. Before 1900, Massachusetts and Illinois were
the only two states that passed factory inspection acts. The acts were unenforceable,
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because regulators did not have the power to impose sanctions on employers who
violated them.44 From 1906, the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL), in
an effort to address the lack of regulation by the states, campaigned on a state-by-state
basis for uniform workplace laws. Focusing on issues such as industrial disease, accident
prevention, and workers’ compensation, its main goal was to prevent companies from
moving to states with less restrictive labor laws.45
Before 1910, coal miners, like workers in most other sectors of industry, found it
difficult to obtain compensation for work-related injuries and impossible to attain
remuneration for occupational disease. Workers could only obtain compensation through
the employer liability scheme. Employers were responsible for making compensation
payments for injured employees, and common law doctrines stated that workers had to
prove the employer was at fault. This was a particularly hard task for seriously injured
workers and the families of people killed on the job, as they had to depend on the
testimony of co-workers and supervisors who were susceptible to manipulation or
intimidation by the employer. Moreover, the companies could take three separate lines of
defense: They could argue the worker had caused the accident through his or her own
careless, that the worker had assumed the risk of injury by accepting the job, or that a coworker had been responsible. Most employers were able to evade a lawsuit by arguing
one of those defenses. 46
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From 1910, workmen’s compensation gradually replaced the employer liability
scheme. Employers were supportive of the shift, even though evidence showed that
workmen’s compensation would actually increase their costs. Over the next fifteen years,
the majority of state legislatures passed workmen’s compensation acts. In most cases,
employers were liable for funding workers’ compensation payments through private
insurance contributions.47 In the coal industry, serious injuries or death caused by
accidents in the mines were eligible for compensation. Black lung disease, however, was
not recognized as a legitimate occupational disease, and so victims were unable to claim
compensation. In 1966, Pennsylvania became the first state to make black lung a
compensable disease.

The United Mine Workers of America (UMW) and Health and Safety in the Mines
As the largest miners’ union in the coalfields of Appalachia and the West, the
United Mine Workers of America (UMW), founded in 1890, was at the forefront of the
struggle over health and safety.48 In its founding statement, the UMW promised to fight
for better working conditions and stronger mine legislation. In its early years, however,
the UMW had little substantive power to improve health and safety in the coal mines. By
the mid-1920s, operators almost succeeded in driving the union entirely from the West
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Virginia coalfields. The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933
provided a foundation for UMW organizers to become more active, and membership of
the union rapidly expanded from 100,000 to 400,000.
Endorsing the principles of state workmen’s compensation laws, the UMW
argued that the victims of work-induced respiratory disease should receive compensation
funded by higher insurance premiums on employers. The union hoped that higher
premiums would act as a preventative measure, by forcing employers to improve working
conditions. Union representatives were aware that compensation for miners would do
little to prevent black lung disease; some even feared that it could lead to mass firings by
the coal operators. Such fears limited the enthusiasm of the union’s national leaders for
‘black lung’ compensation. But district leaders quickly became firm advocates of
compensation. Their anger at the omission of lung disease from state compensation laws
superseded their fears about mass dismissal.49
In 1916, Districts 7 and 9 in the Pennsylvania anthracite region passed resolutions
to fight for state compensation for miners’ disabled by ‘black lung disease.’ For Thomas
Kennedy, the head of District 7, the compensation resolution was part of a broader
agenda that included mothers’ pensions, old age pensions, and unemployment insurance.
Because they focused solely on compensation for occupational disease in their own
industry, the anthracite districts’ campaign to win compensation was unsuccessful. In the
late 1920s, John Walker, the president of the Illinois State Labor Federation, was unable
to persuade the state legislature to adopt an occupational disease amendment sponsored
by District 12 of the UMW. From 1924, the UMW International also began to campaign
49
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for social insurance coverage for miners’ asthma. Its focus on occupational disease
afflicting miners contradicted the universalistic approach promoted by the American
Association for Labor Law. On the eve of World War II, none of the state governments in
the United States had added black lung disease to their workers’ compensation
programs.50
In March 1946, UMW President John L. Lewis was negotiating a new contract
with the coal operators. At the opening of the wage conference on March 12, Lewis gave
a speech in which he emphasized the record numbers of men killed and injured in the
mines. As a solution to this crisis, he presented the operators with a list of “negotiable
suggestions,” rather than firm demands, which included a welfare fund, an unspecified
wage increase, recognition for the foreman’s union, and improvements to miners’
working and living conditions. To support his demands, Lewis presented details from a
recent UMW investigation into mining accidents, living and working conditions,
sanitation, and health care in the coalfields. He informed the operators that he would not
negotiate wages and hours until they had agreed to support a welfare fund.51 Because his
history of manipulation and secret dealings gave the impression of man with few
principles, the national media doubted the sincerity of Lewis’s commitment to improved
health and safety. At the same time, Lewis had been a staunch health and safety advocate
since the late 1930s. He had used the poor conditions in the mines to turn public opinion
against the mine health and safety policies of President Franklin Roosevelt and the coal
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operators, and he devoted considerable time to the improvement of the union’s health and
pension coverage. His attention to health and safety also evolved out of necessity. By
1944, the average age of the union’s members was 45, and only sixteen percent were
under the age of 30.52
In response to the operators’ refusal to support a welfare fund, miners across the
bituminous coalfields went on strike on April 1. When additional negotiations failed, and,
the decline of the country’s coal supplies threatened to impede its post-war economic
recovery, the Truman administration intervened by overseeing a conference between
Lewis and the operators at the White House. On May 10, the White House announced
that the mine owners agreed in principle to a welfare fund. The operators, however, still
refused to endorse the fund in the miners’ contract, even after a further conference at the
White House. The Truman administration responded by establishing government control
of the mines. 53
Secretary of the Interior A. J. Krug negotiated a contract with Lewis that included
a Welfare and Retirement fund for the bituminous miners, to be jointly supervised by the
UMW and the federal government. It was to be funded by a five-cent royalty on every
ton of coal mined. The contract also mandated a separate hospital and medical fund,
which operated by transferring miners’ dues to a union-controlled hospital, rather than
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company doctors.54 In addition to the two welfare funds, the contract included a wage
increase for miners of 18.5 cents per hour, recognition of the foreman’s union, and an
increase in vacation pay.55
Having achieved a favorable agreement for bituminous miners, the UMW struck
the anthracite coalfields in June. The outcome of that strike was a unified benefit
program, the Anthracite Health and Welfare Fund, which was funded solely by a tonnage
royalty. Under the new anthracite fund, several black lung victims received treatment at
Jefferson Memorial College Hospital in Pennsylvania.56 The following year, the union
negotiated the unification of the two funds in the bituminous industry.57
The coal operators expected Lewis to reciprocate the gains the UMW had made,
by supporting its program of mechanization in the mines. He also assured the operators
he would allocate union resources to improving the coal industry’s productivity and
eliminating non-unionized operations. Paradoxically, the mechanization program created
additional health risks for underground bituminous miners. Lewis commented, “We’ve
encouraged the leading companies in the coal industry to resort to modernization in order
to increase the living standard of the miner and improve his working conditions.”58 Lewis
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was convinced that opposing the mechanization of the industry would lead to a reduction
in miners’ wages. In reality, it led to mass unemployment, as the ‘continuous miner’ and
other machines replaced thousands of miners. More significantly, mechanization vastly
increased the quantities of respirable coal dust in the mines, which subsequently led to a
sharp rise in cases of black lung disease. Because mechanization facilitated higher
production and, consequently, increased operators’ payments to the Welfare and
Retirement Fund, Lewis and the UMW leadership did not question the health risks it
created. In fact, Lewis believed that a more hazardous work environment was an
inevitable cost of the fund.59 There was, therefore, a significant hidden cost to the
Welfare and Retirement Fund. It provided miners’ with hospital treatment and health
care, but it ultimately contributed to a greater prevalence of occupational disease.60
Lewis’s policies showed that the union’s commitment to improve health and safety was
limited by the economics of coal production.
Health and safety in the Appalachian coalfields declined further after Lewis
retired as UMW president in 1960. Thomas Kennedy, the union vice-president and
former secretary treasurer, succeeded to the union presidency. He had a long history of
union activism, having led the campaign for miners’ compensation in District 7 in 1916.
Soon afterward, the executive board accepted Kennedy’s appointment of Tony Boyle as
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union vice-president. Over the next three years, Kennedy, who was old and in declining
health, trusted Boyle with much of the daily management of the union.61
In 1947, Tony Boyle had become a member of the union headquarters staff as
Lewis’s administrative assistant. He was born in a Montana mining camp in 1906, the son
of an Irish immigrant miner. His father had worked as a child in the coal mines in
Scotland, and both his grandfathers and great-grandfathers had labored in British mines.
After working for several years as a rank-and-file miner, Boyle became president of
District 27 in Montana in 1940. On being summoned to Washington by Lewis in 1947, he
appointed his brother Dick to replace him as district leader. The union constitution
stipulated that at least five years of mining experience were necessary to assume a
leadership position, but Richard Boyle had never worked in a coal mine.62
Even during his time as Lewis’s assistant, Boyle seemed more concerned with
profits than safety. In 1957, he went to Montana to attend a legislative hearing on
modernizing the state’s mining laws. In his testimony, he vigorously contested the
proposed mine safety bill, particularly its requirement of roof bolts for all mines. Roof
bolts were the most effective device for preventing roof falls, by far the most common
cause of death in the coal industry. However, because Boyle feared that coal operators
would incur substantial financial costs by installing roof bolts, he distorted the logic
behind the bill. He argued that it “would legalize the killing of men in coal mines.” He
threatened that his brother Richard would shut down all his mining operations in the state
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if the legislature enacted the bill. Less than one year later, four men died in a roof fall at
Richard Boyle’s “Montana Queen” mine. The state mine investigator later announced
that the roof had not been properly supported.63
When Thomas Kennedy died in 1963, Boyle succeeded him as UMW President.
By the time Boyle came to power, the union was plagued by corruption and
mismanagement. Most of the staff representatives were not democratically elected,
having been directly appointed by Lewis. The union’s constitutional rules were unused
and meaningless.64 Boyle exploited the corruption and mismanagement in the union to
his own personal benefit. From 1963 to 1969, he spent vast quantities of members’ dues,
totaling almost $200,000, on portraits of himself and other union officers, which he sent
to local headquarters around the country. He used the United Mine Workers Journal as
his personal campaign organ during presidential elections. At the 1964 UMW Convention
provided delegates with expensive gifts, such as electric alarm clocks with his name and
picture engraved on them, to increase his support. In addition, he exploited the union’s
financial reserves for himself and his family. He made his daughter Antoinette a staff
attorney, while still allowing her to keep her private law practice in Montana. She
received an annual salary of $40,000, the same as UMW General Counsel Edward Carey
in Washington D.C. He also provided his brother Richard with an annual salary of
$25,000 for his continuing role as District 27 president. Most notably, however, he and
vice-president John Owens diverted $650,000 of members’ dues into their own private
pension fund. Boyle’s behavior reflected his disdain for the union’s rank and file
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members, and their key concerns such as wages, pensions, and health and safety in the
mines. His disregard for miners’ welfare became a major obstacle in the campaign to
reform coal mine health and safety legislation.65 Chapter two will show that Boyle
vehemently opposed the inclusion of black lung disease in West Virginia’s workmen’s
compensation program. As highlighted in subsequent chapters, he also sought to limit
improvements to federal coal mine legislation.

Defining Appalachia: The Geography, Economy, and Culture of the Coalfields
While this dissertation analyzes coal mine health and safety in the United States,
and devotes substantial attention to the creation and enforcement of federal legislation,
much of its discussion of coal mine disasters, miners’ activism, and community protest
focuses on the Appalachian region. The geography, economy, and culture of Appalachia
played a central role in the development of the coal industry, and in the miners’ fight for
stronger health and safety legislation and workers’ compensation. In order to determine
exactly how the region shaped the coal mine health and safety movement, it is necessary
to address one of the fundamental questions of the dissertation: What is Appalachia?
First, it is necessary to consider the region in purely geographical terms. The
Appalachian Mountains extend for over 2,000 miles, from Newfoundland in eastern
Canada to northern Alabama in the southeastern United States. 66 However, they are not
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a unified mountain system, but rather divided into two segments, the glaciated northern
segment and the unglaciated southern segment, which meet at the Hudson and Mohawk
Valleys in New York State. Within the southern unglaciated segment, there are four
separate provinces, each of which run parallel to the whole chain: the Appalachian
Plateau, the Valley and Ridge Province, the Blue Ridge Province, and the Piedmont Ford
and Thrust Belt.67

For the purposes of this dissertation, I will consider southern

Appalachia.68 I further narrow the geographical focus by examining only the major coalproducing regions within southern Appalachia: eastern Pennsylvania, southern Illinois,
western Virginia, eastern Kentucky, the entire state of West Virginia, and northern
Tennessee. Coal mining takes place in 165 of Appalachia’s 445 counties.69
Within the southern Appalachian mining regions, there are distinct geological
differences that affect the physical properties of the coal. With the exception of
northeastern Pennsylvania, all the coal mining regions contain a soft-rock coal called
bituminous coal. Miners first excavated bituminous coal in West Virginia in 1750,
although initially it did not gain widespread popularity. There was no industry to
facilitate demand for it and the unpleasant smell it generated when burned made it
unsuitable for domestic use. From the late nineteenth century, however, the commercial
market for bituminous coal rapidly expanded. It played a key role in the industrial
development of the United States and, from the mid-twentieth century, in the provision of
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electrical power. The mining districts of northeastern Pennsylvania contain a hard-rock
coal called anthracite. The exact date of anthracite coal’s discovery is unclear, although
the Nantichoke Indians settled along the Susquehanna River started burning a form of
hard rock coal in the 1760s. Anthracite coal is cleaner. It burns more slowly and at a
higher temperature than bituminous coal, and until the 1920s it was widely used to heat
homes.70
As the coal industry developed, the differences between the bituminous region
and the anthracite region expanded beyond mere physical characteristics. In each region,
the geological composition of the coal determined mining practices, working conditions,
employers’ attitudes to health and safety, and the economic welfare of the miners. The
anthracite operators actively tried to prevent employees from organizing. They frequently
evicted union sympathizers from company homes. The absence of a strong union
presence meant that the miners worked longer hours and were paid less than their
bituminous counterparts. The anthracite coal mines also were more dangerous, with a
higher incidence of roof-falls, floods, toxic gases, and explosions. In the early twentieth
century, weak and ineffectual coal mine legislation prompted miners to improvise safety
measures, such as observing the behavior of the rats. Miners believed that rats were
susceptible to changes in the atmosphere, and they followed them if they suddenly darted
away.71

70

Thomas Dublin and Walter Licht, The Face of Decline: The Pennsylvania Anthracite
Region in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press); Barbara
Freese, Coal: A Human History (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 110-113
71

.

Freese, Coal, 138-139.

35
Appalachia has long exported its natural resources of coal and timber, yet the
profits from these resources have not provided the native people with a standard of living
equivalent to most other people in the nation.72 According to Raitz and Ulack, the
widespread poverty in the region constitutes ‘the paradox of Appalachia.’ There is an
“imbalance in fiscal well-being across a region of immense resource wealth.”73 Large
corporations from outside the region have exploited natural resources for short-term
profit, and their irresponsible use of these resources has contributed to many of the
region’s social and economic problems.74
Similarly, Barbara Smith argues that the poverty of the region did not, as the
Appalachian Regional Commission stated, stem from its geographical isolation, but
rather its exploitation by outside investors. She writes that the investors’ exploitation of
natural resources led to “the systematic development of underdevelopment: corporations
headquartered elsewhere drained off the region’s natural wealth, returning almost nothing
in tax revenues and exploiting the people as coal miners.”75 Smith interprets this
exploitation as part of a long historical process. Even in the nineteenth century, before the
onset of industrialization, she argues, most natives labored on farms owned by absentee
landowners. Yet, as a native Appalachian, Smith also cautions against creating a
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dichotomy of ‘us and them.’ There were and are prominent economic and social divisions
within the region.76
Finally, it is also necessary to examine the culture of Appalachia, particularly
religious faith, which played a significant role in the lives of coal miners and their
families. When disasters, such as explosions and roof falls, occurred, trapped miners
coped with the imminent threat of death by turning to religion. Similarly, religion was a
source of comfort for the families who congregated around mine entrances after a
disaster. According to Bill J. Leonard, “Religious life was, and to some extent remains, a
primary source of identity for many southern Appalachian people. It provided a place, a
source, of security in the face of poverty, disease, and the many unpredictable elements
of life.”77 Coal mine disasters were one such ‘unpredictable element of life,’ occurring on
a regular basis and profoundly shaping the religious faith of mining communities. In
Work and Faith in the Kentucky Coalfields: Subject to Dust, Richard Callahan explores
the relationship between coal miners and religious faith, arguing that miners’ labor
concerns “intertwined at a basic level with religious expression, sentiment, and
imagination in the coalfields of central Appalachia.”78 Callahan further maintains that the
broader labor movement in the United States could be defined as “a form of religious
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expression that has emerged from the struggle to express and meet particular concerns in
the context of industrial capitalism.”79
In Kentucky, religious meaning was embedded in the daily lives of coal miners
and their families. Preachers in mining communities often permitted the use of their
churches for union meetings, and regarded labor unions as the “worldly” counterpart to
the church. Callahan writes, “Work remained a fundamental human experience that
linked self, society, and the world, and extended into spiritual issues… Indeed, religion
itself is a form of work, involving constant production and reproduction with old and new
resources.”80 Religious belief helped miners to make sense of the realities they faced,
particularly the continuous threat of injury and death, the exploitation of their labor by
the coal operators, and the anxieties of their families. To adapt to their uncertain
circumstances and the obstacles of life in the coalfields, the Kentuckian coal miners
adopted their own religious idioms.81 Such idioms provided a ‘bodily experience’ to
tolerate the hard and dangerous physical labor of coal mining, while also connecting the
limitations of the body to “a more enduring and eternal dimension of life.”82
Miners’ adherence to religious ritual was by no means unique. In many industries
across Appalachia, religion was a fundamental part of workers’ daily lives. As Ken
Fones-Wolf explains in Glass Towns: Industry, Labor and Political Economy in
Appalachia, 1890-1930s, the church enabled glassworker families to integrate with the
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local community. Fones-Wolf presents the example of Joseph Martin, a flint who died at
the age of twenty-seven and was memorialized by several local organizations, including
the Cavalry Methodist Church.83 He also notes that churches were important for
establishing cohesion between immigrant glass workers and their communities.84

Chapter Outline
This study is organized thematically rather than chronologically. Chapter two
examines the origins and development of the West Virginia black lung movement. It
shows how three radical doctors, known as the Committee of Physicians on Miners’
Health and Safety, not only legitimized ‘black lung’ as a serious medical disease, but also
significantly increased public awareness of it. Their efforts, combined with the
catastrophic disaster at the Farmington mine in November 1968, led to the formation of
the West Virginia Black Lung Association (BLA). Through sustained grassroots protest,
which included a massive wildcat strike in the West Virginia coalfields in early 1969, the
organization convinced the state legislature to make black lung a compensable disease.
The chapter provides a case study of how community-driven protest in a single state
resulted in significant legislative change.
Chapter three widens the scope of the study, focusing on how the Farmington
disaster and the emergence of the black lung movement in West Virginia prompted the
federal government to reshape coal mine health and safety legislation. It explains how
President Richard Nixon’s political ideology and policymaking decisions hindered his
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administration’s efforts to reform working conditions in the coal industry. The chapter
also scrutinizes the legislative hearings in the United States Congress in the early months
of 1969. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate deliberated a number of draft
bills on coal mine health and safety, in a series of hearings that were beset by conflict and
tension. The hearings, as well as legislative debates in Congress in the summer and
autumn of that year, had a significant impact on the passage of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969. Chapter three also presents a separate narrative strand that
focuses on the conflict within the United Mine Workers of America. In May 1969, Joseph
Yablonski, a high-ranking union official, announced his intention to challenge W. A.
Boyle for the union presidency. His decision to contest President Boyle’s leadership had
significant implications for the union’s approach to health and safety issues. Boyle had
long neglected the interests of the rank and file, particularly with regard to working
conditions, while Yablonski made health and safety a key issue of his election campaign.
Chapter four considers the escalation of grassroots protest in the coalfields in
1970. On one level, this protest was directly connected to the United Mine Workers of
America. In April of that year, a group of dissident miners and organizers, responding to
the murder of UMW presidential candidate Joseph Yablonski, broke away from the union
to form an organization called Miners for Democracy (MFD). The new organization
sought to win the UMW presidency at the next election, with the goal of democratizing
the union and reforming its health and safety policies. On a wider level, rank and file
miners, along with their families and communities, protested the federal government’s
poor enforcement of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. The U.S. Bureau of
Mines, the Department of the Interior agency responsible for enforcing the act, was
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largely ineffective, while the Social Security Administration, which processed miners’
claims for federal black lung compensation, was encumbered by bureaucratic red tape.
Several key organizations facilitated the protest in the coalfields, including the
Association of Disabled Miners and Widows (DMWA), the Disabled Miners and
Widows of South West Virginia (DMW/SWV) and the revived Black Lung Association
(BLA), which began to operate as a national organization.
Chapter four will also discuss the mine health and safety hearings in the U.S.
Senate in August 1970, which were a direct response to the short-term failure of the 1969
Federal Mine Act. While the hearings concluded that the act’s failure was largely
attributable to the Bureau of Mines, they did not establish legislative solutions. Nixon’s
conservative approach to staffing the Bureau of Mines and the Department of the Interior
exacerbated the weaknesses of the Federal Mine Act. After dismissing Bureau director
John F. O’Leary, who miners and liberal politicians regarded as a strong proponent of
mine health and safety, Nixon waited several months before appointing a new director.
O’Leary’s successor, Elburt F. Osborn, outwardly supported strong enforcement
measures, but did not support his rhetoric with his actions. Ultimately, Nixon’s staff
policies were detrimental to coal miners’ welfare.
Chapter five will focus in depth on the U.S. Bureau of Mines from late 1970 to
the end of 1971, focusing in particular on coal miners’ perception of the agency. From
November 1970, local and district union leaders began to protest the Bureau’s health and
safety enforcement procedures at non-unionized mines. Many of the coal miners who
transferred from non-union mines to unionized operations informed their union leaders of
the Bureau’s lax inspection policies at their former places of employment. In response,
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the local and district representatives wrote letters to their Congressmen and high-level
UMW officials. They feared that if such accusations were true, then union employers
would be encouraged to ban the UMW from their mines. As the chapter shows, to a large
extent, miners’ allegations about the Bureau’s neglect of non-union mines were valid. In
December 1970, an explosion at the non-union Hyden mine in Kentucky killed 38 men.
A subsequent Congressional investigation attributed the disaster to the Bureau’s failure to
inspect the mine properly. With their suspicions seemingly confirmed, miners continued
to write letters of protest.
Chapter five also shows that the Bureau’s defects went beyond its neglect of nonunion mines. Bureau managers often overturned citations issued by inspectors for health
and safety violations, while many inspectors lacked the necessary training to carry out
their duties. The Department of the Interior’s extensive reorganization of the Bureau in
the spring of 1971 further undermined its ability to provide effective health and safety
enforcement. Miners conveyed their disdain towards the Bureau by writing letters of
protest to the agency’s director, Elburt F. Osborn. The Bureau’s performance finally
showed signs of improvement in late 1971. Because historians have yet to devote
attention to the Bureau of Mines in the early 1970s, chapter five is constructed almost
entirely from primary sources, notably letters from the United Mine Workers Safety
Division Office Files, oral interviews, archival documents, and newspapers.
Chapter six examines the resurgence of the national Black Lung Association
(BLA), particularly its efforts to amend the federal black lung benefits program.
Developing the analysis of the BLA in chapter four, the chapter discusses the
organizational tactics used by the organization, including its demonstrations against the
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Social Security Administration. The chapter also examines the factors that limited the
BLA’s organizational activities, including a lack of funding and dissension within and
between different local chapters. Most significantly, it shows how the Black Lung
Association’s lobbying campaign in Washington D.C., combined with extensive
Congressional hearings on the federal black lung program, led to the Black Lung
Amendments Act of 1972.
Furthermore, chapter six explains how the continuing deterioration of the United
Mine Workers’ health and safety policies, combined with the lack of democracy within
the union, resulted in two important changes. First, a legal ruling by the U.S. District
Court made it easier for miners to claim benefits to which they were entitled from the
union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund. Secondly, the Miners for Democracy won control
of the union in the 1972 election, displacing the Boyle regime and, over time, making the
union more attentive to the concerns of the rank and file. Finally, the chapter discusses
the major changes in the federal government’s health and safety enforcement policies in
1973. The Nixon administration, conscious of the Bureau of Mines’ poor record, created
a new agency, the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA), which was
responsible for enforcing health and safety. The Bureau was still responsible for research
into coal production and technology, a function it had maintained since its inception in
1910.
Chapter seven focuses on the impact of the energy crisis on miners, local
communities, and the environment. It takes as its starting point the Buffalo Creek disaster
of 1972, in which the collapse of a coal slag dam killed 125 people, injured hundreds
more, caused widespread homelessness, and contaminated the landscape with toxic
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chemicals. As the chapter shows, the Buffalo Creek disaster was indicative of the broader
environmental devastation caused by the coal industry in the early 1970s. During this
time, surface coal mining was becoming more widespread across Appalachia and the
western states, resulting in the erosion of mountains, the destruction of homes and
properties, and the pollution of valleys and streams, which conversely also caused serious
health problems among local communities. With oil becoming more costly and more
difficult to import, and domestic oil reserves declining, the United States increasingly
relied on coal for generating electrical power.
Chapter seven also considers how the energy crisis impacted miners laboring in
underground marginal mines. The renewed emphasis on coal as a source of energy meant
that operators were less attentive to health and safety. The hazards of such mines were
clearly emphasized by the Scotia disaster in Kentucky in 1976, which resulted in several
fatalities. In addition, the chapter will provide an overview of coal mine health and safety
under the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations. While the Carter
administration made important legislative changes that improved miners’ conditions,
most notably the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, the Reagan administration
engaged in a program of deregulation that undermined many of the gains miners had
made over the past decade. Ronald Reagan actively supported private business at the
expense of workers’ health and safety, and was responsible for a growing number of
injuries in the coal mining industry.
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Chapter 2
The Origins of Reform:
The Farmington Disaster and the West Virginia Black Lung Movement, 1968-1969
Introduction
On the morning of May 6, 1968, twenty-six miners entered the Gauley Coal and
Coke Company No. 8 mine at Hominy Falls, West Virginia. They divided into separate
groups and began working in different sections of the mine. The smaller group,
consisting of ten miners, unintentionally cut through a wall into an abandoned, waterfilled tunnel. They were quickly trapped in the path of the oncoming water. As millions
of gallons of water surged towards the other group, one miner was able to escape, while
fifteen managed to climb to safety in the higher reaches of the shaft.. Several hours later,
a miner in the group of fifteen contacted rescuers on the surface by telephone, informing
them that the air was safe to breathe. The rescuers became increasingly concerned,
though, for the remaining ten miners, who were still trapped in the deepest part of the
mine. Although two of those miners had telephoned the surface at 5.00 p.m., the rescuers
lost contact soon afterwards. The miner who escaped, 39-year old buggy operator Ernest
Fitzwater, told reporters that he suddenly was engulfed in water. He said, “It was about a
foot from the roof and rising fast. I grabbed this piece of yellow burlap and put it over my
face.” He continued, “By now, the buggy had jack-knifed… so it was all I could do to get
ahead of the water.”1
The Hominy Falls mine was located beneath a steep mountain around sixty miles
from Charleston, the state capital. The following day, the rescue team drilled an air vent
1
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into the mountain and sent food, oxygen, and blankets to the fifteen men on higher
ground using the mine’s conveyor belt. Company officials said it was unlikely that the
other ten miners had survived, as several sections of the mine floor were completely
filled with water. For the rescuers, bringing the trapped miners to the surface was a long,
arduous task. Engineers installed several water pumps at the mine site a few hours after
the disaster, but they were slow and ineffective. The company decided to install a larger,
high-capacity pump, but the engineers faced considerable problems drilling a 15-inch
hole in the mountain to accommodate it. It took more than twelve hours to install the
pump. By the third day of the rescue operation, the pumps had drained enough water
from the mine to allow rescuers to enter the shaft. Their initial efforts to reach the miners
were hampered by water seeping into the mine from another abandoned tunnel.
Eventually, on May 11, more than five days after the disaster, the rescue team made
contact with the 15 miners and led them back through the mine to safety.2
Relieved families greeted the miners at the entrance. Father-of-five Ottie Junior
Walton declared, “I knew we were going to get out. We prayed and sang and talked about
living a better life when we got out. We had a real religious bunch down there.” Another
man in the group told reporters that the miners had survived because of their refusal to
panic and shared sense of humor. Physicians who examined the men said that they were
in good physical condition, despite being confined to damp, airless conditions for several
days. Despite the recovery of the fifteen miners, many of the families at the mine
entrance were despondent, as the remaining ten miners had still not been found. They
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were presumed dead. Company president C. E. Richardson vowed to keep pumping water
from the mine until search teams located them.3
Several days later, on May 16, rescuers found six of the men alive deep inside the
mine. They had protected themselves from the rising water by constructing an emergency
barricade with roof timbers and canvas, and had survived for ten days by rationing the
contents of two lunch buckets and drinking scum-covered water. The other four men had
been swept to their deaths by the force of the water. Doctors at a local hospital were
surprised to find the miners in good physical shape and discharged all of them within 48
hours. The miners emphasized how discipline and teamwork had kept them alive. Eugene
Martin said, “At no time did any man try to leave and make it on his own.” Several of the
miners emphasized how religion had got them through their ordeal. From his hospital
bed, Joseph Fitzwater said, “I was a sinner when I went into that mine, but I came out a
Christian… Each day we grew weaker, but we kept our heads. We survived through the
grace of God. It was a miracle of God’s.”4
The deaths of four men at the Hominy Falls mine showed that coal mining in the
post-war United States remained a dangerous and hazardous occupation. The disaster also
highlighted a number of other characteristics of the United States coal industry in the late
1960s. First, it was indicative of coal miners’ resilience and ability to survive under harsh
conditions. Second, it showed that miners’ identities were deeply rooted in their local
communities.

The men who were trapped in the Hominy Falls mine for ten days

ultimately survived because they supported each other and envisioned life beyond the
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mine. The miners’ connection to their community was reflected by the disaster’s
emotional impact on their families and relatives. Those waiting on the surface at Hominy
Falls experienced an agonizing wait before they learned the fate of their loved ones.
Third, the story of coal mine health and safety up to the late 1960s had been one of
repeated failure. The Hominy Falls disaster emphasized that state mining codes and the
federal mine acts of 1941 and 1952 had done little to protect coal miners. It was precisely
this failure that set the stage for the Hominy Falls disaster and countless other small, yet
fatal, mine accidents across the country.
As bleak as circumstances seemed for Appalachian coal miners, the events at
Hominy Falls occurred at a turning point for health and safety regulation. In the late
1960s, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration was investigating ways to make coal
miners safer, while the media, including the burgeoning television networks, were giving
more coverage to mine health and safety. Moreover, coal miners were beginning to reject
W. Anthony (Tony) Boyle’s national leadership of the United Mine Workers in favor of
organizing at the local level. From 1968, such opposition was especially prominent in
West Virginia, where young workers with Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA)
and welfare rights activists advocated justice and equality for powerless members of
society, including the state’s coal miners. The activists were particularly concerned with
obtaining more stringent legislation and compensation for miners suffering from
pneumoconiosis, a debilitating, work-related lung disease otherwise known as ‘black
lung.’
The issue of black lung disease prompted a determined band of radical physicians,
liberal politicians, activists, local union leaders, and rank-and-file miners to create a
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separate organization called the West Virginia Black Lung Association (BLA) at the
beginning of 1969. Engaging in local, community-based organization, the BLA led a
massive strike across the coalfields in February and March 1969, which ultimately
persuaded the state legislature to introduce a compensation program for black lung
victims. As this chapter will highlight, the BLA’s achievements marked a crucial turning
point in the improvement of coal mine health and safety, not just at the state level, but
across the nation.

The “Discovery” of Black Lung Disease: Fiery Rhetoric and Union Apathy
The emerging mine activism in West Virginia started with a small band of
pioneering doctors and medical specialists. In the late 1960s, those physicians, working
largely outside the institutional settings of the U.S. Public Health Service and the coal
companies, brought visibility to one particular aspect of mine health and safety, a disease
called pneumoconiosis, otherwise known as ‘black lung.’ By far the most prominent was
60-year old Dr. Isidore E. Buff, a heart specialist from Charleston, West Virginia.
Buff had started to take an interest in coal miners’ lung disease when the
continuous mining machine came into widespread use in the Appalachian coalfields in
the early 1950s. Company doctors were increasingly sending him miners who had
collapsed as a result of the excessive dust generated by the new machinery. While the
company doctors typically diagnosed heart failure, Buff soon discovered that most were
victims of miners’ lung disease. Although Buff felt it was imperative that he learned
more about the connection between environmental conditions and lung disorders, he was
unable to obtain funding from either the U.S. Public Health Service or the Bureau of
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Mines to conduct a study.5 His inability to obtain support for the study reflected the
power of the coal operators, who had strong economic and political influence in
Washington, D.C. Buff also tried to create an educational program about the dangers of
coal mining for West Virginia high schools, but he was unsuccessful in this effort. He
had intended the program to function as a counterweight to an extensive, federally
supported recruitment campaign by the coal operators, but industry pressure ultimately
forced him to back down. Even as head of the West Virginia Air Pollution Control
Commission, a position he took in 1967, Buff struggled to convince the general public
about the environmental hazards of underground coal mining.6
By mid-1968, Buff had become the self-appointed leader of the emerging welfarerights movement in West Virginia. He became actively involved in the Poor People’s
Campaign. More significantly, he pressed for workers’ compensation for miners’ lung
disease. In defining miners’ lung disease, he abandoned the term ‘silicosis’ in favor of
‘black lung.’ Silicosis was a lung disease common among miners who worked in western
hard rock mines. He played to miners’ belief that the coal operators were destroying their
health.7 Buff argued that coal miners did not suffer from silicosis, a disease typically
caused by the inhalation of silica dust, but from a unique disease caused by coal dust. He
5
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quickly gained a reputation for his fiery rhetoric. The miners felt that they had found
someone who understood them and could communicate with them.
Just days after the Hominy Falls disaster, Buff spoke to around 100 miners at a
small local union hall in Clifftop, West Virginia. He showed them a picture of a normal
lung, then one of a lung afflicted by black lung disease, before breaking into an
impassioned speech:
Black lung is what’s killing all of you. But the company says you’re sick in the
head, shiftless, or stupid. They ask, ‘Don’t you care about your family?’ And
those cute little girls in miniskirts over at the welfare department feel your head
and say, ‘You’re not sick. Don’t you want to work?’ You believe them! But don’t
you know that they just don’t want to pay you compensation? You have a mind
like anyone else. You’re sick and the company knows it. But they won’t pay a
dime… The miners of this state ought to demand compensation and safer working
conditions. And if you don’t get them – use whatever means are necessary!” 8
As Buff worked to focus public attention on pneumoconiosis, two other
physicians were making important advances in the battle against black lung disease.
Pulmonologist Dr. Donald Rasmussen was carrying out research on miners’ lung disease
at the Miners’ Memorial Hospital in Beckley. Rasmussen had arrived in West Virginia in
1962 with no knowledge of black lung. Some internists drew his attention to the disease
when they asked him to perform medical evaluations on a group of miners. At an early
stage of his evaluations, Rasmussen realized that the miners exhibited breathing
difficulties, but X-rays, physical examinations, and even pulmonary function tests failed
to provide concrete evidence of lung disease. Electing to adopt a different approach,
Rasmussen carried out exercise studies and analyzed the miners’ arterial blood. He
obtained conclusive proof of lung disease from the first miner he examined, which
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prompted him to start investigating the disease in much greater depth. In order to obtain
the funding that was necessary to conduct further studies, Rasmussen transferred to the
local branch of the U.S. Public Health Service. He spent just over two years touring local
coal mines and conducting evaluations when the PHS cut off his funds and transferred his
research program to Morgantown University. Despite losing the federal government’s
support, Rasmussen and one of his colleagues, Earl Stafford, testified before
Congressional mine safety hearings on a regular basis.9
The other physician at work on miners’ lung disease was pathologist Dr. Hawey
Wells, director of a chest laboratory in a Pennsylvania hospital. He also taught medicine
at the University of West Virginia, Morgantown, and had worked with Rasmussen during
the early 1960s. Wells gained a thorough knowledge of the effects of coal dust on miners’
lungs by conducting autopsies. He was a strong advocate of black lung preventative
legislation and compensation and, like Isidore Buff, flamboyant and outspoken. He
frequently stood before audiences of miners and crumbled blackened lung tissue into
small pieces with his fingers, informing them that the same would happen to their lungs if
they were continuously exposed to high quantities of dust.10 In the summer of 1968, Buff,
Rasmussen, and Wells formed an alliance. They began collectively touring the coalfields
of West Virginia to emphasize the impact of pneumoconiosis on coal miners and their
families.
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Despite the physicians’ efforts, there was little progress in defining, treating, or
compensating miners’ occupational illnesses. In general, advancements in coal mine
health and safety faced significant obstacles, not least a union leadership that was bound
to the coal operators. In September 1968, UMW President W. Anthony (Tony) Boyle
used the union’s convention as an opportunity to consolidate his position as national
leader of the union. Despite recent mine accidents, and new medical findings, Boyle had
little interest in reform. In keeping with the 1964 convention in Florida, Boyle held the
1968 meeting far from the bituminous coalfields, in Denver, Colorado. He purposely
selected a distant location to restrict the attendance of rank-and-file miners who might
criticize his leadership. He also plundered union funds to provide financial incentives for
his supporters to attend the convention and circumvented the union’s constitution by
allowing the participation of “bogus” local unions. Under constitutional rules, local
unions had to have at least ten members to maintain active status within the national
organization. Despite the fact that at least 566 locals did not have enough members,
Boyle and his colleagues still permitted them to send delegates. The national leadership
supplied delegates for locals that were not able to provide them. It typically placed the
delegate on a committee and instructed him how to vote, with the promise of financial
reward.11
At the 1968 convention, delegates from across Appalachia passed several
resolutions concerning pneumoconiosis. Twelve of the resolutions called for
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compensation for miners disabled by lung impairments and advocated measures to
achieve it, such as overhauling workers’ compensation laws, increasing operators’
contributions to the union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund, and making operators
responsible for paying compensation directly to miners. The other six resolutions
advocated preventative measures, including dust suppression in mines and mandatory
dust limits. In an impassioned speech, Dr. Lorin Kerr of the UMW Welfare and
Retirement Fund urged the national leadership to become more actively involved in
health and safety issues. Boyle retorted that changes in mining laws could happen only at
the state level. He made Kerr read a resolution that called on all union districts to press
for legislation that would make pneumoconiosis eligible under workers’ compensation
laws. In the aftermath of the convention, however, Boyle and his colleagues abandoned
most of the health and safety resolutions that delegates had passed.12
The convention took place just before the union started contract negotiations with
the coal operators. The union’s 1966 contract with the Bituminous Coal Operators’
Association was scheduled to expire in early October 1968. On October 1, believing that
the contract had ended, over 10,000 bituminous coal miners in Appalachia engaged in a
wildcat strike. They were protesting what they perceived as the inadequacies of the 1966
contract, particularly the failure of Boyle and the coal operators to negotiate an increase
in the tonnage royalties that funded the UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund. For the
majority of miners, the WRF was the only available source of subsidized health care.
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Boyle, who was already negotiating the new contract with the BCOA, declared that the
strike was illegal, as the existing contract included a one-week grace period and thus did
not end until October 8. District union officers urged the men to return to work, but their
pleas went largely unheeded, as only a fraction of the miners resumed their jobs. The
strikers were joined on October 9 by thousands more coal miners who walked off the
job.13
By the time the union signed a new contract on October 14, 130,000 miners were
on strike. Boyle boasted that a wage increase of three dollars per day meant that the
contract was “the best ever negotiated by any union in history,” but the new contract did
not include higher royalty payments for the Welfare and Retirement Fund. Throughout
the negotiations, the coal operators had firmly refused to agree to such a provision. The
miners returned to work, as the national leadership of the United Mine Workers
continued to demonstrate its lack of commitment to better health care for coal miners.14
The Farmington Disaster: The Catalyst for Change
In mid-November, a horrific disaster intensified the nation’s focus on coal mine
health and safety. Shortly after 5:00 a.m., on November 20, 1968, an explosion ripped
through the Consolidation Company’s No. 9 mine in Farmington, West Virginia. It
destroyed the main entrance to the mine, trapping inside the majority of the 99 miners
who were on the nightshift at the time. Only 21 of those miners, working far from the
13
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source of the blast, managed to escape through portals and airshafts. A second explosion
followed just a few hours later, by which time anxious families and relatives had
descended on the site of the mine. In the days that followed, they kept a constant vigil at a
local church, as several more explosions hindered the efforts of rescue crews to locate the
trapped miners. On November 29, Consolidation President John Corcoran ordered rescue
crews to seal the mine to prevent further explosions. While few people on the mine site
believed the miners had survived the explosions, not least because surface tests showed
that lethal amounts of methane in the mine could not support human life, Corcoran’s
decision brought a sense of finality to their deaths. It also provoked mixed reactions
among the families and relatives of the miners. Some vehemently opposed the action
while others passively accepted it. “We knew it was coming, we knew there was nothing
else to do,” commented the wife of one of the trapped miners.15
The exact cause of the disaster was unclear. Investigators cited high levels of
methane, poor ventilation, and the accumulation of large quantities of combustible coal
dust as possible causes. During its inspections at the Farmington mine over the previous
six years, the Bureau of Mines had consistently discovered inadequate rock dusting. The
practice of rock dusting, a requirement of the 1952 Federal Mine Act, involved covering
the walls of underground mines with limestone to prevent the spread of combustible coal
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dust, thereby reducing the risk of explosions. Furthermore, the bureau had recorded an
additional 25 safety violations in the Farmington mine since 1966.16
Lewis E. Evans, Safety Director for the United Mine Workers of America
(UMWA), asserted that Consolidation had prioritized large profits over preventing
accidents. However, his view was not typical of the UMWA leadership. On the first day
of the catastrophe, Tony Boyle made a speech that, remarkably, defended Consolidation.
At the scene of the disaster he proclaimed, “I share the grief. I’ve lost relatives in a mine
explosion. But as long as we mine coal, there is always this inherent danger of
explosions. This happens to be, in my judgment as President of the United Mine Workers
of America, one of the better companies to work with as far as cooperation and safety is
concerned.” William Poundstone, Consolidation’s executive vice-president, echoed
Boyle’s claims by arguing that his company followed lawful practices and was not
therefore responsible for the disaster.
Assistant Secretary of the Interior J. Cordell Moore, one of Washington’s most
influential mine legislators, provided further support for the company during a brief trip
to Farmington. “We have tried our very best to make mines safe and I think the company
has done all in its power to make the mine safe,” he declared. “Unfortunately, these
things happen – we don’t understand why they happen, but they do happen.” The
comments of the men who vindicated Consolidation Coal provoked outrage among the
relatives of the victims. Judy Henderson, widowed at the age of just 21 as a result of the
disaster, had particular contempt for Boyle. “I hated him right then,” she later
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remembered.” I couldn’t believe someone could say that right in front of the mine where
all our husbands were buried alive.”17
The Farmington disaster exacted a heavy toll on the local community. Of the 78
miners who died, 73 were married and 55 had dependent children.18 One of the deceased
miners, Hartsel L. Mayle, left behind a wife and 13 dependent children.19 While the
widows were distraught at the loss of their husbands, they also were determined to fight
for changes to federal mine legislation. Representative Ken Hechler (D-WV) agreed to
meet with the widows shortly after the disaster occurred, assuming he would be giving
them consolation and emotional support. The widows, however, displayed a resilient
attitude. They demanded that he take immediate action to prevent future disasters and the
conditions that resulted in black lung disease. They implored him, “You’re a
Congressman, why don’t you do something about this?” 20
First elected to Congress in 1958, Hechler had long been an advocate of safer coal
mines. During his inaugural term in office, shortly after the completion of the 1960
census, the West Virginia legislature redrew the state’s Congressional districts. Under the
17
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United States Constitution, state legislatures were required to engage in redistricting after
every ten-year census, in order to democratize the election process for the U.S. House of
Representatives. As part of the West Virginia redistricting, the state legislature removed
Tyler County from Hechler’s control and gave him authority over Logan County instead.
The redrawing of county boundaries actually facilitated Hechler’s re-election in
November 1960, as Tyler County was traditionally a Republican County, whereas Logan
County leaned more towards the Democratic Party. Moreover, it prompted Hechler’s
involvement in coal mine health and safety. While there were no coal mines in Tyler,
there were several in Logan County, which meant that many of his new constituents were
coal miners and their families. As a Congressman, Hechler became aware of the
problems and injustices that workers in the coal industry faced.21
The re-election of Lyndon B. Johnson to the U.S. Presidency in 1964 further
advanced Hechler’s interest in coal miners’ welfare. President Johnson sought to tackle
mine health and safety head on with preventative legislation, in contrast to his
predecessor, John F. Kennedy, who had adopted a relatively passive approach. President
Kennedy’s administration had only provided relief for mine disaster victims after the fact,
instead of advocating preventative measures. In Hechler’s own words, Kennedy, “instead
of putting a fence around the cliff, put an ambulance in the valley.” Hechler cited
President Johnson’s introduction of a draft bill on mine health and safety to Congress in
September 1968 as a signal event, despite the fact that only he and two other
Congressmen supported it.22
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By the time he met the Farmington widows, Hechler was knowledgeable about
the issues affecting miners. The meeting prompted him to become more active in coal
mine policy and legislative issues.23 In a written statement, dated November 25, 1968,
Hechler proclaimed, “Coal miners don’t have to die. In a civilized society, it is nothing
short of criminal to allow the present conditions to continue in the coal mines.”24 He
contended that federal and state mine safety laws were weak and hindered by
bureaucratic obstacles, that most companies had advance warnings of inspections, and
that dust levels in mines were unacceptably high. He further argued that miners accepted
the constant risk of death and injury, while Congress and the general public were
apathetic to the dangers of coal mining. Hechler was particularly scathing toward mine
company officials and union leaders who claimed they were doing all in their power to
protect miners. The nation had a duty, asserted Hechler, to push Congress for more
effective mine safety legislation.25
The Department of the Interior, meanwhile, was hastily planning a conference on
mine health and safety in response to the Farmington disaster. Two weeks after the mine
first exploded, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall announced that the conference
would take place on December 12, with the participation of members of Congress,
industry representatives, and union leaders. Udall stated, “We are looking into ways in
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which we can better discharge our current responsibilities under existing law, and are
considering what additional legislation is needed to provide practical remedies for the
hazards to which our miners are exposed.”26 Udall’s announcement prompted an outbreak
of activity at the offices of the United Mine Workers. President Boyle instructed several
delegates, including Safety Director Lewis Evans, to collate evidence that would enable
the union to retract Udall’s charges that it “had not done enough in the field of safety,”
and to show conference attendees that it had “been the crusading force in improved safety
in the coal mines of [the United States].”27 Boyle was reacting to the increased national
focus on the UMW in the aftermath of the Farmington disaster. The union was now under
pressure to justify its contributions to coal mine health and safety.
The substantial media coverage of the Farmington disaster also heightened public
awareness of West Virginia miners and the black lung movement. After the initial
explosions, reporters from national newspapers and television networks descended on the
local community. For almost a week, renowned anchorman Walter Cronkite presented a
nightly segment on the events at Farmington, as the nation waited in suspense for news
about the entombed miners. Given that nearly all the trapped men in the Hominy Falls
disaster had escaped the mine alive, there was initially hope that the Farmington miners
might also survive. For long periods of time, however, there was nothing for the media to
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report. While awaiting news of the trapped miners’ fates, journalists started to investigate
other aspects of miners’ lives. Isidore Buff capitalized on the media’s presence by
informing them about black lung and its harmful effects on miners. He had no
compunction about criticizing the coal operators, the UMW, and the Bureau of Mines.28
In his book Forcing the Spring, Robert Gottlieb argues that the Farmington
disaster only “tangentially affected the black lung movement,” but he fails to take into
consideration the highly visible campaign orchestrated by Buff and others in the
aftermath of the disaster. 29 Moreover, Gottlieb ignores the fact that in underground coal
mines immediate safety risks and long-term health hazards were interconnected. The
deaths and injuries caused by explosions and the lung disease caused by coal dust were
both reflections of weak legislation and the disregard of coal operators and federal and
state governments to miners’ welfare. Furthermore, coal dust was both a cause of
explosions and serious lung disease in the miners who toiled in underground mines.
In the aftermath of the disaster, Buff, Wells, and Rasmussen intensified their
efforts to increase awareness of black lung disease. They brought a more formal nature to
their partnership by establishing the Committee of Physicians on Mine Health and Safety.
The committee toured the West Virginia coalfields extensively, talking to miners about
the effects of the disease and the need for preventative legislation and compensation. Buff
typically spoke first, much to the chagrin of Rasmussen, who frequently disapproved of
his frenzied, inaccurate speeches. In a booming voice, Buff told the miners, “You’ve all
28
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got black lung! You’re all gonna die!”30 Rather than accept such rhetoric with silent
fatalism, most miners broke into loud shouts and applause. Buff sometimes exaggerated
the proportion of miners who had the disease, claiming on some occasions that four fifths
of West Virginia miners were afflicted by it.31 Like Buff, Hawey Wells relied on theatrics
to highlight the threat posed by the disease. He continued to stand before miners and
crumble lung tissue from deceased black lung victims between his fingers. Rasmussen’s
research had demonstrated that not every miner was susceptible to black lung. After Buff
and Wells had finished playing to the emotions of the audience, Rasmussen was left to
discuss the disease in more scientific, grounded terms. This was often a difficult task, as
the miners were often still clapping and cheering for Buff.32
Craig Robinson, a law graduate working in West Virginia with the Volunteers in
Service to America (VISTA), collaborated with local unions to organize the physicians’
appearances.33 With the help of his colleague Rick Bank, he used the dialogue that
emerged from the meetings to draft changes to the West Virginia compensation law.
Robinson and Bank formulated the new changes on the presumption that miners who had
worked underground for a significant length of time should automatically receive

30

Donald Rasmussen, interview with author, August 21, 2008.

31

Derickson, Black Lung, 148.

32

Donald Rasmussen, interview with author, August 21, 2008.

33

For a detailed account on the emergence and development of Volunteers in Service to
America (VISTA), see Ronald D. Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 90-176.

.

63
compensation from the state. The miners embraced this idea, for they had long
recognized that working underground diminished their labor capacity.34
The West Virginia state legislature responded to the Farmington disaster by
holding a hearing from December 5 to 7, 1968. Representatives from the U. S. Bureau of
Mines, the West Virginia Department of Mines, the United Mine Workers of America,
and the Mountaineer Coal Company, the subsidiary of Consolidation responsible for
operating the Farmington mine, gathered in the Federal Building in Fairmont to
deliberate the cause of the disaster. Several of the miners who survived the disaster, or
who had not been on shift when it happened, testified at the hearing, giving their
perspective on the working conditions in the mine. Although preliminary evidence
showed that a dangerous accumulation of methane gas had caused the disaster, the
miners’ conflicting testimonies only served to complicate the investigation into what
happened at Farmington.
Lawrence Riggs, the General Superintendent of the No. 9, asserted early in his
testimony that rock dusting procedures in the mine were adequate. As questioning
progressed, however, he implied that the procedures for monitoring methane levels in the
mine were flawed. When Frank C. Memmott, the Associate Director of Health and Safety
in the Bureau of Mines asked Riggs to describe his experience with methane monitors, he
responded, “We had a methane monitor in 6 right, 7 south, and in main west, and I
believe they were both operating. I wouldn’t make that for a face, but I believe they
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were.”35 Quickly trying to cover up any sense of hesitation or doubt, Riggs stated that
neither the mine’s own inspection staff nor the inspectors from the Bureau of Mines had
found problems with the monitors. He further claimed, “… I’ve watched them operate
lots of times, and I never did see an operator continue to run when those meters showed
that there was methane in there.”36
Walter Slovekosky, a main-line motorman, cited his belief that section managers
had too many responsibilities to carry out their duties effectively. He said, “Well, one of
our problems that I have thought for a long time, especially in our mines, has been the
fact that a section boss isn’t really a section boss. He has a belt system to look after and
he has everything else to look after and he doesn’t really have the time to spend on the
section to be sure that the section is safe. I know that to be a very real fact.”37 Asked by
Memmot if the section managers gave utmost priority to safety, Slovekosky responded, “I
would say that although that boss may have safety at heart and maybe that was what he
was wanting and worrying about, it’s not something that he can look after continually
like he should and spend time right there on his own section with his own men at the
working face…”38 Ralph Starkey, who was responsible for running the loading machine,
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further cast doubt on operating procedures in the mine. He said that there could have been
better dust control on the continuous mining machine. In contrast to the testimony given
by Riggs, he also emphasized his belief that there could have been more rock dusting in
the mine.39
A common theme emerged from the testimonies given at the hearing. All of the
witnesses questioned indicated there were irregularities or flaws with safety procedures in
the No. 9 mine, but they appeared reluctant to discuss them in great detail. Their
hesitation reflected that the balance of power in the coalfields still favored the coal
operators and their supporters in the United Mine Workers. The presence of a legal
assistant from the Mountaineer Coal Company on the interrogation panel was hardly
conducive to establishing an accurate testimony from the miners. Moreover, the
witnesses were reluctant to acknowledge that the disaster could have been prevented. The
delegates concluded the hearing without establishing a definitive cause for the disaster.
The federal government was concerned not only with determining the cause of the
disaster, but also its wider implications for coal mine health and safety. To that end, the
Interior Department’s conference on mine safety opened in Washington D.C. on
December 12. In his opening speech, Stewart Udall placed much of the onus for
improving underground working conditions on management and labor. He told attendees,
“The Federal Government can establish the standards and assist in the process through
inspections and training, but, in the last analysis, management and labor must see to it
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that good safety practices are observed.”40 Udall clearly envisioned a limited role for the
federal government in the enforcement of mine regulations. He also realized, however,
that it was necessary to modify the operating practices of the Bureau of Mines, as it did
not do enough to enforce safe working conditions. He recommended giving the Bureau
more power to carry out surprise inspections and the authority to shut down mines that
were particularly unsafe. A further, crucial measure for Udall was the passage of
President Johnson’s 1968 mine health and safety bill, albeit with a few modifications,
including the addition of minimum dust standards for coal mines. Secretary Udall also
highlighted the need for non-legislative measures, such as better training for mine
inspectors.41
In his statement to the conference, Consolidation Coal President John Corcoran
cautiously admitted that the Farmington disaster reflected the inadequacy of the
company’s safety enforcement practices, despite its commitment to reducing
underground fatalities. He assured the delegates that ‘Consol’ was re-evaluating its
operating procedures and that its first priority was the welfare of its employees: “There
can be no question that the health and safety of employees in the coal mining industry
must be given first priority… Our trained and experienced employees constitute our most
valuable resource and the protection of their health and safety is an absolute prerequisite
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to the successful and continued operation of our business.”42 Corcoran indicated that he
would support changes to health and safety laws, so long as the federal government
actively reinforced them. In doing so, he indirectly challenged Udall’s assertion that the
federal government should have only a limited role in safety enforcement.43
UMW President Tony Boyle brought a large entourage of fellow union officers to
the mining safety conference, to ensure an appreciative audience for his speech.44 From
the outset, Boyle sought to exaggerate the union’s contribution to coal mine health and
safety legislation. In a protracted discussion of the history of mine legislation during the
twentieth century, he exaggerated and misrepresented the union’s role. For instance, he
credited the union as a major influence in the creation of the Bureau of Mines in 1910,
while underplaying the role of the federal government. He completely ignored the impact
of public and media pressure in the wake of the 1907 Monongah mining disaster.45 In
fact, Boyle credited the UMW with the passage of all previous mine health and safety
laws, including the 1952 Federal Mine Safety Act and the 1966 law that extended the
terms of the 1952 legislation to small mines.46
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The Department of the Interior conference was more than a forum for the
discussion of coal mine health and safety; it was nothing less than a contest over who was
responsible for protecting the nation’s miners. Moreover, Boyle’s manipulation of his
leadership position, and his contempt for the rank-and-file, meant that the average coal
miner was not represented at the conference. The Department of the Interior, therefore,
was unable to assess the impact of federal legislation on miners’ working conditions, or
miners’ interpretation of the legislation.
From mid-December, Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary, conscious of the
measures advocated by Udall at the conference, adopted a stronger approach to enforcing
mine safety. He instructed Bureau inspectors to make unannounced spot-checks on mines
and to close any that posed an immediate risk to miners’ health and safety. Stewart Udall
had appointed O’Leary in late October, just prior to the Farmington disaster, as part of his
drive to reform conditions in the mines. Although the Bureau had gained the authority to
shut down mines after the passage of the Federal Mine Act in 1952, it rarely used this
power. O’Leary’s new policy, therefore, marked an important shift in the Bureau’s role in
regulating the coal industry.47 The Bureau’s more active role in mine policy did not have
an immediate effect. Throughout 1968, a total of 98 miners in the bituminous coal
industry died from roof falls or collapses of the mine face or ribs, four more than the
previous year. The 1968 fatality rate represented 0.67 casualties per million man-hours
worked, and 36.7 percent of the total underground bituminous fatalities. The 1967 fatality
rate for roof falls and face and rib collapses represented 0.63 casualties per million manhours worked, although a larger proportion of the total bituminous fatality rate, at 56.6
47
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percent. Thus, even discounting the Farmington disaster, safety in bituminous coal mines
was worse in 1968 than it had been the previous year.48
The Farmington disaster not only resulted in stronger enforcement policies by the
federal government and increased activism by the black lung movement. It also prompted
consumer advocate Ralph Nader to campaign for tougher legislation. A graduate of
Harvard Law School, Nader had established a visible public profile through his recent
investigation of automobile safety. In his 1965 book Unsafe At Any Speed, he criticized
the safety of many American cars, particularly General Motors’ Chevrolet Corvair.49
Nader described the Corvair as “one of the greatest acts of industrial irresponsibility in
the present century.”50 Most notably, the Corvair’s swing-axle rear suspension
occasionally caused the car to spin out of control or roll over. General Motors responded
to Nader’s claims by conducting extensive investigations of his private life and hiring
undercover detectives to follow him.51 Nader sued the company for $26 million for
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invasion of privacy, and eventually won a settlement of $425,000.52 His investigation led
to the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966.53
Nader became involved in coal mine health and safety after learning of Dr. Buff’s
travels through Appalachia.54 He had already demonstrated his commitment to the issue
by pressing the Johnson administration to overhaul federal mining legislation. He also
published an article on black lung, entitled “They’re Still Breathing,” in The New
Republic. In the article, Nader criticized the U.S. Public Health Service’s lack of attention
to black lung disease, as well as the federal government’s failure to enforce coal mine
health and safety laws.55 Moreover, Nader argued, “both the operators and officials of the
United Mine Workers are more concerned about the problems of competing energy
sources and anti-air pollution drives than the slow death in the mines. UMW hospitals are
available for the sick worker but the UMW seems far less interested in the toxic
environment of the mines.”56 In essence, Nader argued, the coal operators and the United
Mine Workers were more concerned with maintaining the financial profits of the coal
industry than miners’ welfare.
As 1968 drew to a close, Nader escalated his campaign for better coal mining
conditions. In a letter to Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Nader argued that pneumoconiosis was the “major public health problem in several states
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-- especially West Virginia and Kentucky.” He attributed a large degree of responsibility
for this problem to the coal operators, the Bureau of Mines, and the United Mine
Workers, but he was particularly critical of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. He argued that the department’s Division of Occupational Health had failed to
capitalize on a study of black lung it had conducted more than a decade earlier. Nader
wrote, “The $5 million in appropriations that the Department has received since 1953 for
research on the causes and prevention of soft coal workers’ pneumoconiosis has little to
show for itself, apart from the afore-mentioned prevalence study and the aborted research
effort at Beckley, West Virginia.” The Department, therefore, had failed to devise
effective preventative measures for black lung disease, even though it had received
substantial funding to do so. As Nader pointed out, it had abandoned its research on the
disease at its health field station for miners in Beckley. He asserted the department’s
failings were the result of “poor management, petty bureaucratic in-fighting, and a wellknown belief by the physician in charge of the research program that a safe dust level for
coal mines could not be set because of political and economic factors.” According to
Nader, the physician in question, Dr. Murray Brown, placed the coal industry’s financial
interests ahead of his scientific obligations to miners.57
Nader proposed that a group of impartial observers should carry out an
investigation of the Department’s mismanagement of the program. He argued that the
investigation should address several specific issues, including the closure of the miners’
health field station in Beckley and the department’s failure to use its only qualified
57
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mining engineer in the investigation of underground dust levels.58 Nader also used the
letter as an opportunity to criticize the medical profession’s role in the black lung crisis.
He reiterated a comment made to him by Dr. Lorin Kerr, that physicians’ general
indifference was “one of the greatest disgraces in modern medicine.”59 Nader’s
intervention gave the miners a powerful new ally, and increased national attention on
black lung disease.
Even so, beyond the United Mine Workers’ mismanaged and under-funded
Welfare and Retirement Fund, there was little financial relief available for miners. Only
Pennsylvania, Alabama, and Virginia provided state compensation for coal miners
suffering from black lung. Outside those states, sick miners could claim social insurance
benefits, but they were administered through a set of tough and often unrealistic criteria.
In order to receive benefits, miners typically had to demonstrate the quantity and
chemical composition of the dust they had inhaled throughout their working life. Coal
miners in West Virginia fared particularly badly, as only silicosis, and not
pneumoconiosis, was classified as a compensable miners’ disease. Local branches of the
UMW had pushed to expand workers’ compensation laws in 1964 and again in early
1968, but without success. 60

58

Ibid., 2.

59

Ibid.

60

Derickson, Black Lung, 144.

.

73
The West Virginia Black Lung Association (BLA) and Community Activism
In early January 1969, a handful of rank-and-file miners in West Virginia formed
the Black Lung Association (BLA).61 Lacking the support of the UMWA national
leadership and the mine owners, they believed that any movement for change had to stem
from the miners themselves. The Committee of Physicians played an instrumental part in
the creation of the organization, which intended to press the West Virginia legislature for
the addition of pneumoconiosis to the state workers’ compensation law. Charles Brooks,
president of the Winifrede local branch of the UMW in West Virginia, became the
association’s first president. Brooks mortgaged his home to help raise the $10,000 needed
to hire a lawyer for the new organization, while other local union branches across the
state engaged in fund-raising efforts. The BLA appointed attorney Paul Kaufman, a
former state senator, to draft legislation and provide legal support. He immediately
drafted new black lung compensation bill with the assistance of Craig Robinson and Rick
Bank. The draft contained the radical clause that any miner with a breathing impairment
was presumed to have work-related pneumoconiosis. It also proposed that doctors should
be able to use evidence other than X-rays to prove the existence of the disease and that
those afflicted with the disease should be allowed to sue their employers for damages.62
The Black Lung Association met for the first time on Saturday, January 4, 1969, at
the community center in Vivian, West Virginia. Dr. Isidore Buff told an audience of 450
miners, “You get a black lung from working in the mines, not from cigarettes, not from
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tobacco.”63 Buff was arguing against propaganda issued by coal companies, conservative
politicians, and several physicians, that black lung was not a legitimate disease and
miners’ lung ailments were the result of cigarette smoking. The association concluded its
first meeting by scheduling a statewide demonstration for January 26 in Charleston. In
the aftermath of that first meeting, the BLA spread throughout the West Virginia
coalfields. The Committee of Physicians continued to play an important role in
mobilizing support. Speaking to miners at Park Junior High School on January 18, Buff
drew cheers of applause as he denounced the influence of major railroad and mining
companies on the coal industry and promised changes to the existing compensation laws.
He urged audience members to attend the meeting scheduled to take place in Charleston
at the end of the month. Robinson and local union leaders also organized Black Lung
Association meetings throughout South West Virginia, to inform miners’ about the
campaign for compensation and the forthcoming meeting in Charleston.64
On January 26, over 3,000 miners attended the BLA’s first statewide meeting at
the Charleston Civic Center. They were joined by a number of significant people,
including Ken Hechler, Paul Kaufman, and the three doctors from the Committee of
Physicians. Sixty year-old James Wyatt, a pneumoconiosis victim, opened the meeting by
performing his own song, “Black Lungs.” Accompanied by a guitarist, and struggling to
breathe throughout, Wyatt encapsulated the decline in health that countless miners
experienced during their working lives:
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A young miner’s lungs may be hearty and hale
When he enters the mine with his dinner pail
But coal dust and grime
In a few years time
Fills up his lungs and they begin to fail
Black lungs, full of coal dust
Coal miners must breathe it or bust
Black lungs, gasping for breath
With black lungs we are choking to death.65
The song, which truly captured the impact of pneumoconiosis on coal miners, set the tone
for the speeches that followed.
Ken Hechler read a message to the coal miners from consumer advocate Ralph
Nader, who was unable to attend the rally. Hechler had agreed to read the message after
meeting Nader in the office of Congressman James O’Hara of Michigan a few days
earlier. Nader’s message accused Tony Boyle and his colleagues of abandoning the
miners at their time of need:
The record is overwhelming that Mr. Tony Boyle has neglected his responsibility
to protect coal miners… You may conclude that he is no longer worthy of being
your leader, that you need new leadership that will fight for your rights and not
snuggle up close to the coal operators and forget about the men who are paying
the dues and paying the price.66
This bold assertion crystallized what had long been apparent, that there was a massive
gulf between the national union leadership and the rank-and-file on the issues of black
lung and mine safety. In the hope of addressing the union’s failure, those present
unanimously passed a resolution calling on Boyle to assist the West Virginia miners in
their fight for improved legislation. In addition to reading out Nader’s message, Hechler
65
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gave his own speech, in which he publicly condemned the West Virginia Medical
Association for giving him a document with the slogan, “Black Lung is Good for You.”
In response, the Congressman produced a 12-pound slab of baloney from his bag and
shouted, “That is baloney,” to the cheers of the miners. Hechler also criticized those who
argued that prolonged studies of black lung were necessary before the introduction of a
new compensation program.67
Donald Rasmussen spoke of the need to disseminate knowledge among the state’s
physicians. He argued that doctors in Kanawha and Cabell counties had passed
resolutions condemning the Committee of Physicians on Mine Health and Safety only
because they did not fully understand the nature of black lung disease: “Part of our
problem is the lack of education of physicians in West Virginia in modern techniques. If
it takes too long to educate the doctors, we will educate the miners and the legislators.”
Rasmussen did not trust the medical profession to identify black lung in miners. He
envisioned miners and legislators playing an important role in the diagnosis of the
disease.68
Isidore Buff was less critical of the medical profession. To loud applause, he
thundered, “There is no person more dedicated in the country than the country doctor or
the general practitioner… The country doctor likes people, but some specialists don’t like
people. Specialists work for the coal companies.” Buff, therefore, believed that
independent doctors, who were not under the influence of the coal companies, had an
important role to play in diagnosing black lung disease. Showing the audience slides of
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blackened lungs, Buff reiterated what he had long been saying: “There are many coal
miners who think they have heart disease, but they have lung disease.”69 As he continued
his speech, Buff also repeated his assertion that the coal workers had to empower
themselves to achieve legislative change.70 Paul Kaufman also spoke at the event. He
explained to the miners the features of the bill he had drawn up with Robinson and Bank.
Although not present at the meeting, UMW President Boyle denounced the
miners as “black-tongue loudmouths.” He claimed that the Black Lung Association was a
“dual organization.” This was a serious charge, as it jeopardized the activists’
membership in the United Mine Workers. Under the union’s constitution, members could
be expelled for participating in other unions or external organizations.71 Boyle’s
criticisms, however, did little to detract from the success of the meeting. The gathering at
Charleston reflected the Black Lung Association’s ability to mobilize West Virginia’s
miners. It was also indicative of the discontent and anger that had long been simmering
beneath the surface in the state’s coalfields. The BLA gave the miners a focal point for
their anger, and it demonstrated its potential to invoke real legislative change. In his
pivotal study, Black Lung Disease: Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster, Alan Derickson
argues that the Charleston rally enabled the BLA’s members and supporters to realize the
strength of the movement they were building, and showed that high-profile political and
medical figures were willing to support the miners’ cause. Moreover, he contends, the
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rally increased the miners’ trust of the Committee of Physicians on Mine Health and
Safety.72
The Charleston demonstration reflected the groundswell of support for black lung
compensation in West Virginia. In addition to pneumoconiosis, however, coal miners still
faced the kind of safety hazards that had resulted in the Farmington disaster and countless
other mine catastrophes. The lack of progress in addressing such hazards became
apparent just two days after the Charleston demonstration, when, on January 28, rescue
workers pulled twelve men from the burning Humphrey No. 7 mine in Mount Morris,
Pennsylvania. The mine, owned by Consolidation Coal, had caught fire after a roof
collapse triggered an electrical fault. On this occasion, there were no fatalities, although
one man was treated at hospital for smoke inhalation and exhaustion. In addition to the
twelve men who were rescued, another 126 miners escaped the shaft using elevators and
safety bucket hoists. During its last three inspections of the mine, the Bureau of Mines
had uncovered more than 100 safety violations. It dismissed the violations as common
occurrences for an underground mine, and did not compel the owner to address them. The
fire’s occurrence in the face of those violations demonstrated that the bureau lacked any
real regulatory will.73
Despite the high fatality rate emanating from disasters and safety failures, the
Black Lung Association’s sole priority was tougher preventative legislation and
compensation for black lung disease. Its focus on a single issue was its greatest strength,
contributing to its ability to mobilize a broad coalition of support. Even so, the
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association still faced an uphill climb to achieve its goals. Events in early February 1969
reiterated the challenge that the association and its supporters faced. First, Stephen G.
Young, Vice President of the West Virginia Coal Association, accused the organization
and its supporters of “clowning around.” In a thinly veiled attack against Buff,
Rasmussen, and Wells, Young said the vast majority of physicians were more concerned
with establishing scientific, medical facts about pneumoconiosis than spreading
mistruths. Second, a joint hearing between the West Virginia Senate Judiciary Committee
and its counterpart in the House of Delegates on February 11, while giving a public
forum to the reformers, did not result in immediate change to the legislation, despite the
strength of their evidence.74
Dr. Murray Hunter, director of the UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund clinic in
Fairmont, attended the February 11 hearing with a panel of “expert” witnesses, while the
Committee of Physicians and UMW leaders put aside their differences to present a united
front. Thousands of miners also missed work to attend the hearing in Charleston.
Hunter’s panel opened the hearing by stressing their desire to make compensation more
widely available. In Hunter’s view, Buff’s term “black lung” was medically inaccurate,
but useful because of the attention it had generated for pneumoconiosis.

Welsh

pathologist Jethro Gough bolstered the panel’s claim by testifying that lung diseases other
than silicosis affected miners, and that ‘simple’ coal workers’ pneumoconiosis – that is,
pneumoconiosis that had not reached an advanced stage – could be disabling. Radiologist
Eugene Pendergrass, meanwhile, reiterated the assertion that Rasmussen had long been
making, that X-rays were an inadequate method of detecting black lung. The advocates of
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reform were so forceful in their arguments that their opponents had a hard time
presenting their own case, particularly when it emerged that one of them, Rowland Burns,
was being paid by the coal operators to testify.75
Although the West Virginia state legislature was deliberating several legislative
bills that provided workers compensation for the victims of pneumoconiosis, it was slow
to enact legislative change. Growing resentment in the coalfields, however, quickly led to
industrial action. On Tuesday, February 18, 1969, at the East Gulf mine in Raleigh
County, 282 miners walked off the job after a dispute with the management. As the strike
quickly spread across West Virginia, the miners demanded the state legislature’s swift
passage of the new black lung legislation. One man threatened, “If necessary, we will
stop every lump of coal in the state until we get this legislation through… We support the
state and the federal government with our taxes. It’s time we did something for our
benefits.” Two days after the walkout began, the strike had already escalated to 5,000
miners. Its rapid growth was largely attributable to the roving pickets that traveled around
the state’s coalfields. Although the BLA had not started the strike, it supported the
miners. Ken Hechler and Paul Kaufman, in contrast, opposed the walkout, believing the
action was premature. By the weekend, 30,000 miners across the state were staying away
from work in protest over the state legislature’s failure to respond to their concerns. Coal
production had stopped in the southern part of the state, while many of the northern
mines had temporarily shut down.76
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On Sunday, February 23, a large crowd of miners gathered for a meeting at the
local union hall in Affinity, Raleigh County. Five hundred crammed into the hall, while
another 700 waited outside in the snow. The large attendance meant that the speakers,
which included the Committee of Physicians, state delegates Warren McGraw and Ted
Stacy, and BLA representatives, had to climb in and out of a window in the hall to
address both groups. At the meeting, Buff roused the miners with another fiery speech,
extolling them to fight for the compensation they deserved. Ernest Riddle, the BLA
treasurer, then spoke of black lung as a disease that affected entire families, not just
individual miners:
We appreciate every bit of support, we appreciate everything we see here today.
And we know that everybody that’s got a father – each and every one of you –
when Dad comes home in the evening and he can’t breathe, you know what’s
a-hurtin’ him [“Yes, sir,” “That’s right”]. And a woman that’s living with a man
and seeing him slowly die, nobody has to tell her. Nobody has to explain to them
babies what was wrong with Daddy that he couldn’t get his breath at night…”77
Riddle recognized that many families were familiar with the physical symptoms of black
lung disease, and thus had an important role to play in the black lung movement. In
Digging Our Own Graves, Barbara Smith argues that while the meeting at Raleigh
County was disorganized and unfocused, it enabled the black lung leaders to lay the
foundations for a march on the state Capitol on February 26, the purpose of which was to
pressure state legislators into signing their black lung bill. Later that evening, a roving
picket stopped the midnight shift at several mines across West Virginia.78
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As a result of the growing agitation among the miners, there was a tense
atmosphere in the state Capitol. A number of legislators were hostile to the Black Lung
Association leaders and their demands for legislative change. Harry Pauley, a member of
the House of Delegates, was especially critical of Ken Hechler:
Hechler is a celibatic, misogynic, extrovert putting himself before the public at
every opportunity. He is a political acrobat who would swing by his tail, if he had
one, on the flagpole in front of a polling place to get attention. He is like a jackass
who becomes lonely at night for attention and keeps the neighbors awake by
making braying noises at one end and unrestrained noises from the other and
thinks he is pleasing his audience with his melodious voice.”79
Pauley implied that Hechler was more concerned with gaining public approval and
furthering his own political career than supporting the coal miners. His speech was a
direct personal attack on Hechler, rather than a criticism of his legislative policies. He
clearly intended to undermine the power of the black lung movement by condemning one
of its key leaders. Moreover, his speech illustrated the significant fractures in the West
Virginia political establishment over the issue of black lung compensation. In the House
and the Senate, there was enough opposition to black lung compensation to prevent the
passage of the Black Lung Association’s legislative bill.80
Despite the obstacles it faced, the black lung movement continued to gain
momentum. On Wednesday, February 26, three thousand miners and their supporters
from across the state gathered for a rally in Charleston’s Municipal Auditorium. A
number of speakers, including Ken Hechler, Paul Kaufman, Isidore Buff, Hawey Wells,
and Donald Rasmussen, discussed the state government’s ongoing legislative debates
79
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over black lung compensation. The miners responded cautiously to Hechler at first,
because of his initial opposition to the strike. Hechler regained their trust with a rousing
speech, in which he admitted had made a mistake. He proclaimed, “The greatest heroes
are you coal miners who have taken your future in your hands and said, ‘No longer are
we going to live and die like animals.’” He went on, “The national searchlight is on West
Virginia. I can report to you that the hope and prayers of many people throughout this
land are with you.” Hechler also indicated that he had made a $1,000 donation to the
Black Lung Association as part of his support for tougher legislation. His contribution,
notes historian Alan Derickson, far outweighed the five dollars given to the association
by West Virginia Secretary of State John D. Rockefeller IV. Reiterating the tension
between the BLA and the leadership of the United Mine Workers, Hechler reminded the
miners that the union leadership had labeled him a “fink,” because of his assertion that it
was not doing enough to help them.81
At the rally, BLA attorney Paul Kaufman discussed the association’s stance
regarding the legislative bills under debate in the Capitol. He explained to the miners that
the association supported Senate Bill 216 and House Bill 814, which contained
presumption clauses. Under those clauses, black lung victims who had worked a certain
number of years in the mines could receive compensation, without having to provide Xray evidence. Rasmussen, meanwhile, contested legislators’ claims that VISTA workers

81

Charleston Gazette, February 27, 1969, 1 and 2; New York Times, February 27, 1969,
28; Derickson, Black Lung, 160; Hume, Death and the Mines, 140-141; Smith, Digging
Our Own Graves, 121.
.

84
were responsible for the statewide strike, asserting that the miners were intelligent
enough to undertake the strike of their own volition. 82
After the rally, the miners marched to the state Capitol, many of them bearing
placards with slogans such as “No Law, No Work” and “78 / 4,” a reference to the miners
killed in the Farmington and Hominy Falls disasters. One legislator recalled watching the
procession approach the Capitol. “We were in a committee meeting,” he remembered.
“Our room was on the third floor facing Kanawha Boulevard. You could look out and
watch them come – watch them march up the steps and into the building… Well, none of
us had ever seen anything like that!”83
Historian Alan Derickson argues that the February 26 demonstration symbolized
the miners’ revolt against UMW President Boyle’s leadership. It did not mean that they
had rejected the union itself. Miners who booed at the speakers’ mention of national
union officials and jeered while marching past the District 17 headquarters carried
placards displaying the name of their local union. Moreover, local union leaders played a
significant role in organizing the demonstration, while many local union presidents, such
as Arnold Miller, Charles Brooks, and Elmer Brown, were leaders in the Black Lung
Association.84
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Governor Arch A. Moore Jr. addressed the assembled group from the steps of the
Capitol. When he announced that the state government’s efforts to establish a new bill
might be delayed until the July legislature was in session, however, the miners
interrupted him, chanting, “No! We want it now. If we don’t get it now, we won’t work.”
Moore explained that he was already committed to a new black lung law, but he could
only extend the current legislative session for budgetary matters. In an attempt to
persuade the miners to end the strike, the governor said they would only be hurting their
families by continuing. Wives, children and widows, however, were present at the
demonstration to show their support for the miners. Mrs. Hall, from nearby Gallagher,
complained to the Charleston Gazette that physicians were dismissive of her husband’s
claims that he was disabled by black lung disease. Eight-year old Mark Legg, whose
father Charles worked in a coal mine in Raleigh County, bore a placard that said, “My
daddy is a coal miner. He need’s [sic] protection.” 85
Hundreds of the miners made their way into the public galleries in the Capitol
building. In response to their presence, the House Judiciary Committee reported a draft
bill to the floor of the House. Although the bill incorporated many of the miners’
demands, it was still weaker than they had been anticipating. Delegate Robert Nelson
said the bill accomplished 60 percent of the miners’ proposals. Similarly, delegate
Warren McGraw, who had consistently supported the miners’ cause, commented, “The
bill doesn’t go as far as I hoped it would but it goes much further than the coal industry
thought it would.” Most significantly, the bill contained a ‘presumptive’ clause, which
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stipulated that miners suffering from pneumoconiosis would be presumed to have
contracted the disease as a result of their work if they had spent ten of the past fifteen
years in underground mines. Under the presumptive clause, victims would be entitled to
collect compensation from their employer.
The bill also stipulated that X-rays were insufficient for diagnosing
pneumoconiosis, as they were unable to detect the disease in its early stages. Under the
existing law, if X-rays detected nodules on miners’ lungs (that is, signs of advanced
pneumoconiosis) then they were deemed to be suffering from silicosis, not
pneumoconiosis. The bill advocated the replacement of the silicosis medical board with
an occupational disease medical board and setting disability benefits as a percentage of
miners’ weekly wages, as opposed to a set dollar amount.86 For the most part, the bill
would not be retroactive, except where a miner met the criteria for the presumptive clause
and could prove he contracted the disease in the three years before the passage of the bill.
Stephen Young, of the West Virginia Coal Operators Association, attacked the bill as
“social legislation,” and a “signed blank check” for all kinds of illness not related to
work. Coal operators and the UMW leadership falsely claimed that pneumoconiosis was
“already compensable under the existing laws.” 87
Several of the black lung leaders were pessimistic about the Judiciary
Committee’s bill. Paul Kaufman rejected the bill, because it covered only
pneumoconiosis and not other dust-related occupational diseases. Appearing before the
House Rules Committee to request the complete rewriting of the bill, Kaufman argued
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that the passage of the bill in its existing form would be more detrimental than beneficial
to the miners. He was particularly opposed to the bill’s stipulation that the diagnosis of
pneumoconiosis was dependent on the assessment of individual physicians. Dr. Hawey
Wells, meanwhile, accused the Judiciary Committee of colluding with the mine
operators. Responding to his claims, J. E. Watson, the head of the committee, said a few
doctors and “a baloney waving Congressman” were unfairly creating hysteria among the
miners. In a speech on the House floor, Watson said that the behavior of some miners had
gone “beyond the conduct which can be tolerated.” Watson, a native of West Virginia,
was the great-grandson of the founder of the Consolidation Coal Company.88
The continuing pressure from the black lung movement pushed the full House of
Delegates to make several amendments to the bill. In a prolonged session on Friday,
February 28, during which the doors to House chamber were locked and guarded by state
policemen, the legislators modified the bill by incorporating several of the activists’
demands. The new version of the bill placed less emphasis on medical opinion in the
diagnosis of pneumoconiosis, stressing instead the importance of pulmonary function
tests. It also placed the onus on employers to prove that miners had not contracted lung
disease as a result of their work. In a significant victory for the Black Lung Association
and the striking miners, the House voted 95-0 to pass the amended bill. 89
Warren McGraw commented that the bill “[was] the most important piece of labor
legislation in this state in this century.” But not everyone was satisfied with the bill. Paul
Kaufman feared that doctors would still play a significant role in diagnosing miners’ lung
88
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disease. For Kaufman, the only way to diagnose pneumoconiosis was by mechanical tests
of lung efficiency. In contrast, several House delegates contended that the modified bill
did not allow for a broad enough spectrum of medical opinion.90 A spokesman for the
coal industry claimed the bill could cost operators up to $16 million per year. Paul
Morton, the President of the West Virginia Coal Association, referred to the bill as “not
just social legislation, but galloping socialism in one of its purest forms.”91 Having given
unanimous approval to the bill, the House passed it on to the Senate for consideration.
While the miners were jubilant about the House bill, they resolved not to go back
to work until the Senate and Governor Moore had endorsed it. A number of coal
operators, including the U.S. Steel Corporation and the Eastern Associated Coal
Corporation, sought an injunction against the strikers. They charged that the strike
violated their contract with the UMWA and resulted in the loss of $4,488,000 in revenue
and 748,000 tons of coal production. The operators’ court suit targeted in particular the
UMW International and Districts 17 and 29; it sought S1.1 million for each day the strike
had been in progress. A hearing before Federal Judge John A. Field on March 1 did not
result in a court injunction. By March 1, the strike had escalated to over 40,000 miners,
and coal production in West Virginia had come to a halt.
Thousands of impatient miners marched to the State Capitol on March 2 to
pressure the Senate and Governor into endorsing the House bill. The Senate Judiciary
Committee responded by releasing a draft bill the next day. To the miners’ dismay, the
bill significantly weakened the House legislation. It stipulated that pneumoconiosis could
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only be diagnosed with an X-ray, or other “objective medical evidence,” and included a
more stringent presumptive clause. The Senate’s presumptive clause rested on the word
“continuous,” stipulating that miners’ exposure to occupational dust had to amount to at
least two “continuous” years during the ten years before their last exposure.92
The West Virginia Black Lung Association immediately released a statement
condemning the bill. The statement quoted Donald Rasmussen, to the effect that “there is
no relationship between what an X-ray shows and the degree of symptoms the patient
complains about.” The statement also quoted Dr. Eugene Pendergrass, treasurer of the
BLA and former president of the Radiological Society of North America. According to
Pendergrass, “Black lung cannot be seen on conventional X-rays. An X-ray does not
provide any reliable evidence for evaluation of pulmonary function or disturbed
pulmonary function in early pneumoconiosis.” Jeanne Rasmussen, wife of Donald
Rasmussen and spokesperson for the BLA, said the miners opposed the bill’s rule on
“continuous” exposure to coal dust.93
The Senate had the option of either passing its amended bill or the House bill in
its original form. On Wednesday, March 5, it rejected the House version of the bill and
voted by a clear majority of 34-0 for its own amended version. A crowd of over 400
miners watched silently from the galleries as the bill was passed. The Senate’s
endorsement of the bill was a major setback for the Black Lung Association. After close
scrutiny of the bill, the House rejected the amendments, which meant the bill became the
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subject of negotiation in a conference committee. By March 7, the 59th day of the 60-day
legislative session, the committee had neared a compromise. Its failure to agree on a final
version of the bill prompted Governor Moore to allow deliberation for three more days.
Across West Virginia, 42,000 miners were still on strike, awaiting the results of the
committee’s negotiations. It was the largest strike in response to a health and safety issue
in American history, and the largest political strike in the country’s history.94
On March 8, at 11:45 p.m., just fifteen minutes before the scheduled legislative
session ended, both branches of the legislature passed a rewritten version of the black
lung act. The House voted 93-0 in favor, while the Senate endorsed the bill by 32-2. The
revised bill closely resembled the original House version, restoring the more liberal
clause on presumption and authorizing an occupational disease medical board. It also
gave a broad definition of pneumoconiosis, using the term to describe a range of
occupational-related lung ailments. While the legislation still emphasized the importance
of X-rays and expert medical opinion as evidence of pneumoconiosis, it stated that Xrays were not sole proof of the disease. Nevertheless, the bill rejected the utility of
pulmonary function tests, and it mandated a fixed weekly sum of $55 for compensation,
rather than establishing rates connected to miners’ wages. Furthermore, the presumption
clause only applied to miners who were actively working as of July 1, 1969. Although an
improvement on the conservative black lung legislation passed by the Senate, the final
version of the bill fell short of the original bill drafted by the BLA. Paul Kaufman stated
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that he wished to study the bill in detail before commenting. Donald Rasmussen,
meanwhile, praised the bill’s rejection of X-rays as definitive evidence of black lung. 95
Only a few hours after the state legislature’s endorsement of the bill, two
thousand miners gathered for the Black Lung Association’s final rally in West Virginia,
at Park Junior High School in Beckley. One miner later recalled that miners spilled out of
the crowded auditorium into adjacent hallways and even onto the streets. “I remember
there was one guy that got up and asked for a vote to go back to work,” he said. “And I
can’t describe it… but there was a great big roar – “No!” – that they wouldn’t go back to
work. They were going to wait until the governor signed the bill.”96 Another miner at the
rally perceived a lack of consensus over what the next course of action should be. The
miners ultimately decided to continue the strike until Moore signed the bill. As the rally
was taking place in Beckley, a group of around fifteen black lung activists stopped a coal
train in Kanawha County, delaying it by several hours. The activists only dispersed with
the arrival of the local sheriff. 97
Governor Arch Moore signed the black lung bill in a ceremony on March 11. By
this time, 15,000 coal miners had already returned to work, confident of his endorsement
of the bill. After signing the bill, Moore commented, “As I noted in my message to the
legislature only three days after taking office, coal mining is an essential part of the
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economy of this state, therefore it is incumbent upon us to provide for the health of those
engaged in that vital industry.”98 His approval of the legislation marked the end of the
West Virginia miners’ strike. Shortly afterwards, the remaining 30,000 miners ended
their walkout.

Conclusion
Governor Moore’s signing of the black lung bill represented a significant advance
in coal mine health and safety in West Virginia. Although the legislation did not fulfill all
the demands of the black lung activists, it was far more progressive than the existing state
law. That the activists were able to achieve their demands so quickly reflects a number of
significant points. First, the rank-and-file miners’ decision to align themselves with the
Black Lung Association, rather than the union leadership, shows just how fragmented and
aloof the United Mine Workers had become. The miners were no longer able to rely on
organized labor to better their working conditions, to the point were they sought an
alternative medium to achieve their demands. Furthermore, the events of late 1968 and
early 1969 revealed the corrupt practices of Tony Boyle and the UMW national
leadership. Regardless of his public statements to the contrary, Boyle viewed his position
as UMW President as a way to advance his own personal interests. The union, miners
believed, no longer fought for its own members, but rather supported the interests of the
coal industry.
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Second, the passage of the new West Virginia black lung legislation demonstrated
the effectiveness of grassroots protest. The pressure exerted by the Black Lung
Association leaders and thousands of rank and file miners was instrumental in persuading
the state legislature to endorse comprehensive legislation. By engaging in a lengthy strike
and halting coal production, the miners were able to demonstrate both the significant role
they played in the state’s economy and that they were entitled to more comprehensive
black lung legislation. The association’s leaders not only framed the miners’ demands in
politically comprehensible terms, but provided the motivation and determination the
miners required to maintain their protest. Furthermore, miners organized through local
unions to achieve improved compensation measures.
Third, the black lung movement in West Virginia showed that coal miners’
identities were deeply rooted in their local communities. After major disasters such as the
ones at Hominy Falls and Farmington, families and relatives kept vigil at the mine sites
as they waited for news. Similarly, they marched with the miners through downtown
Charleston and attended rallies and demonstrations. The black lung movement
transcended the individual injuries and diseases of coal miners. More importantly, it was
about miners achieving justice for the small communities in Appalachia that were often
overlooked and exploited by corporate interests.
The success of the black lung movement in West Virginia had much broader
ramifications. It led to the growth of similar movements in Ohio and Kentucky, and while
these movements, which will be discussed later, were not as large and successful, they
still led to notable improvements in black lung compensation at the state level. It also had
a significant influence on coal mine health and safety legislation at the federal level -- the

.
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events in West Virginia prompted Congress to look for ways of improving the existing
laws, and of making the mines safer places to work.

.
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Chapter Three
A Conflict of Interests:
Political Dissent, Union Rivalry, and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969
Introduction
In early 1969, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives both opened
legislative hearings on coal mine health and safety. They sought to strengthen federal
mining laws and ultimately prevent catastrophes such as the Farmington disaster from
happening in the future. At both sets of hearings, several legislative bills were the focus
of debate. The Senate passed a bill with strong health and safety measures on October 1,
1969. Later that month, as the House of Representatives was debating the final terms of
its own bill, a group of fifty miners stormed unannounced into Congressman Ken
Hechler’s office in Washington D.C. The miners challenged Hechler for not endorsing
the two draft safety bills the United Mine Workers had submitted to the House and for
presenting his own, more stringent legislative bill. The leader of the group, a man named
Eli Zitkovich, started shaking his fist at Hechler, demanding to know why he had rejected
the UMW bill. Zitkovich was an aide to Tony Boyle, the president of the UMW. The
confrontation was interrupted when the bell started ringing to signal that Congress was in
session. Hechler tried to leave his office, as he was scheduled to deliver a speech, but the
miners jostled him, shouting “Damn traitor!” Outside in the corridor, Hechler noticed
UMW leader Tony Boyle standing in a corner. Assuming that Boyle had orchestrated the
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confrontation, Hechler went over to shake his hand. Boyle promptly turned his back on
Hechler, refusing to have any contact with the congressman.1
As this chapter will show, the encounter between Hechler and the miners
symbolized a number of larger issues. First, the UMW leadership clearly opposed the
radical overhaul of the nation’s mining laws. Boyle’s use of a small, aggressive group of
his own supporters to intimidate Hechler suggested that Boyle was out of touch with the
majority of rank-and-file miners. He was still hostile to broad reform and unwilling to
jeopardize his financially lucrative position as UMW leader. Boyle more closely
represented the standpoint of the coal operators, who claimed that more stringent health
and safety standards would lead to economic catastrophe and declining production in the
coal industry. Thus, an important priority for Boyle was stamping his influence on the
legislative debates on mine health and safety in Congress.
The confrontation also highlighted Ken Hechler’s political representation of the
rank and file at the national level. His submission of a tough legislative bill to the
Congressional hearings reiterated the support he had shown to West Virginia coal miners
in their campaign for black lung compensation. On a broader level, the confrontation
between Hechler and the miners emphasized the political divisions and internal labor
conflict that jeopardized the overhaul of the United States’ inadequate mine laws. Many
conservative politicians were, like Tony Boyle, opposed to strong federal legislation. In
contrast, Hechler and other liberal Congressman such as Phillip Burton sought tough
legislative measures such as limits on underground dust levels and federal compensation
1
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for the victims of black lung disease. Political rivalries characterized the Congressional
hearings throughout the spring of 1969. This chapter further shows that President Nixon’s
political ideology complicated the legislative debate. While Nixon supported the
improvement of federal mine health and safety legislation, he did so largely to attract
more blue-collar votes in the 1972 presidential election and to obtain support from
Congress for his defense and foreign policies. Furthermore, he was fundamentally
opposed to a federal compensation program for the victims of black lung disease.
The same conflict and dissension that characterized the legislative debates in
Congress was evident within the institutional framework of the United Mine Workers of
America. In May 1969, Joseph A. “Jock” Yablonski challenged the national leadership of
Tony Boyle by announcing he intended to run for the union presidency. Yablonski sought
to reinstate democratic practices to the union, such as the election of district leaders, and
address the health and safety concerns of the union’s members. His candidacy prompted
the most bitterly contested election campaign in the union’s history.
During 1969, there was an intensive struggle over the redrawing of America’s
federal mine laws. Rank-and-file miners, union leaders, federal government officials, and
medical researchers clashed over the most effective ways to improve working conditions
and to compensate victims of work-related injury and disease. This chapter will show that
pressure from liberal politicians and high-profile activists, combined with the influence of
mining communities, led to significant improvements in federal mine laws.
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The Limits of Reform: The Nixon Administration and Coal Mine Health and Safety
The public outcry resulting from the Farmington disaster, combined with the
rising militancy of the Appalachian coal miners, expressed most visibly in the West
Virginia black lung movement, prompted the Nixon Administration to address the issue
of coal mine health and safety. On March 3, 1969, after less than two months in office,
President Richard Nixon sent a special message to the United States Congress,
accompanied by new draft legislation. The Senate had already opened its own hearings
on coal mine health and safety on February 27. Nixon’s message vividly described the
risks that characterized underground coal mining and stressed the importance of
eradicating them:
The workers in the coal mining industry and their families have too long endured
the constant threat and often sudden reality of disaster, disease, and death… Death
in the mines can be as sudden as an explosion or a collapse of a roof and ribs, or it
comes insidiously from pneumoconiosis or black lung disease… The time has
come to replace this fatalism with hope by substituting action for words.
Catastrophes in the coal mines are not inevitable. They can be prevented, and
they must be prevented.2
Nixon stated that he had authorized several measures to create a safer and more healthful
working environment for coal miners, including the expansion of government-funded
research into pneumoconiosis, the creation of a program to foster greater cooperation
between management and labor in mine safety, and an increase in the federal mine
inspection force. He outlined the key proposals in the draft legislation, known as the
Javits bill, after its main author Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY). The Javits bill proposed
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the improvement of state workmen’s compensation programs, the modernization of
underground equipment, and the expansion of the Secretary of the Interior’s power to
modify coal mining regulations when required. Moreover, it sought to “provide strict
deterrents and enforcement measures and, at the same time, establish equitable appeal
procedures to remedy any arbitrary and unlawful actions.” The bill also advocated a
mandatory dust limit of 4.5 milligrams per cubic meter of air in underground coal mines
and the elimination of the distinction between ‘gassy’ and ‘non-gassy’ mines. Nixon
urged Congress to adopt the new legislation immediately.3
The Javits bill was, in many respects, stronger than the bill introduced by the
Johnson administration the previous September, but the West Virginia Black Lung
Association argued it did not go far enough and immediately rejected it.4 Despite the
positive measures embodied in the Javits bill, there were clear limits to Nixon’s plans to
reform the coal industry. First, by advocating the improvement of state workmen’s
compensation programs, Nixon was stopping short of recommending a federal
compensation program for the victims of black lung disease. In fact, Nixon was wholly
opposed to such a program because of its substantial financial cost.5 Second, the
conservative 4.5-milligram dust standard would only partially reduce miners’ risk of
developing pneumoconiosis, and it would still present a significant explosion hazard in
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underground mines. Third, Nixon’s call for “strict deterrents and enforcement measures”
against operators did not include concrete or tangible sanctions for those who violated the
law. In a broad sense, then, President Nixon’s proposals to reform coal mine health and
safety were limited in scope.
The weaknesses in the bill stemmed from Nixon’s inherent political beliefs, many
of which were not conducive to significant reform. Nixon believed that the federal
government had become too unwieldy in the realm of domestic politics, a problem he
intended to rectify by giving more power to state and local governments. Furthermore,
Nixon viewed Lyndon B. Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ reforms as too expansive. Instead,
Nixon favored a welfare program reminiscent of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal.’
His criticism of the ‘Great Society’ program had enabled him to win votes of
disillusioned Democratic voters who felt that the Johnson administration had become too
intrusive with its broad, far-reaching social policies. The same voters, however, did not
completely embrace Nixon’s conservative beliefs. They were still attached to the liberal
consensus that had dominated American politics in the immediate post-World War II
years. The liberal consensus was essentially a centrist approach that believed in the
importance of a strong economy, the New Deal political order, and aggressive foreign
policy.6
Nixon’s political ideology meant that he had to work within narrow parameters in
his quest establish a new Republican majority and win reelection to a second term. In
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Beyond the Liberal Consensus, Iwan W. Morgan argues that the approach Nixon adopted
was a combination of neo-conservatism and populist conservatism. Neo-conservatives
were typically intellectual elites who favored government policy that mirrored the old
liberalism, while ‘populist conservatives’ were the suburban and Sun-Belt masses who
rejected the extensive liberalism of the North East and wanted to protect their new-found
economic status. Both camps opposed extensive bureaucracy, taxes, and federal
regulations.7 They were, therefore, hardly conducive to reform of federal mining laws or
extensive government regulation of the mines.
Nixon’s commitment to strong federal regulation of the coal industry was
hindered by the fact that he had come to office with a slender domestic policy agenda. He
based his election campaign largely on his promises to end the war in Vietnam and to
reform Cold War diplomacy. Moreover, he had little interest in courting the support of
Congress. He relied instead on senior White House staff to set policy. During his first
term in office, Nixon, however, faced a Congress with Democratic majorities in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, so he understood that compromise was
necessary in the realm of domestic policy.8
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His political ideology aside, Nixon was uninterested in, if not woefully ignorant
of, coal mining policy. While meeting with congressional representatives shortly after his
election, he was accosted by Ken Hechler, who informed Nixon that federal mine health
and safety laws were ineffective and in dire need of reform. Nixon merely responded, “I
have a wonderful Secretary of Labor, I’ll tell him to look into it.” He was unaware that it
was the Department of the Interior, not the Department of Labor, that was responsible for
coal mine health and safety.9
Many of Nixon’s staff appointments did not bode well for the improvement of
coal mine health and safety laws. His appointment of Alaska Governor Walter J. Hickel
to the position of Secretary of the Interior particularly concerned advocates of reform.
Hechler argued that Hickel’s previous ties to the oil industry jeopardized the
implementation of effective mine legislation and might erode miners’ rights. Shortly after
entering office, Hickel met with seven widows from the Farmington disaster. He later
claimed in his memoir, Who Owns America, that the meeting convinced him of the need
to improve miners’ working conditions. He wrote, “This meeting, unscheduled and
unannounced, illuminated for me one of the most pressing and oppressing problems on
the agenda of the American people. When I talked to these women of West Virginia, I
was deeply moved. I decided that if it was humanly possible, I would change the
situation.” The widows, however, were unimpressed with Hickel’s attitude. Similarly,
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Ken Hechler felt that Hickel had been unresponsive to the widow’s concerns. Hechler
had arranged the meeting and personally financed the widows’ visit to Washington D.C.10
In Who Owns America?, Hickel identified the U.S. Bureau of Mines as the main
source of the coal industry’s poor safety record. He criticized the Bureau’s failure to shut
down coal mines that posed an imminent danger to miners, as well as its policy of
educating operators rather than imposing sanctions against them. According to Hickel,
the Bureau’s failings could be resolved by giving it the power to impose civil and
criminal penalties on operators who committed safety violations.11

In early 1969,

however, Hickel did not take any substantive action to implement such measures.
Moreover, the problems with the Bureau went far beyond those highlighted by Hickel in
his memoir. In the past two decades, it had typically failed to follow up on its preliminary
inspections, a fact that the Farmington disaster made all too clear. The Bureau was caught
between two competing functions: upholding health and safety standards on the one hand
and promoting the interests of the coal industry on the other. During its sixty-year
existence, it had always leaned more towards the production aspects of the coal industry.
Despite the Bureau’s failures, its director John F. O’Leary had made significant
efforts to improve its health and safety enforcement policies after the Farmington
disaster. Consequently, there was an outcry when President Nixon announced in February
1969 that he planned to replace O’Leary. Outraged by Nixon’s decision, Ken Hechler

10

Ken Hechler, interview by author, August 22, 2008; New York Times, January 2, 1969,
8; Walter J. Hickel, Who Owns America? (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1971), 131-32; Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 21;
Moffat, Ken Hechler, 215.
11

Hickel, Who Owns America?, 132

104
urged miners across West Virginia to send letters of support for O’Leary to the White
House. At a press conference, Hechler voiced his concern that O’Leary’s departure would
be a setback to the thousands of coal miners who were continually at risk from injury and
death and “a victory for the special interests who opposed vigorous enforcement of the
law.” Hechler found support from Speaker of the House John W. McCormack (D-MA),
who argued that the Nixon Administration should reappoint O’Leary because of his
efforts to reduce the mine fatality rate. UMW President Boyle also declared his
endorsement of O’Leary. This was surprising given his opposition to strong health and
safety enforcement. Nixon defended his plan to remove the bureau director. In a public
statement, he said he was under pressure from coal operators who disliked O’Leary’s
tough policies.12
Walter Hickel later claimed he felt uncomfortable about removing O’Leary from
office. He commented, “It bothered me, because I had not yet had the time to evaluate the
quality of his work. However, my instructions were clear. Remove O’Leary. Following
my orders from the White House, I took steps to let O’Leary go.”13 One of those steps
was to interview Dr. Beecher H. Charmbury, Secretary of Mines and Mineral Industries,
as a potential replacement for O’Leary. According to reports in the national media,
Hickel offered Charmbury $36,000 per year for the position. Charmbury, whose
experience centered more on the production aspects of the industry than health and
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safety, rejected the position, leaving the immediate future of the U.S. Bureau of Mines
uncertain.14
Although Hickel was ready by late February to dismiss O’Leary, the
administration’s plan for a new defense program prevented him from doing so. Nixon
was anxious to gain Congressional approval for his Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
program. The previous year, before he began his presidency, his initial proposal to
provide extensive ABM protection for major cities and missile silos across the country
had not been received favorably by Congress. He therefore pursued a scaled-down
version of the plan, which centered on ABM coverage for America’s offensive missile
silos. To gain support for the program, the Nixon administration aggressively lobbied
Congress.15
Nixon feared that dismissing O’Leary, a tough bureaucrat who was highly
regarded by the Democrats, would alienate potential supporters for the ABM program,
and he decided to postpone firing O’Leary. Nixon told his Congressional liaison Bryce
Harlow, who had been at the forefront of the White House’s lobbying efforts for the
ABM plan, to prevent Hickel from making a formal announcement about O’Leary.
Hickel later recalled: “Before I could make the official announcement, I received a call
from Bryce Harlow telling me to hold off for a while… he said this would mean two
more votes on the Administration side of the ABM question. I thought to myself, ‘Okay,
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so I’ll be a team player.’” As directed by the administration, Hickel refrained from firing
O’Leary, who remained in his position. Despite Nixon’s political maneuvering, and the
addition of a weakening amendment to the ABM bill by Republican Margaret Chase
Smith, the outcome of the final vote was a 50-50 tie. The vote was enough to allow the
ABM program to proceed, but on another level it represented a defeat for Nixon in
Congress. Hickel wondered, “What about the miners? How in the hell do all these
political games help solve their problems?”16
In early 1969, President Nixon was ambivalent about coal mine health and safety.
While he outwardly criticized the injustices coal miners faced, there were limits to his
plans for legislative reform. The Javits bill was a calculated response to the Farmington
disaster and the black lung movement in West Virginia. Nixon felt he had to act, but he
sought to do so within the parameters of his own political ideology. Similarly, Nixon’s
decision to halt the termination of John F. O’Leary did not reflect commitment to strong
enforcement measures, but rather his prioritization of defense strategy and foreign policy
over domestic affairs. In the months that followed, as Congress held coal mine health and
safety hearings, the support of the Nixon administration for a radical and far-reaching
overhaul of the nation’s mining laws was by no means certain.

Congressional Hearings and the Search for a Legislative Solution
The Farmington disaster and the West Virginia black lung movement spurred
Congress to take decisive action to combat the work-related hazards faced by the nation’s
coal miners. In the early months of 1969, the House of Representatives and the Senate
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both scheduled hearings on coal mine health and safety. The purpose of the hearings was
to debate several draft legislative bills, including the Javits bill submitted by the Nixon
administration. Historian Alan Derickson argues that federal preventative legislation for
coal mines was long overdue by 1969. The technology to reduce the risks of coal dust
had existed since the early twentieth century, and for several decades coal companies had
understood the need to suppress coal dust.17 Yet the lobbying power of the coal industry,
combined with political divisions on mine health and safety, kept the legislation weak. In
both the House and the Senate, the search for a legislative solution was a bitterly
contested process. Federal politicians, coal miners, officials from the United Mine
Workers, coal companies, physicians, and state legislators clashed over how best to
afford coal miners greater protection from the hazards of their work.
In the House of Representatives, mine health and safety fell under the mandate of
the Education and Labor Committee, chaired by Congressman Carl Perkins of Kentucky,
while the specific task of drafting and presenting new bills was the responsibility of the
Labor Subcommittee, chaired by John Dent of Pennsylvania. Before the hearings, the
House afforded all its members the opportunity to submit draft bills on coal mine health
and safety. Ken Hechler introduced a bill on February 6 that recommended harsher
penalties for safety violations than those set by local and state governments, the transferal
of safety enforcement from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor,
and a minimum dust standard of 3.0 milligrams per cubic meter of air. His bill also
included a provision for a national insurance scheme, whereby the federal government
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would make up any shortfall in state compensation payments to miners.18 Hechler said
his bill was necessary “to break the dismal chain of disasters in the coalfields and to
check the slow death caused by the ravages of black lung.” 19
The House Subcommittee on Labor opened its hearings on March 4, with several
bills under consideration. In addition to the Hechler bill (H.R. 6504) and the Javits bill
(H.R. 7976), the subcommittee introduced bills by John Dent (H.R. 1047), Carl Perkins
(H.R. 4047), and the United Mine Workers (H.R. 4295 and H.R. 7747). Dent’s bill H.R.
1047 was a duplicate of the bill presented by President Johnson in September 1968, while
H.R. 4047 by Perkins embodied the most recent legislative proposals of the Johnson
administration made in early 1969. The UMW introduced two bills, because its national
leaders felt that health and safety were two distinct, separate issues. As such, H.R. 4295
dealt with health concerns, while H.R. 7747 focused on safety matters.20
In an opening statement during the House hearings, Secretary of the Interior
Walter Hickel endorsed the Nixon administration’s bill, but he also argued that safer
mines were the responsibility of mine owners and miners, not just federal government
inspectors.21 Framing the legislative debate in moral terms, Hickel stated, “There is more
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at stake here than the lives and health of 144,000 coal miners, though they surely merit
out most strenuous efforts on their behalf. The problems we are wrestling with have an
impact that extends beyond any coal mine. If we fail, those problems can weaken the
physical and moral fiber of our whole society.”22 Hickel stressed the importance of
finding a balance between improving health and safety while maintaining coal production
at level that would sustain the nation’s energy requirements. “Coal is our most abundant
fuel resource,” he cautioned. “Right now, it supplies nearly a fourth of our total energy
demand and every forecast, whether by the Government or the private sector, indicates
that coal must continue to play a significant role if this country’s future energy
requirements are to be satisfied.”23
Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary also emphasized his support for the
Nixon administration bill in his appearance. In his statement before the subcommittee, he
explained that Bureau’s existing powers of enforcement, as dictated by the 1952 Federal
Mine Act and its 1966 amendments, were too limited:
The Bureau needs broader authority, and it needs it now, in order to bring coal
mine injury and fatality rates into line with those of other major industries, and to
assure that our coal miners do not escape accidental injuries onl to fall victim to
an insidious industrial disease. The administration’s bill would, in our opinion,
provide the kind of authority that is urgently required.24
O’Leary emphasized the importance of research, which he argued was the key to
providing long-term solutions to hazardous conditions in coal mines. He also argued that
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the dust standard in the administration’s bill was not too restrictive, but rather provided
the foundation for a lower standard in the future once the necessary technology had been
developed. Both he and Hickel claimed that the technology to create a 3.0-milligram dust
limit did not yet exist, but they neglected to mention that such technology had been in use
in Britain and most parts of Europe for the past three decades.25
The House hearings continued on March 19, with Ken Hechler and coal miners
Elmer Yocum and Elijah Wolford as the opening witnesses. The appearance of Yocum
and Wolford showed that rank and file miners were aware of the contemporary legislative
debate on coal mine health and safety. Prior to that day’s hearing, Yocum and Wolford
had visited Hechler in his Charleston office without invitation and asked to speak before
the Subcommittee. Hechler, reluctant to dismiss their request, agreed to bring them to the
hearing.26 In a lengthy testimony, Wolford emphasized that miners were partly
responsible for safe working conditions. He proposed that miners should be penalized a
full day’s wages for any health and safety violations they committed. Wolford also
stressed the importance of clearer escape routes in underground mines and better roof
maintenance.
In his prepared statement, Hechler charged that the government and coal industry
had invested millions of dollars in coal production, but had spent only “pennies” on
research and development in health and safety. Such neglect, he argued, underscored the
necessity of devising and implementing protective measures for the nation’s 144,000
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miners.27 Hechler devoted much of his statement to reiterating the key measures in his
own bill (H.R. 6504), including the introduction of minimum qualifications for
inspectors, harsh financial penalties against operators, and the transferal of safety
enforcement from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor. He
proposed the Bureau of Mines should not be responsible for enforcing mine health and
safety because it “[had] been subservient to every special interest, to every interest except
the man who mines the coal,” although he acknowledged there had been some
improvement under O’Leary. He reiterated the importance of a dust standard of 3.0miligrams and the assignment of miners who already displayed signs of pneumoconiosis
to a work environment containing not more than one milligram of dust per cubic meter of
air. And, in agreement with Walter Hickel, Hechler stressed the importance of including
both health reforms and safety measures in one bill.28
During the Labor Subcommittee hearings, Hechler added lawyer David Finnegan
to his staff. Recently, while working for the Department of the Interior, Finnegan had
assisted Senator Jacob K. Javits in drafting an early version of the Nixon administration’s
coal mine bill. When, on the insistence of Javits, Finnegan included a dust standard of
three milligrams, in contradiction to the administration’s goal of 4.5 milligrams, Walter
Hickel fired him for insubordination. On learning of Finnegan’s dismissal, Hechler, who
had already consulted Finnegan in drafting his own bill, offered him a staff position.29
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Finnegan aided Hechler’s quest for strong legislation in two ways. First, he was in
contact with several inspectors at the Bureau of Mines, who were able to identify
loopholes in the different bills passing through Congress. The inspectors advised Hechler
not to weaken his own bill (H.R. 6504) with vague clauses such as “where economically
possible,” or “where technologically feasible,” and to use strong, assertive language.
Secondly, Finnegan’s close ties with the House Subcommittee on Labor enabled him to
observe committee meetings and to participate in technical debates. His connections
proved invaluable to Hechler, who was not a member of either the subcommittee or the
Committee on Education and Welfare. He was able to gain an insight to the workings of
the subcommittee, and he relayed his views to the subcommittee through Finnegan.30
As the hearings continued, UWM President Tony Boyle informed the
subcommittee that he opposed a single health and safety bill. Unlike Walter Hickel and
Ken Hechler, he advocated two separate bills, one for health issues and another for
safety. He argued that health and safety were distinct subjects that required separate
treatment and that the union’s introduction of two bills was the most effective way to
secure the passage of new legislation.31 Boyle failed to recognize the strong connection
between health and safety in the underground working environment. For instance, the
issue of dust control was pertinent to safety, as limiting the quantities of airborne dust
prevented explosions. It was also pertinent to health, as dust control was a key factor in
preventing miners’ occupational lung disease.
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The House subcommittee hearings marked the emergence of an unlikely advocate
for the coal miners’ cause. Democratic Representative Phillip Burton from San Francisco
was the first Congressman to propose a federal compensation scheme for black lung
victims. Burton argued that new health and safety legislation should include a federal
compensation program that covered all black lung victims, including those who
developed pneumoconiosis prior to the legislation’s enactment, and widows. Burton had
been searching for a cause to promote since failing to gain enough support to run for the
Senate the previous autumn. His past accomplishments marked him as one of the most
liberal representatives in the House. In 1966, Burton, working with John Dent, had
orchestrated the largest extension of the U.S. minimum wage program since the early
1930s.32
Alan Derickson argues that Burton’s commitment to federal compensation was
not as unlikely as it first appeared. Although there were no coal mines in San Francisco,
there was an extensive network of docks. Burton’s knowledge about the federal
compensation program for the city’s injured longshoremen and harbor workers provided
a foundation for drafting similar legislation for miners. Moreover, Burton was a member
of both the Committee on Education and Labor and its Labor Subcommittee. According
to Derickson, Burton’s position on the full committee provided him with the ideal
position to criticize both the Nixon administration and the coal operators. His position on
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the Labor Subcommittee afforded him an intimate role in the creation of the coal mine
legislation.33
At the hearing on March 26, Burton vehemently challenged Undersecretary of
Labor James D. Hodgson for his recommendation that state governments should assume
responsibility for sick miners’ compensation payments. Ken Hechler later recalled,
“Burton came into the hearing late. He looked as if he’d just gotten out of bed. He was
unshaven and you could smell his bad breath, as he was drinking black coffee to try to
stay awake.”34 The dialogue that ensued between Burton and Hodgson exemplified
Burton’s brusque and often aggressive manner. Burton emphasized that workers injured
or disabled prior to the bill’s enactment would be ineligible for compensation unless they
lived in a state that provided workers’ compensation to black lung victims. Ignoring
Hodgson’s efforts to provide an explanation, Burton argued:
All the previously injured people, through all the history of the failure of the
States and the Federal Government to act, are going to get no relief or assistance
at all under this bill. And when you use a State scheme of compensation there is
no way that I am aware of that you can impose liability on private insurance
companies to pay for injuries that took place prior to the time they received
premiums. 35
Hodgson admitted, “There is no ex post facto aspect to this bill.” In response, Burton
commented, That is a very fine set of three Latin words to say that this proposal isn’t
going to provide any help to 95 percent of the workers affected.36
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Representatives Marvin Esch (R-MI) and John Dent tried to convince Burton that
state compensation would allow for retroactive payments to miners who were already
sick. Dent highlighted the “grandfather’s clause” in the Pennsylvania compensation law,
which enabled miners to collect benefits if they had developed pneumoconiosis before
the state government made it a compensable disease in 1966. They also contended that
federal investment in the state compensation programs would ensure they were
adequately funded. Burton, however, was convinced that only a broad federal program
would provide adequate compensation.37
Burton’s unwavering avocation of federal black lung benefits broadened the scope
of the Congressional hearings. Prior to his outburst on March 26, delegates had not
considered a federal plan that provided retroactive coverage to miners and widows.
Furthermore, Burton cast further doubt on the legitimacy of the Nixon administration’s
bill, and marked himself, along with Hechler, Nader, and the Committee of Physicians, as
a firm supporter of the rank and file in the coalfields.
The conflict that characterized the hearings before the House Subcommittee on
Labor also was evident in the Senate hearings on coal mine health and safety. In the
Senate, mine safety issues fell under the mandate of the Labor and Public Welfare
Committee, chaired by Ralph Yarborough (D-TX), while the General Labor
Subcommittee, chaired by Harrison Williams (D-NJ), held the specific role of drafting
new legislative bills. Jennings Randolph, the Democratic Senator from West Virginia,
played a significant role in both committees. He was the most senior Democrat after
Yarborough on the Labor Public Welfare Committee and held second place on the
37
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General Labor Subcommittee. As a senator from a coal mine state, Randolph was in a
difficult position, as he had to placate the coal operators who dominated the state’s
economy and the miners who represented the majority of West Virginia’s voting bloc. In
trying to appeal to a broad constituency, he adopted a moderate attitude to coal mine
health and safety.38
In contrast, Harrison Williams was a strong advocate of coal mine reform, having
encouraged the black lung activists in West Virginia to expand their movement into
Kentucky. However, Williams’ hopes for extensive legislative changes faced two
significant obstacles. First, Jennings Randolph, who did not want to burden mining
operators with unnecessary regulations, outranked Williams on the full committee.
Second, Williams’ political reputation had been sullied by a long battle with alcoholism.
Although undergoing treatment for the disease, his capabilities as a Senator were still in
question.39
When the Labor Subcommittee’s hearings opened on February 27, Randolph and
Williams each introduced two new legislative bills on mine health and safety. Randolph
introduced S. 355, which represented the original view of the Johnson administration. It
was the equivalent of bill H.R. 1047 in the House, along with S. 467, which embodied the
safety demands of the United Mine Workers and acted as a companion bill to H.R. 7747.
Senator Harrison Williams, meanwhile, presented S. 1094, which mirrored Ken Hechler’s
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bill H.R. 6504, as well as his own draft bill S. 1178.40 The subcommittee considered
several other bills later in the hearings, including the United Mine Workers’ separate
health bill.
During the first day of the hearings, the representatives lamented that it had taken
a tragedy of the magnitude of the Farmington disaster to force them into action. John
Dent argued that the decline in health and safety standards was attributable to members of
Congress and state legislators, because they had failed to pass strong protective laws.
While there had clearly been inaction on the part of the federal and state governments,
much of the responsibility for death and injury in the mines rested on the coal operators.
Despite the coal industry’s culpability in the nation’s shocking mine fatality rate, the
National Coal Association (NCA), the organization that protected the coal industry’s
interests, openly approved of the Senate’s hearings. By publicly supporting the hearings,
the NCA gave the impression that it was concerned about miners’ welfare. Behind closed
doors, however, it planned to take measures to dilute the legislation.41
UMW President Tony Boyle’s testimony on the first day of the hearing was far
more aggressive than the statement he later made in the House. Boyle informed the
committee that he had more knowledge of black lung disease than most people, having
watched his father and two of his uncles die from the disease. He condemned the “instant
experts” who spoke out in support of sick and injured miners, arguing they had not
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supported the union’s previous struggles for better legislation. Casting doubt on the
credibility of these ‘experts,’ Boyle said, “Such false prophets lead people astray by
distorting the truth, indulging in falsification and distort every facet of the truth in order
to create evidence of self importance.” He claimed that both the UMW leadership and the
coal industry agreed that coal operators should be penalized for unsafe mines, and that
miners should not lose their jobs if they refused to work in a dangerous mine. He further
claimed that he “[had] no other ambition in life but to protect the underdog coal miners of
this country.”42
Several times during his speech, Boyle singled out Ken Hechler for criticism,
although he mostly refrained from referring to the congressman by name. At one point,
referring to Hechler’s appearance at the black lung rally in Charleston on January 26, he
ranted:
How many dollars have we [the union] spent? Over $2 billion to rehabilitate these
people. I didn’t say millions, I said billions of dollars to rehabilitate these people.
Then we are characterized as doing nothing. We didn’t get any donations, we
didn’t get any help, we didn’t get any assistance from these bologna experts. I
didn’t know he was a bologna expert until the other day, didn’t know he existed.43
In a fierce attack on consumer advocate Ralph Nader, Boyle stormed, “He has never been
in a coal mine. He has never come to see me. He has not asked me anything about coal
mines. He is not an expert.” Boyle threatened, “I will tell him, too, when I see him,
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physically, mentally, in the alley or anywhere he wants to see me.”44 Boyle was
especially critical of Nader’s letter to the West Virginia coal miners, which had been read
at the January 26 black lung rally. In that letter, Nader had disputed Boyle’s capabilities
as union president and called on the miners to displace him. Responding to the letter,
Boyle boasted that several delegates at the 1968 UMW Convention had submitted
resolutions calling for his election as union president for life. He claimed that the 2,000
delegates at the convention represented local unions, which showed there was strong
support for him among the rank and file. Moreover, he argued that because delegates
discussed every resolution on the convention floor, the convention “was more democratic
than the Congress of the United States.”

45

Boyle was asserting that he, not the Black

Lung Association or political figures such as Hechler or Nader, was the true voice of the
miners on health and safety issues.
Boyle distorted the truth, as he had on other occasions. He had filled the 1968
convention with his own supporters and used intimidation to prevent anyone from voting
against him, especially on mine safety and health issues. Furthermore, his staging of the
event in Denver, Colorado, far from the Appalachian mining communities, meant that
most genuine rank-and-file miners were unable to attend. With his aggressive and selfserving rhetoric, Boyle was trying to deflect criticism of the ineptitude and lethargy that
characterized his UMW leadership. His personal attacks on Ken Hechler and Ralph
Nader aside, not everyone was persuaded by Boyle’s representation of the union’s health
and safety record. In an interview for NBC television news, Hechler responded:
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[Since] the last coal mine safety legislation was passed [in 1952], only one
significant amendment was achieved as a result of the UMW’s efforts, and that
was to extend the provisions to those mines employing less than fifteen. All these
years, that’s the only little mouse that has been produced with all this laboring at
the mountain. The UMW should have been leading the parade for effective safety
legislation, when, as a matter of fact, all they’ve done is watch to see where the
parade was going and then try to run around in front of it.46
Several witnesses at the Senate hearings clashed over the incidence of
pneumoconiosis among coal miners. Most of the people who testified about the disease
used recent United States Public Health Service statistical data as their starting point. The
PHS figures showed that 1 in 10 active miners and 1 in 5 inactive miners suffered from
pneumoconiosis. U.S. Surgeon General Dr. William H. Stewart established a firm
connection between coal dust and Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis (CWP), which he
referred to as “an occupational disease of previously unrecognized magnitude.” He
claimed that the disease afflicted as many as 100,000 coal miners. Dr. Lorin E. Kerr, the
head of the UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund, lambasted the medical profession for its
failure to recognize the disease and take preventative measures against it. He estimated
that 125,000 of the country’s 144,000 coal miners were suffering from it. Consumer
advocate Ralph Nader further insisted that 150,000 active and retired miners had
advanced black lung disease and that tens of thousands more had it to a lesser degree.47
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Other witnesses who appeared before the General Labor Subcommittee
downplayed the prevalence of black lung disease, and even argued that it was not a
legitimate occupational disease. Dr. Paul Goss argued that coal dust was not harmful to
the lungs. Miners’ breathing problems, he argued, were more likely bronchitis or
emphysema induced by cigarette smoking, while Dr. Charles E. Andrews, a lung
specialist at West Virginia University, argued that pneumoconiosis affected only a small
minority of miners. The National Coal Association (NCA), assuming that the ratio of
active to inactive miners was four to one, calculated that 15,000 miners had the disease.
In a cautious statement that reflected the Nixon administration’s stance, Walter Hickel
stated that the PHS data on black lung disease was inadequate. In fact, Hickel maintained,
the extent of the disease could not be adequately measured.48
As the hearings progressed, additional legislative bills appeared before the
Subcommittee, including S. 1300 and S. 2917. The former, reflecting the official line of
the Nixon Administration, was conservative in its standards. It advocated an underground
dust limit of 4.5 milligrams per cubic meter of air, in contrast to the limit of 3.0
milligrams proposed by the Hechler bill. In keeping with Nixon’s opposition to federal
compensation, it did not contain any provisions for black lung compensation, and placed
few obligations on coal mine operators. Bill S. 2917, endorsed by Ken Hechler, was more
liberal than most of the other bills under deliberation. It proposed an intermediate dust
standard of three milligrams, with a further reduction to two milligrams within six years.
It also placed much of the responsibility for safety enforcement on the coal operators.
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Immediately after the hearings ended, on May 12, Jennings Randolph added
another bill to those already under consideration. It was far more conservative than any of
the bills submitted up to that point. Randolph’s bill abolished all monetary penalties for
safety violations. It also did not provide for basic underground amenities such as toilets
and had a weak dust standard. It further perpetuated the existence of the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Board of Review, an outdated agency set up to enforce the 1952
Mine Act.49 Although his action went largely unnoticed, the bill quickly drew the
attention of consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Outraged by the terms of the bill, and by
Randolph’s surreptitious introduction of it after the hearings had ended, Nader wrote an
open letter to Randolph, which he also distributed to several newspapers and media
organizations. In the letter, Nader complained that Randolph’s bill prioritized the coal
operators’ interests at the expense of the welfare of miners and their families. He accused
Randolph of being insensitive to the risks that coal miners faced, particularly the dust that
caused black lung disease. In a scathing attack on the Senator, Nader stated:
Coal mining is the most dangerous occupation in the country in the category of
trauma and far and away the most hazardous in the country in the category of
disease. Black lung strikes at about fifty percent of the working miners to a
significant degree, often ending in death. The misery and pain were brought to the
Senate hearings. You saw miners in such pain, you saw an actual black lung [from
an autopsy], you heard the testimony of experts abstracting the anguish and bodily
destruction of these cruelly depleted human beings who rely on you to represent
them. Why have you forsaken them? 50
Nader identified what he described as

“forty separate weakening provisions” in

Randolph’s legislation that nullified the terms of the Javits bill. For example, Randolph’s
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bill did not grant the Secretary of the Interior authority to change mining laws without the
consent of Congress, and it maintained the distinction between “gassy” and “non-gassy”
mines, a provision that would exempt so-called non-gassy mines from installing safety
equipment.51
Nader surmised that Stephen Dunn of the National Coal Association had inspired
Randolph’s bill. His guess was partly true, as the NCA had participated in the drafting of
the bill. To Nader, Randolph’s actions reflected the prevalence of coal industry lobbying
in congressional politics.52 When questioned by the media, Randolph claimed that he had
not read Nader’s letter. He also stressed that he was not “inflexible” to supporting a
different bill, as he had introduced two other legislative bills earlier in the year. He flatly
denied representing either the coal industry or the United Mine Workers. Two days after
the story first came to light, John Corcoran of the National Coal Association publicly
rejected Nader’s claim that his organization had played a significant role in authoring the
Randolph bill. While Corcoran admitted that he had met with Jennings Randolph on
several occasions, he said that the bill was largely the Senator’s own work.53
In his analysis of the Congressional hearings, Nader relied heavily on the
expertise of his general counsel, 32-year old Gary Sellers. Nader had originally hired
Sellers, a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School, to help him run the Center
for the Study of Responsive Law. The center was the base for Nader’s consumer
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investigations, which were executed by Ivy League college students known as “Nader’s
Raiders.” Prior to working for Nader, Sellers had been employed in the Natural
Resources Division of the Bureau of the Budget under the Johnson Administration.
During his time in the Bureau, Sellers had devoted much of his time to learning about
coal mine legislation. By the spring of 1969, he had compiled extensive data on coal
mine health and safety.54
The intense debate during the House and Senate hearings, which concluded in
mid-May, emphasized the political divisions that impeded the passage of new legislation.
The hearings solidified the lines of opposition between the competing interests in the
struggle for a new health and safety bill. On the one hand, there was a notable movement
for legislative reform. For example, Ken Hechler recommended stringent measures for
health and safety enforcement, including the dust standard of three milligrams, while Phil
Burton proposed a federal compensation program for black lung disease. On the other
hand, there was strong opposition to tougher coal mine laws. Senator Jennings Randolph
and UMW President Tony Boyle both actively tried to limit the scope of legislative
reform. Congress therefore faced a complicated task in its quest of strengthening coal
mine health and safety laws.
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Jock Yablonski: A Major Challenge to the Boyle Regime
On May 29, a small group of reporters gathered in the Pan-American room of the
Mayflower hotel in Washington D.C. The previous evening, Ralph Nader had telephoned
each of them to request their presence at a secret press conference by a key United Mine
Workers representative. The conference began with the arrival of Joseph “Jock”
Yablonski, a 33-year veteran of the union, and labor attorney Joseph Rauh. With Nader
sitting in the audience, and three men guarding the doors to the room, Yablonski
announced that he intended to challenge Tony Boyle for the presidency of the union in
the forthcoming election. By doing so, the relatively unknown Yablonski thrust himself
into the national spotlight and made the first significant challenge to the Boyle regime.
Born in Pittsburgh in 1910, Yablonski started working in the mines as a young
boy. He became actively involved in the United Mine Workers after his father died in a
mine explosion. He was first elected as a local union leader in 1934. Although Yablonski
had been a member of the union’s executive board since 1942, he was not the most likely
candidate to challenge Boyle’s leadership. Before he announced his candidacy, Yablonski
had always publicly supported Tony Boyle. In 1964, he campaigned for Yablonski’s reelection as president over rival candidate Steve Kochis. And, in his delivery of the
keynote speech at the 1968 UMW Convention, Yablonski praised Boyle’s
accomplishments as union leader. Boyle had recently appointed Yablonski the head of
the Labor Non-Partisan League, the political arm of the United Mine Workers, as a
reward for his loyalty.55
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Privately, however, Yablonski detested Boyle. In 1966, Boyle had forced him to
resign as leader of District 5 in retaliation for his unauthorized bid for the UMW national
presidency in the 1964 election.56 Yablonski reluctantly stepped down when Boyle
threatened to place District 5 into trusteeship. The district was one of only four that still
held democratic elections; in most districts, leaders were appointed directly by the union
president. Furthermore, Yablonski was convinced that Boyle was uninformed about
modern labor practices in the coal industry. In December 1962, an explosion at U.S.
Steel’s Robena mine in Pennsylvania had killed 37 men. At the scene of the disaster, a
reporter overheard Boyle, who was union vice-president at the time, dismissively asking,
“Did a trapper boy leave the door open?”57 The industry had not used trapper boys, who
controlled the streams of ventilation traveling through mines, for several decades.
Yablonski also knew that Boyle was using miners’ union dues to provide himself and
several of his family members with large salaries and lucrative pensions. Finally, he
disapproved of Boyle’s refusal to renegotiate the miners’ contract on their own terms and
his apparent disregard for health and safety.
Yablonski’s speech at the press conference reflected his private contempt for
Boyle. He launched into a blistering attack on Boyle’s record as UMW leader:
… In recent years, the present leadership has not responded to its men, has not
fought for their health and safety, has not improved grievance procedures, has not
rooted itself in the felt needs of the membership and has rejected democratic
procedures, freedom to dissent and the right of rank and file participation in the
small and large issues that affect the union.
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Contrary to Boyle’s claims at the recent Congressional hearings, Yablonski believed that
the UMW President had been inactive on the issue of health and safety. He attacked
Boyle for denying the rank and file the opportunity to vote on union policies, as they
were entitled by the UMW constitution. Yablonski was particularly critical of Boyle’s
failure to address black lung disease. He stated, “In recent months, the shocking
ineptitude and passivity of the union’s leadership on black lung disease – not to mention
its ignoring this massive disability of its men for years – became apparent to the nation,
not just those inside the union.”58 Yablonski believed that Boyle had conveyed his
disregard for black lung to the nation when he condemned the West Virginia Black Lung
Association earlier in the year.
Yablonski argued his decades of union experience made him a strong candidate
with the rank-and-file. As part of an eleven-point program, he proposed increasing the 40
cents per ton royalty for the union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund, adopting a more
assertive stance in contract bargaining, pushing industry to adopt the latest safety
equipment, and levying local and state extraction taxes to fund education programs in
Appalachia. He also advocated an increase in workers’ compensation and the expansion
of the union’s Safety Department.59
Yablonski knew that capturing the union presidency would be a difficult task. He
commented, “I am not naïve enough to think that there is not going to be much difficulty
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put in my way.” To run for the presidency, he first had to secure the nominations of fifty
union locals. Boyle had increased the number of required nominations from five to fifty
after his election in 1964. In acquiring the requisite number of local nominations,
Yablonski faced a significant challenge. Every local union was affiliated with a larger
district branch, and Boyle essentially controlled all the districts. Even in the districts
where there were still elections and Yablonski had firm support, Boyle had enough
financial and institutional power to manipulate the nominations in his favor. Although the
United States had filed suit five years previously to return full autonomy to the local
unions, the outcome of the case was still pending. The union had planned the nomination
period for one month beginning on July 9. 60
Joseph L. Rauh from the Department of Labor was Yablonski’s attorney for the
campaign. Nader for his part provided Yablonski with a full time legal researcher,
Beverley Moore, Jr., from Harvard Law School.61 Yablonski encountered obstacles from
the outset of his campaign. On June 2, he wrote to Boyle to ask the union to mail out his
campaign literature at his own expense, under the terms of the Landrum Griffin Act,
Section 401(c). Attorney Edward Carey, representing the union leadership, denied
Yablonski’s request. He argued that since Yablonski was not yet a ‘bona fide’ candidate,
the terms of the law did not apply to him. Joesph Rauh filed a motion with the federal
district court in Columbia, which later ruled that the union had to send out Yablonski’s
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campaign materials.62 The union leadership also ignored Yablonski’s request for
publication space in the United Mine Workers Journal.63
Although Boyle did not comment directly on Yablonski’s decision to run for
office, his actions showed he was unwilling to accept the challenge to his leadership. In
early June, he dismissed Yablonski as the head of the Labor Non-Partisan League,
claiming he had been neglecting his duties, and ordered him to report to District 5 for
reassignment. Joseph Rauh filed suit, arguing that Boyle’s actions were political in nature
and a violation of labor law.64 He challenged Boyle for dismissing Yablonski without
prior notice. Boyle responded that Yablonski had given his own notice the moment he
decided to challenge the union hierarchy by deciding to run for president. The coal
operators’ reaction to Yablonski’s announcement was mixed. Some welcomed the news,
while others feared that a union led by Yablonski would be harmful to their interests.65
Opposition against Yablonski intensified throughout the month of June. At a
meeting in Springfield, Illinois, on June 28, someone gave him a karate-chop to the back
of his neck and rendered him unconscious. His family doctor informed him the next day
that he had narrowly escaped paralysis or death.66 The identity of the perpetrator was
never discovered. On June 29, John Karlavage, a prominent Boyle staff campaigner, led
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the disruption of a Yablonski campaign meeting in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania. Still
recovering from the assault the previous day, Yablonski had appointed his vice-president
nominee Elmer Brown to head the meeting. Karlavage and his cronies burst into the hall
where the meeting was taking place and paraded around with banners and placards in
support of Boyle. One week later, at a meeting of local union 7113, John Aiello, a staff
member for district 17 and the financial secretary for local 7113, nominated Boyle for the
presidency, even though the nomination period had not started. He rejected another
miner’s nomination of Yablonski and declared that the nominations were closed.67
The attitude of the Boyle regime to Yablonski’s challenge reiterated its stance on
union democracy and key issues such as health and safety. It was unresponsive to the
concerns of the rank and file, and sought to maintain control of the coalfields. As the
nomination period began, Yablonski offered the miners the chance of safer and more
equitable working conditions, but he faced an enormous challenge to gain the required
amount of nominations, far less win the UMW presidency.

The Summer of Discontent
Throughout the summer of 1969, as the debate over coal mine legislation
continued, the divisions between competing interests became more even pronounced.
Representatives from the coal industry and the federal government assembled in New
York in June for the annual convention of the National Coal Association (NCA). The
convention emphasized that the majority of coal industry leaders were opposed to
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legislative reform. As the convention unfolded, the mine operators’ prioritization of coal
production ahead of miners’ welfare became clear.
At a convention panel discussion on June 16, John Corcoran, the head of the NCA
and President of Consolidation Coal, announced that Consolidation had decided to reopen
the Mannington (Farmington) mine. Although the company had not established a fixed
date, it planned to make the mine operational as soon as it had approval from the
Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Mines, the West Virginia Department of Mines,
and the United Mine Workers. Corcoran assured the audience that the bereaved families
would learn of the opening date before the general public, and that the company would
undertake the reopening as safely as it could. Consolidation’s decision to reopen the site
of the worst mining disaster in the post-World War II era suggested the coal industry was
obsessed with increased production.68
At the same time, Corcoran insisted that the Farmington disaster had persuaded
Consolidation of the need for tough federal health and safety legislation. He urged his
fellow operators to accept new mining laws, if not for humanitarian reasons, then out of
economic necessity. The industry would not be able to attract the required workforce
unless it offered a safe and healthful working environment. However, his company’s
decision to reopen the Farmington mine undermined the sincerity of his remarks. He cast
further doubt on his professed commitment to reform by objecting to the closure of
unsafe mines, as advocated by several recent legislative bills. Emphasizing the coal
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industry’s production-orientated focus, Corcoran justified his objection to mine closures
by arguing that coal was vitally important to the national economy and that production
could not be disrupted. He stated that Congress should create legislation based on factual
evidence, not emotions.69
George Judy, the president of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association
(BCOA), was more conservative than Corcoran in his assessment of mine health and
safety. In his view, safety could not be regulated because “Mother Nature reacts violently
and unexpectedly in countless ways to civilized man’s intrusion in her private domain to
steal her private treasures.”

70

Furthermore, Judy argued, coal miners were prone to

human error, and such error could not be controlled by legislation. He conceded that
certain minimum legislative standards were necessary, but only to the degree that
operators could strive for better working conditions. To Judy, the Federal Code, a set of
rules applying to companies that had signed a labor agreement with the United Mine
Workers, contained acceptable standards. With only vague health and safety provisions,
the code was limited in scope. It certainly did not address many of the industry’s biggest
risks, such as excessive underground dust levels.
Judy also condemned the United Mine Workers’ recent campaign to phase out the
flame safety lamp. He argued that the lamp, used to detect dangerous accumulations of
methane gas, operated on scientific principles. There was nothing better, he insisted, to
replace it. His most extreme proposal, however, was to prevent the Secretary of the
Interior from enforcing health and safety regulations. The Secretary’s role, maintained
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Judy, should be limited to ensuring conformity to standards in the context of daily
operations, not regulating health and safety from a distance.71 The position of the BCOA,
then, was that mine owners should be able to run their operations with minimal regulation
and government intervention. The BCOA had always strongly opposed federal
regulation, particularly preventative measures and compensation programs.72
James R. Garvey, the president of Bituminous Coal Research and vice-president of
engineering in the National Coal Association, denied that the industry opposed coal mine
dust standards. He complained that the bills before the House and the Senate were open
to conflicting interpretations and that the extraction of coal was just as important as
miners’ health. He argued that the dust standard of three-milligrams per cubic meter of
air, as proposed in the Hechler and UMW bills, would not guarantee better health
standards. Coal dust affected individual miners differently, contended Garvey, and a
better understanding of dust levels was required for a workable law to take effect.73
Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary also addressed the NCA convention.
While he admitted that the Bureau had “been remiss in [its] attention to health,” he felt
that the interim dust standard of 4.5 milligrams in the Nixon administration bill was
adequate. He believed it was unrealistic to expect operators to establish minimum dust
levels of three milligrams in less than three years.

71

74

O’Leary’s speech reflected the

Ibid., 6-7.

72

Curtis Seltzer, Fire in the Hole: Miners and Managers in the American Coal Industry
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 101.
73

“Panel Discussion on Mine Safety,” 8-10.

74

Ibid., 2-5.

134
official line of the Nixon administration, but it was also marked by an underlying tension.
O’Leary, who had adopted a stricter approach to enforcement after the Farmington
disaster, was trying to avoid conflict with the administration, following the dispute over
his resignation earlier in the year. His speech also indicated that he was conscious of the
need to bring a more humanitarian perspective to the Bureau’s research activities. He
remarked, “Our mining research to date has been preoccupied with one element of cost:
those that we can list as economic. I think more and more, not because we want to but
because we must, we are going to be forced to look upon human cost and environmental
cost as well.” 75
The NCA conference did not bode well for the prospects of a broad, liberal health
and safety law, particularly given the coal industry’s lobbying power in Washington D.C.
More so than the Congressional hearings, the conference revealed the industry’s
opposition to tough legislative standards. By way of confirmation, in the weeks that
followed, the coal operators stepped up their efforts to shape the terms of new coal mine
legislation.
In early July, Phillip Burton and Gary Sellers began collaborating on their own
health and safety bill. Burton was still convinced that new legislation should include
federal compensation for black lung victims. Sellers had approached him on the
recommendation of Representative Morris Udall (D-AZ), who served with Burton the
House Labor Subcommittee. Udall informed Sellers, “He’s got the personality of a brillo
pad, but he gets a lot done.”76 Sellers and his employer Ralph Nader also realized that
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Burton, as a representative from San Francisco, was not beholden to the coal industry’s
money or influence. Moreover, because he was not the head of a major Congressional
committee, they perceived him as “a tremendous strategist and tactician in the House.”77
The bill that Sellers and Burton began drafting proposed strict limits on coal dust,
improved standards for the quality of air and ventilation in underground mines, and,
crucially, federal payments to miners and miners’ widows affected by pneumoconiosis.
The bill was loosely based on the Johnson administration bill from the previous
September, which Sellers had helped to draft. Burton and Sellers focused in particular on
that bill’s “presumptive clause,” which stipulated that miners with lung ailments were
presumed to have an occupational illness and were thus automatically eligible for
compensation.78 The Johnson administration bill had been presented in modified form as
H.R. 1047 at the House Labor subcommittee hearings earlier in the year.
Burton hoped successful passage of the bill would allow him to establish new
connections, particularly with influential politicians in coal mining states, and enhance
his reputation among national labor unions. His determination to see strong federal
mining legislation passed, however, was not just rooted in his own political ambitions.
His intense engagement in the issue also emanated from genuine concern for miners and
their families. He was distressed by accounts of the hardships they suffered and
committed to using his expertise to solve their problems. 79 In his single-minded approach
to creating new legislation, Burton refused to abandon his own political values. He
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shunned the so-called “philosophical liberals” in Congress, who he perceived as weak
and unable to implement legislative proposals, and refused to compromise or negotiate
with Republicans, much to the despair of House Committee leader John Dent. In fact, he
openly advocated a coal mine dust limit of zero, rather than trying to reach a middle
ground with the Republicans.80
The Committee of Physicians, meanwhile, continued to rail against the coal
operators. On July 4, Dr. Isidore Buff led a miners’ rally at the Jefferson Memorial in
Washington, D.C. Brandishing a plastic bag containing what he claimed was blackened
tissue from a deceased miners’ lungs, he delivered an impassioned 40-minute speech, in
which he attacked “the enslavers and killers of coal miners.” He promised that the miners
would strike if operators did not take the health and safety issue more seriously. “This is
a warning, not a threat,” he stated, “but if the miners do not dig coal the economy of this
country will stop for 90 days. You would have no electricity. Factories would close. And
the country would be almost gone.” Ken Hechler, also attending the rally, stated, “Let the
word go forth to every coal miner throughout the nation, we will no longer tolerate the
conditions in the coal mines which produce disasters like Farmington. Let the word go
forth, the coal miner refuses to work in conditions of coal dust so high that it produces the
deadly black lung.”81
Buff’s threat of a strike was rendered less potent by the small attendance of less
than fifty miners. He alleged that United Mine Workers and the coal operators had falsely
80
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broadcast messages on West Virginia radio that the event was cancelled, a charge the
accused parties strongly denied. In reality, Buff was being over-ambitious in expecting a
large attendance of miners at the Washington, D.C. rally. Most Appalachian miners lived
far from the nation’s capital, and many did not have access to their own transportation.
The black lung movement in West Virginia had been successful because it was a local
movement, grounded not just in miners’ grievances about their working conditions, but
also in community and family. Nevertheless, the demonstration reaffirmed the black lung
leaders’ determination to use radical measures to make operators’ more sensitive to the
miners’ plight.
At a press conference on July 31, Buff’s two colleagues on the Physicians’
Committee, Dr. Hawey Wells and Dr. Donald Rasmussen, publicly announced their
endorsement of Jock Yablonski and Elmer Brown for the UMW leadership. Rasmussen
argued that the UMW leadership had completely failed to protect miners from the health
and safety hazards in the coal industry, and had offered them nothing but “ a stale diet of
alibi and artifice.” He continued, “Because I believe the rebirth of the UMW into a
vigorous and progressive labor organization is vital to the future well-being of the miner,
I am compelled to express publicly my endorsement of the candidacy of Joseph
Yablonski and Elmer Brown.”
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members of the state silicosis medical board, who, he claimed, had neglected miners’
interests.83
Yablonski, who had recently won his fight to remain head of the Labor NonPartisan League, did not attend the press conference. His continuing efforts to gain the
support of fifty local unions for his nomination meant he was working in his office in the
capital.84 Elmer Brown made an appearance, though, informing reporters that UMW staff
members were trying to stop the Yablonski-Brown ticket from gaining enough local
union support. He stated that he had been the recipient of several threatening phone calls.
His testimony was indicative of the ongoing difficulties that he and Yablonski faced in
challenging the Boyle regime.
Two weeks later, the UMW headquarters announced the results of the election
nominations. Yablonski had secured 96 nominations, enough to run for the presidency,
while his running mate, Elmer Brown, also was eligible with 86 nominations. Tony Boyle
had obtained 1,056 nominations.85 In a public statement, Yablonski commented, “Boyle
assumed that, with all the power at his command, no man could ever win the support of
fifty local unions, but he was wrong.”86 Despite securing his place as an election
candidate, Yablonski still faced a significant challenge. Boyle had secured over ten times
more nominations, which hindered Yablonski’s chances of winning the December
election.
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Throughout the summer, the Senate Labor Subcommittee deliberated the various
bills presented during the hearings, in the face of considerable outside pressure. The
Nixon Administration continued to push for a dust standard of 4.5 milligrams, while Ken
Hechler urged the subcommittee to endorse a bill with a standard of three milligrams per
cubic meter of air. The coal companies favored a weak bill with minimal dust regulations
and worked through Senator Jennings Randolph to achieve it.87

When the Senate

subcommittee started leaning towards S. 2917, a tough, progressive bill introduced in the
later stages of the Senate hearings, operators pressured Randolph to weaken a number of
its more stringent provisions. Still reeling from Nader’s accusation that he had abandoned
the nation’s miners, Randolph was maintaining a low profile, and he did not accede to
their demands. Bill S. 2917, endorsed by Harrison Williams, eliminated the distinction
between “gassy” and “non-gassy” mines, set the underground dust limit at three
milligrams, with a further reduction to two milligrams after six years, and mandated the
introduction of new equipment to reduce the risk of explosions. The subcommittee
ultimately passed bill S. 2917 to the full Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. On
July 31, the last day of Congressional proceedings before summer recess, the Committee
voted 17-0 to send bill S. 2917 to the Senate floor. 88
Jennings Randolph concluded that the bill was an important step forward in the
improvement of health and safety standards, but he was still torn between his conflicting
support for both the miners and the operators. He acknowledged that the bill would exact
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“heavy costs” on the coal industry.89 Jacob K. Javits, the ranking Republican member of
the Labor Subcommittee, praised the bill’s stringent dust standard. “By setting maximum
standards for coal dust, we have taken the major step necessary to seek to end the scourge
of black lung, which, up to now, has afflicted thousands of coal miners,” he said. 90 Javits
had supported the three milligrams limit from the outset, having tried to include that
provision in the Nixon administration’s original bill. However, the administration
instructed him to include the less stringent limit of 4.5 milligrams.
In the House of Representatives, the Labor Subcommittee’s deliberations extended
into the summer recess period. As the basis for its legislative bill, the subcommittee used
H.R. 1047, originally introduced by Representative John Dent. By late summer, the bill
was radically different from Dent’s original version. It included Burton and Sellers’
federal black lung compensation program, as well as several health and safety measures
devised by Ken Hechler, including an immediate dust standard of three-milligrams per
cubic meter of air, the prohibition of smoking in underground mines, and regular
inspections by the Bureau of Mines. Phil Burton, David Finnegan, and Gary Sellers
played an instrumental role in convincing the subcommittee to adopt Hechler’s
amendments.91 On August 6, the subcommittee made minor changes to the language of
bill H.R. 1047, before sending it to the full labor committee. The committee voted in
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favor of H.R. 1047 by 29 votes to 3 on September 18, and passed the bill to the House
floor.92

The Troubled Road to Change
The first day of full Senate deliberations on bill S. 2917 began on September 25,
1969. A key theme that emerged was the obligation of the federal government and the
coal operators to improve coal miners’ working conditions. In his opening address,
Harrison Williams, the chairman of the Senate Labor Subcommittee, predicted, “The bill,
however effective it may be, will never achieve adequate health and safety for the miner
unless the Department of the Interior acquires new perspective and focus concerning the
importance of the miner and unless there is strong and vigorous administration by the
Department.” Williams noted that the bill incorporated measures to address the failing
health and safety research program of the Bureau of Mines, the stagnant enforcement
agency in the Interior Department.93
For Williams, the success of the bill S. 2917 depended on the commitment of the
federal government: “The officials and employees of the Interior Department and the
Bureau of Mines must reorient their attitudes towards the miner. Business as usual is no

92

United States House of Representatives, House Report No. 91-563, “Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act,” October 13, 1969, United States Code: Congressional and
Administrative News, Vol. 2, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969 (St. Paul, Minnesota: West
Publishing Company, 1970), 2506.
93

United States Senate, Legislative History of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969 (Public Law 91-173) as Amended Through 1974, Including Black Lung
Amendments of 1972, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1975), 242. Hereafter, this document will be referred to as Senate, Legislative
History.

142
longer acceptable. They must develop the role of the “advocate” for the miner. They must
vigorously seek sufficient manpower and funds to do the job.”94 Williams’ assessment of
the federal government’s role emphasized the distance between the Subcommittee and
the Nixon Administration, which still favored a restrained and limited role for the
Department of the Interior in mine health and safety. More importantly, Williams framed
the obligations of the Department of the Interior not just in legal and political terms, but
also in moral terms. He stressed the need for the department to protect miners’ welfare,
and to direct considerable effort and finance into protecting miners from the hazards of
their work. Williams highlighted some of the other key components of the bill, including
its elimination of the distinction between ‘gassy’ and ‘non-gassy’ mines. The bill
stipulated that all mines, regardless of their classification, were required to install
machinery to reduce methane gas. Although gassy mines were more prone to explosions
because they contained higher levels of methane, Williams argued that applying the same
standards to both categories of mine was the only way to afford equal protection to all
coal miners.
Not everyone shared Williams’ perspective. Senator Jacob K. Javits, the author of
the Nixon administration’s health and safety bill, opposed eradicating the scientific
distinction between the two types of mine. He claimed that non-gassy mines had a much
better safety record than gassy mines.95 To support his argument, Javits presented
statistics from Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary, which showed that 374
workers had died and 427 had been seriously injured in methane explosions in the
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country’s 392 gassy mines over the past sixteen years. In contrast, there had only been 27
deaths and 54 injuries in non-gassy mines during the same period.96 Javits argued that
non-gassy operations posed far less risk of pneumoconiosis because, unlike gassy mines
owned by large corporations, they typically did not deploy the continuous mining
machine, and as a result were far less dusty.97 He neglected to mention that coal miners
had been suffering black lung disease since the late nineteenth century, long before the
continuous miner came into widespread use in the 1950s. The Senate rejected his
proposal to maintain the distinction between gassy and non-gassy mines.
Before voting on bill S. 2917, the Senate adopted an amendment that provided
federal compensation for black lung victims not covered by state workers’ compensation.
Under the terms of the amendment, single miners would receive $1,635 per year, while
miners with three dependents would receive up to $3,264 annually. The compensation
measure was originally part of a separate bill presented to the Senate by Robert C. Byrd
and a number of co-sponsors on behalf of the United Mine Workers. Following the black
lung movement’s success in West Virginia, the UMW devised the bill to provide benefits
for black lung victims in other states who were unable to apply for workers’
compensation. Senator Jennings Randolph played a crucial role in convincing the Senate
to approve the compensation measure. On October 2, the Senate unanimously passed bill
S. 2917 by 73-0, demonstrating that the improvement of miners’ working conditions
outweighed issues such as the financial cost of the bill’s implementation.98
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In early October, the House was still engaged in debate over H.R. 1047. As
representatives began to negotiate the final terms of the bill, Phillip Burton embarked on
an intensive lobbying campaign to gain support for the bill’s black lung compensation
provision. Both he and Gary Sellers exerted considerable pressure on Labor
Subcommittee Chairman John Dent. For two weeks, they spent their evenings in Dent’s
apartment in the Congressional Hotel, playing poker and eating Italian food, to ensure
that he did not attempt to dilute the bill. Burton told Sellers, “This is when the lobbyists
come out of the woodwork, and Dent will want to make concessions.”99 When the
lobbyists visited the apartment, Burton merely informed them that he and Dent would
discuss their proposals.100 Sellers, worried that Dent was going to submit to the pressure
of the lobbyists, proposed enlisting the help of Ken Hechler. He suggested that Hechler
should call a press conference and accuse Dent and the Labor Subcommittee of
supporting the coal industry. Burton agreed that the conference would erode the
lobbyists’ influence over Dent, but he cautioned Sellers, “Please don’t leave any
fingerprints.”101 Unaware he was being manipulated, Hechler appeared at the press
conference, where he attacked the committee for ‘selling out’ the coal miners. The
conference, which made national news headlines, worked. Dent was infuriated, as he
could no longer accede to the demands of the coal companies.102
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To ensure support for the bill, Burton set the compensation rate for black lung
victims at fifty percent of the benefits rate paid to GS-2 government employees.
Explaining the rationale of this move to Labor Subcommittee Staff Director Bob Vagley,
he predicted that no one would vote against compensation for a black lung victim who
received only half the benefits of the lowest-paid government worker. He also knew that
they would never have to increase the benefits again, as government raises were
automatic. Under Burton’s compensation scheme, individuals would receive $136 per
month, and miners with wives and three dependent children would receive $272.103
Burton obtained additional support for the bill by courting southern Congressmen.
On October 9, the House was scheduled to vote on a bill to limit agricultural subsidies to
$20,000 for a single farming business. Large farming corporations were opposed to the
bill, as it would cost them millions of dollars. Because many southern Congressional
representatives were dependent on the same corporations to stay in the office, they
wanted to see the bill overturned. Burton persuaded several liberal northern Congressmen
to vote against the bill, which was defeated by just four votes, 181-177. In the weeks that
followed, Burton used the defeat of the agricultural bill to pressure the southern
representatives into voting for the coal mine bill. He continually reminded them that he
was responsible for overturning the subsidies bill, and now they were obligated to repay
him.104 Burton’s political maneuvering was highly effective. On October 29, the House
passed the coal mine bill H.R. 1047 with the federal compensation provision intact, by a
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majority of 389 to 4. Federal benefits for coal miners were by no means assured, as the
provision still had to pass through the joint House-Senate conference committee. The
compensation measures in the House bill were stronger than those in the Senate version.
In the weeks that followed, the committee deliberated the final terms of the coal mine
health and safety legislation.
On December 9, the UMW held its presidential election with Tony Boyle and Jock
Yablonski as the candidates. While Yablonski had been successful in gaining the enough
local union nominations, he had encountered several other problems in recent months.
Despite frequent requests by his attorney Joseph Rauh, the Department of Labor had
refused to investigate the UMW for evidence of corruption and illegal practices against
Yablonski and Brown. The Department also refused to monitor the polling stations on the
day of the election. It stated it would not consider investigating the UMW leadership until
after the election.105 Yablonski had further damaged his own credibility by failing to
campaign in the first three weeks of August.106
When voting commenced, Boyle’s staff used violence or intimidation to prevent
Yablonski’s supporters from entering the polling station at a number of locations. In other
places, the UMW leadership changed the location of the polling station at the last minute.
Ralph Nader employed a number of his “raiders” to ensure the UMW followed fair
voting practices, but they had little overall impact. They were too small in number to
monitor all the polling stations and mostly were unable to stop the intimidation or
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manipulation of Yablonski’s supporters. Boyle won the election by a margin of almost
two to one, gaining 74,335 votes to Yablonski’s 40,847. Following his victory, Boyle
stated, “We regard this victory as the miners answer to those outside forces seeking to
substitute their judgment and values for those of the men who have risked life and limb to
dig the nation’s coal.”107 Yablonski accused Boyle of stealing votes by violating the
Landrum Griffin Act, otherwise known as the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, a 1959 law designed to prevent internal corruption in labor unions.108 The
Department of Labor still refused to carry out an investigation. The significant margin of
Boyle’s victory, combined with the union’s illegal practices on election day, emphasized
the corruption within the UMW. The re-election of Boyle to the national leadership
prevented the union from adopting democratic practices, such as the election of district
leaders, and stifled the reform of its health and safety policies.

The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
By late November, the conference committee had consolidated the House and
Senate bills into a single coal mine health and safety act.109 The final legislation retained
the strong health and safety measures from the individual bills in the House and Senate. It
prohibited underground smoking, mandated strict guidelines on roof supports, and
instructed operators to install ‘permissible’ equipment and machinery. Small operators
were given a deadline of five years to install the equipment, in contrast to the four years
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accorded to large corporations. The bill also set an immediate mandatory dust standard of
three milligrams per cubic meter of air, with a further reduction of one milligram within
three years. The Bureau of Mines, the mine safety agency in the Department of the
Interior, was responsible for enforcing the legislation by conducting inspections of all
underground coal mines and imposing financial penalties on operators who violated the
law. Where conditions posed an immediate threat to miners’ safety, the Bureau was
required to shut down the mine. The law, however, did not incorporate Ken Hechler’s
recommendation of assigning safety enforcement to the Department of Labor.
The final bill retained the federal compensation program for miners totally
disabled by pneumoconiosis and widows of miners who had died from the disease. The
Social Security Administration (SSA), a branch of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, was to process all benefit claims filed before December 31, 1972. It was
responsible for conducting medical examinations to determine which miners qualified for
benefits, and for administering benefits of $272 per month to those who were eligible.110
The Federal Mine Act defined pneumoconiosis as “a chronic dust disease of the lung
arising out of employment in an underground coal mine.”111 The key diagnostic test for
detecting total pneumoconiosis was the X-ray exam. If a miner’s X-ray was positive,
additional medical testing was required. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare was responsible for conducting research into dust abatement and other measures
to prevent black lung disease. Furthermore, it was required to conduct studies into the
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prevalence of black lung disease in the coal industry by subjecting miners to regular
compulsory X-ray exams.112
On December 17, the House of Representatives assembled to vote on the bill. A
small faction of Republicans who were opposed to the bill’s liberal terms tried to redirect
it back to the conference committee. Representative John Erlenborn (R-IL) claimed the
bill would provide compensation to miners with diseases other than pneumoconiosis. He
argued that the conference committee version made ‘simple’ pneumoconiosis a
compensable disease, while the individual bills passed by the House and the Senate only
provided compensation to the victims of complicated pneumoconiosis. His assessment
was completely inaccurate and designed solely to diminish congressional support for the
bill. The language of the bill stated clearly that only miners who were completely
disabled by pneumoconiosis should receive compensation.113 A number of Democratic
Representatives strongly contested Erlenborn’s claims. Carl D. Perkins argued that the
conference report was far more precise in its instructions and guidelines than the original
Senate version. Similarly, Representative James O’Hara (D-MI) asserted that the
conference committee report had not gone beyond the Senate bill in its health and safety
measures.114 John Dent emphasized that the federal compensation program provided an
income for black lung victims who were unable to work.115
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The bill was opposed not only by a minority within the Republican Party, but also
by the Nixon administration. The same day, the administration stated it would veto the
legislation if it passed through the House and Senate. The president publicly claimed he
objected to the bill in both “substantive and fiscal” terms, but he mainly opposed it
because he was unwilling to finance the cost of the pneumoconiosis compensation
program, which his aides estimated would cost $385 million per year. The administration
had delayed making its opposition known, despite having had access to a copy of the
legislative bill for almost a month. 116
In contrast, Ken Hechler, who was responsible for most of the bill’s key
preventative health and safety measures, highlighted his satisfaction with the new bill. He
commented, “Mr. Speaker, this is a magnificent piece of legislation. It is strong and
effective in its terms. It is a tribute to the initiative and hard work of Congress.” Referring
to the conservative mine health and safety bill drafted by the Nixon administration,
Hechler said, “Had the Congress followed the advice of the executive branch, this would
have been a milk and water piece of legislation instead of a brick and mortar piece of
legislation. Had the Congress followed the advice of the executive branch, there would
have been little protection for the health and safety of the coal mines of this Nation.”117
Hechler warned the Nixon administration not to veto the legislative bill. He
commented, “Every action taken by the White House during the consideration of this
legislation was in the form of trying to weaken, delay or eliminate provision for the
protection of coal miners. Now it ill behooves the President and a member of the
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President’s Cabinet to send a message here at the last minute in an effort to stall or kill
this legislation.”118 Hechler acknowledged the impact of the Farmington disaster in the
creation of the new legislation. “The major drive for this legislation began immediately
after the tragic fire and explosions at Consol No, 9 Mine in Farmington, W. Va. resulting
in the deaths of 78 miners on November 20, 1968. Passage of this legislation is a fitting
monument to the memory of the 78 miners who lost their lives at Farmington. Their
widows have waited 12 months since Farmington for the passage of this legislation.”119
The House voted by a clear majority of 258 to 83 to pass the bill. The following
day, December 18, the Senate approved the bill by majority voice vote. President Nixon’s
opposition to the federal black lung program, however, meant the enactment of the
legislation was still in doubt. On December 29, 1,2000 miners went on strike in West
Virginia in response to Nixon’s plan to veto the bill. Nixon, worried that the strike would
spread through the coalfields and jeopardize coal-fuelled energy for New Year week,
decided to sign the bill. His announcement that he would sign the bill coincided with the
arrival of seven Farmington widows in Washington D.C. The widows had been flown
there at the personal expense of Ken Hechler to press Nixon to enact the legislation.120
Speaking before television cameras, one of the widows, Mrs. Kaznoski, said, “This is a
wonderful day for all miners.” The widows were taken on a tour of the White House,
although they did not meet the president.121
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On December 30, Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969 into law, describing it as “an historic advance in industrial practices.” Reiterating
his opposition to the compensation provision, Nixon stressed that the bill was not a
precedent for federal compensation programs in other industries. He also emphasized that
the federal compensation program for miners was only a temporary measure, until the
states assumed control of the program in 1973.122 The passage of the Federal Coal Mine
Act followed almost a year of heated legislative debate. It introduced long overdue health
and safety reforms for the coal industry, designed to improve the working conditions of
the nation’s miners and provide compensation to those suffering from pneumoconiosis.
The Act was set to become effective on March 30, 1969, giving the U.S. Bureau of Mines
just three months to draft the technical standards required for operators to implement the
act.

Conclusion
The passage of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act emphasized
the importance of coal mining to the American economy at the end of the 1960s.
President Nixon signed the legislative bill to avoid a potential nationwide strike and,
consequently, the disruption of the nation’s coal production. Although Nixon was not
unfavorable to coal mine health and safety reform, having introduced the Javits bill in
March of that year, he was strongly opposed to a federal compensation program for
miners, which he felt was both too costly and an infringement of states’ rights. His
passage of the bill therefore reflects the substantial political and economic power the
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nation’s coal miners had gained during 1969.
In a broader sense, though, the bill emphasized that the United States federal
government had finally recognized the occupational hazards faced by the nation’s coal
miners. The Federal Coal Mine Act symbolized greater awareness of the human costs of
industrial production. This awareness was driven in large part by the efforts of dedicated
Congressional representatives such as Ken Hechler and Phil Burton, and was also
sustained by activists such as Ralph Nader, UMW insurgent Jock Yablonski, and the
three renegade doctors in the Committee of Physicians. Despite heated conflict in both
the House and Senate over the new coal mine legislation, their efforts were critical in the
passage of the final bill.
Yet, the re-election of Tony Boyle to the presidency of the United Mine Workers
suggested there were clear limits to the reform of miners’ conditions. As Joseph
Yablonski and Elmer Brown continued to press the Department of Labor for an
investigation of the election, Boyle’s record on health and safety cast doubt on the
union’s commitment to the new legislation. At the end of 1969, there was, therefore, a
clear split in the UMW. Despite this tension, coal miners still faced a brighter future and
the prospect of a safer, more healthful working environment.
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Chapter Four
A Turbulent Year:
Grassroots Protest and the Failure of Federal Health and Safety Enforcement in
1970
Introduction
On January 5, 1970, Kenneth Yablonski, the son of United Mine Workers
presidential candidate Joseph A. Yablonski, went to his parents’ home in Clarksville,
Pennsylvania, after being unable to contact them by telephone. On entering the house, he
found his father, his mother Rita Wasicek, and his sister Charlotte shot dead. The state
police quickly determined that they had been murdered. They concluded that more than
one perpetrator was involved. Charlotte and Margaret had been killed as they slept, while
Joseph Yablonski’s body was sprawled on the floor of the spare bedroom. He had been
sleeping there to avoid disturbing his wife with his loud snoring. Detective Munz
speculated that he had awoken and made “an instinctive grab” for a rifle in the far corner
of the room. Based on the contents of the mailbox outside, the police determined that the
family was killed on New Year’s Eve. The phone wires to the house had been cut, while
the tires of the cars in the driveway had been slashed.
Joseph “Chip” Yablonski, the other surviving son, immediately charged the
United Mine Workers with his father’s death. He told reporters. “You guys just didn’t
believe how rotten this union was.” Tony Boyle denied that the union was involved in the
murders. In a public statement, he said, “I do not know at this time what caused the
deaths of Brother Yablonski, his wife, and his daughter, but whatever the cause, the
violent deaths of three members of the Yablonski family can only be called a tragedy.”
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Boyle offered to give his full cooperation to the authorities’ investigation of the murders.
At the request of the surviving Yablonski family members, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) became involved in the investigation.1
On hearing the news of his death, West Virginia politicians paid tribute to
Yablonski. Secretary of State John D. Rockefeller IV said, “I was very strongly moved
by his intensity and commitment to making the life of the coal miner better. And if the
life of the coal miner does get better – and I think it will – Jock Yablonski deserves a lot
of the credit.” Ken Hechler commented, “He was not afraid of threats or beatings. Coal
miners throughout the nation owe Joseph Yablonski a lasting debt for speaking out for
the rights of the rank and file coal miner.”2 Ralph Nader, although shocked by the news,
felt the murders typified the violence and harsh realities of Appalachian coal country.3
While the national media was reluctant to make direct accusations about who was
responsible for Yablonski’s death, it hinted strongly at union involvement. The editorial
staff at the New York Times had its suspicions that the United Mine Workers was
involved in the murders. Without substantial evidence, the newspaper refrained from
saying as much explicitly. It stated, “Violence is part of the tradition of mine unionism,
and it was no secret to Joseph Yablonski, a man as rugged as coal, that death might be the
price of his challenge to the leadership of the United Mine Workers.” The New York
Times was referring indirectly to another incident that almost cost Yablonski his life. As
1
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illustrated in chapter two, he narrowly avoided death in June 1969 when someone gave
him a karate chop to the back of his neck during a campaign meeting. The editorial
further stated:
There is, of course, no evidence to support the assertion of Pennsylvania state
police that his murder and that of his wife and daughter represented “an act of
vengeance.” Much less can anyone know whether Yablonski’s distraught sons are
right in charging that the deaths were the work of “professional assassins.” The
union has condemned the killings and plans to post a large reward to help bring
the murderers to justice.4
The newspaper refused to support claims by the Pennsylvania state police that UMW
representatives had murdered Yablonski for contesting Tony Boyle’s leadership in the
recent presidential election. It also refused to endorse accusations made by Kenneth and
Joseph “Chip” Yablonski that the UMW had hired professional assassins to kill their
father, their mother, and their sister. Furthermore, it evaded making direct accusations by
highlighting the union’s condemnation of the murders and its promise of a reward for the
arrest of the killers. Yet the New York Times hinted shrewdly at union involvement in the
murders by commenting, “But the public will be glad that Attorney General Mitchell has
assigned the F.B.I. to the probe. Even the shadow of terror must be removed from union
affairs, and that cannot be done until every fact in this monstrous tragedy has been
brought to light…”5
The January 7 editorial in the Washington Post adopted a similar approach. It
stated, “Seeking the presidency of the union, [Yablonski] spoke out, as Rep. Ken Hechler
put it, for the rights of the rank-and-file coal miner. Apparently that challenge cost him,
as he feared it might, his life – and the lives of his wife and daughter.” Like the New York
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Times, the Washington Post noted that Yablonski had perceived death as a possible cost
of his election campaign. The Post also did not blame the UMW explicitly for the
murders, stating, “To say this is by no means to say, or even to suggest, that the union
leadership he attacked had anything to do with the assassination of the Yablonski family.
The killings may have been the work of chance, sadistic intruders.” It went further than
the New York Times, however, by implying that miners opposed to Jock Yablonski’s
election campaign may have carried out the killings. It also acknowledged claims by
Kenneth and Chip Yablonski that vengeance was a motivating factor in the murders:
More probably, however, they were in some way, direct or indirect, a
consequence of the bitterness of the union election campaign and of Mr.
Yablonski’s exposed position on the front lines, and may well have been
perpetrated by fanatical individual partisans. Robbery seems not to have been a
motive. Revenge might have been…6
The editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post implied that the union was
characterized by intimidation and violence and unwilling to engage in open dialogue or
follow democratic principles. As the New York Times noted, this was not a new
development, but rather part of a long history of violence and corruption within the
UMW. The editorials also encapsulated the hostility and resentment that defined the
union’s presidential election in 1969. While the New York Times and Washington Post
refrained from naming a suspect to avoid libel charges, their editorials also reflected an
element of fear, that if the union was responsible for Yablonski’s death, then no one was
safe. The murders made Yablonski’s close associates particularly apprehensive. In a
handwritten letter to Ken Hechler on the day the murders were reported, Jesse Stuart, an
author from Kentucky, warned:
6
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Whatever you do be careful with your own life. I think you are in danger. Once I
was warned – didn’t heed the warning and almost got killed. You were with
Yablonski – and I think both of you honest men are definitely right – now he, his
wife, and daughter are dead. I’ll say you are a marked man in this situation
because you stand for law, order, and right. You cannot stand any other way. Do
be careful. I think you should have protection when you return to West Virginia.7
Stuart believed that opponents of political and legislative reform had killed Jock
Yablonski. He was concerned that the killers would target Hechler because of his support
for Yablonski and his pivotal role in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act.
The union was not the only source of danger in the coalfields. The coal operators had
long engaged in violence and intimidation to control their workforce and prevent dissent
from company policy.
The death of Joseph Yablonski, the only person who had been able to mount
substantial opposition to Boyle’s leadership, effectively meant that the majority of rank
and file miners were without a representative voice in the union. With the 1969 Federal
Mine Act, the Nixon Administration had shown its commitment to afford coal miners
greater protection, but the one institution that was supposed to fight for safe working
conditions, the United Mine Workers, was still more concerned about the coal operators
than its members. Angered by Yablonski’s murder and the lack of democracy within the
union, thousands of miners across Appalachia took matters into their own hands by
declaring a wildcat strike. On January 6, around 7,000 miners in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
northern West Virginia walked off the job. By the following day, the strike had escalated
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to 20,000 miners. The strike paralyzed production at a number of mines, threatening to
jeopardize coal supplies to electrical power plants.8
At a rally in Monongah, West Virginia, 150 striking miners vowed not to return to
work until Boyle and other UMW leaders had taken lie detector tests about the murders.
Captain Joseph C. Snyder of the Pennsylvania state police said such tests would only be
effective if the evidence pointed towards a particular suspect. He revealed that the police
had not yet uncovered any clues about the perpetrators. Ken Hechler added weight to
Snyder’s comments, stating that “[he was] convinced that the top leaders of the U.M.W
did not direct the brutal murders.” Hechler contended that a low-ranking union official
might have carried out the murders to cover up illegal activities during the union election
campaign. Despite the assurances of Hechler and Snyder, by January 10, the day of the
Yablonski family funeral in Pennsylvania, thousands of miners remained on strike. 9
Two weeks later, police arrested three men on suspicion of the murders. Two of
them, Paul Gilly and Aubran Martin, were later convicted and sentenced to death, while
the third, Claude Vealey, received a life sentence after agreeing to testify against his
fellow accomplices. Gilly’s wife also received a life sentence for her role in the murders.
Police continued to investigate, and by 1973, they had uncovered evidence directly
implicating Tony Boyle in the murders. The UMW president had provided union funds to
Albert Pass, a member of the executive council, to hire assassins to kill Yablonski. Both
Boyle and Pass, along with a third union representative, Silous Huddleston, received life
sentences for their role in the murders. Boyle had ordered the murder of Yablonski
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because of his campaign pledge to remove voting rights from retired miners, which were
the main source of Boyle’s power. 10
Although the Yablonski murders created an atmosphere of fear and apprehension
in the Appalachian coalfields, the subsequent wildcat strike foreshadowed the grassroots
protest that spread across the coalfields in 1970. The most visible manifestation of this
protest was the small group of miners and labor activists who formed the Miners for
Democracy (MFD), an organization that sought to bring democracy to the UMW and to
reform its approach to health and safety issues. The rank and file, along with disabled and
retired miners and the widows of black lung victims, also engaged in protest. Most
notably, they challenged the failure of the new Federal Coal Mine Act. They were
particularly aggrieved at its black lung compensation program, which was denying
benefits to many pneumoconiosis victims. They also criticized its preventative health and
safety measures. Throughout 1970, the federal government’s enforcement of the 1969
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was woefully inadequate. The Bureau of
Mines, the agency in the Department of the Interior charged with enforcing the
legislation, was under-staffed, under-funded, and encumbered by bureaucratic red-tape.
As a result, it was unable to fulfill its role as an enforcement agency. It continued to lean
more towards production and the interests of the coal operators than safety enforcement.
President Nixon also showed a lack of sincere commitment to health and safety,
particularly in his policy decisions regarding the Bureau of Mines.
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Crucially, miners built on the experience of the activists in West Virginia in early
1969, empowering themselves to press for more equitable distribution of black lung
benefits and better enforcement of the 1969 Mine Act. Throughout 1970, a conscious and
determined activism swept the Appalachian coalfields, as miners and their communities
campaigned for improved working conditions.
The Bureau of Mines and the Problems of Enforcement
In the early months of 1970, the Nixon Administration had already cast doubt on
its commitment to reform coal mine working conditions. Before the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act went into force on March 30, 1970, the Bureau of Mines had to
clarify a number of issues, including the standards for coal mine dust levels and the
specifications for underground roof support systems. The Bureau’s work on the new
standards, however, was hindered by President Nixon’s decision in January to fire
director John F. O’Leary. Nixon had attempted to dismiss O’Leary the previous year, but
reversed his decision to gain support for his domestic defense program. When Nixon
dismissed O’Leary in 1970, he used a letter of resignation O’Leary had submitted in early
1969 as the basis of his dismissal. The letter did not reflect O’Leary’s desire to leave his
position. O’Leary, a Democrat, had become head of the Bureau in September 1968 while
the Johnson Administration was still in power. When Nixon became president, every
member of the outgoing Johnson administration was required to submit a resignation
letter as a matter of course. Nixon retained O’Leary because of the intense public focus
on mine health and safety generated by the Farmington disaster.11
The rationale behind Nixon’s decision to fire O’Leary went beyond a simple letter
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of resignation. The president was reacting to pressure from the coal operators, who
disliked O’Leary’s strong measures to enforce health and safety in the coal industry.
O’Leary later claimed he was dismissed because he was pushing for a tough
interpretation of the new legislation. Referring to the coal operators, he said, “I think they
felt it was not in their best interest to have me administering the Act once it went into
effect. You know, the mining industry doesn’t like to be regulated.”12 He also sensed that
“the Nixon Administration would rather have someone administering a program who was
accepted by the people against whom that program was directed.”13 Several Democratic
representatives argued that Nixon was acquiescing to pressure from the coal industry by
removing O’Leary from the Bureau. Ken Hechler contended that the industry was
determined to dilute the 1969 Federal Mine Act. The president gave credence to such
arguments by neglecting to appoint another director after O’Leary had served out his
notice in March. In fact, the debate over who should succeed him dragged on for almost
six months. In the interim period, Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel managed the
Bureau.14
Other problems in the Bureau of Mines did not bode well for its role as a safety
enforcement agency. On passing the Federal Mine Act, Congress advised the Bureau to
publish the specific coal mine safety regulations by February 28, 1970. The Bureau had
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not published the regulations by that date. Officials attributed the missed deadline to the
complexity of the legislation and the narrow deadline set by Congress to prepare it.
Frustrated by the Bureau’s inaction, one coal miner and three Democratic Representatives
filed a lawsuit to compel the Nixon administration to publish the legislation immediately,
but without success. The Bureau eventually published the regulations on March 28, just
two days before the new legislation was scheduled to go into effect.15
The law went into effect at the end of March as scheduled. In the first ten days,
Bureau inspectors issued 1,830 penalty notices and shut down ten mines. Mine operators
did not hesitate to raise their grievances against the Bureau’s zealous approach. Many
argued that the severe terms of the act might jeopardize the provision of coal-fuelled
electrical services. The owners of small mining operations complained to federal officials
that the substantial financial costs of adhering to the new legislation would drive them out
of business, a claim that was not unfounded. In the same ten-day period, 272 mines
voluntarily closed because they could not adhere to the new law. According to some
industry representatives, however, the operators deliberately shut down their operations
to protest the Federal Mine Act. Across the Appalachian coalfields, operators pressured
the Bureau of Mines to modify the regulations. At the American Mining Congress
convention in Ohio in May, Jesse F. Core, the vice-president of the U.S. Steel
Corporation, said the federal law “was conceived in an emotionally charged atmosphere
and must be sent back to Congress for reconsideration.” In Virginia, a group of small
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operators obtained an injunction against the Bureau, which prevented it from issuing
harsh penalties or sanctions.16
Yet, the Bureau was not as tough and unrelenting as the mine operators and their
supporters in Congress made out. Hollis M. Dole, Assistant Interior Secretary for Mineral
Resources, argued that coal industry was exaggerating the impact of the new law. The
enormous scope of the Bureau’s task meant that it struggled to enforce the law. On April
4, Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel announced that the Bureau would be unable to
enforce the Federal Mine Act to its full extent for several months, as it did not have
enough inspectors. He admitted that the Bureau had just 220 inspectors for 2,832 coal
mines. Until the Bureau had acquired enough staff, it would inspect coal mines “on a
partial but representative basis.” During its inspections between April 19 and 25, the
Bureau found more than 1,000 violations of the law across 108 mines, but the shortage of
inspectors meant it was unable to impose sanctions on those mines or set deadlines for
modification of the violations. Because the inspectors were stretched so thinly across a
large area, they would not be able to follow up on the violation notices.17
Even in light of the Bureau’s ineffectiveness, the mine owners found support for
their grievances in Congress. On April 22 1970, Democrat John H. Dent condemned the
Bureau of Mines for not allowing flexibility in its enforcement of the new law. Other
representatives in the House echoed Dent’s comments, accusing Interior Secretary Walter
Hickel of not exercising enough discretion in his enforcement policies. Their objection
16
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was not that the law was too harsh on mine owners, but rather that federal mine officials’
stringent enforcement policies had given mine owners the incentive to fight it. Moreover,
they held the view that there was not enough distinction between different violations of
the legislation. Operators who did not maintain a bulletin board faced fines as severe as
those who were found responsible for endangering human life.18
In its first month, the Federal Coal Mine Act had little impact on injuries and
fatalities in the coal industry. The Bureau of Mines came under further scrutiny in early
May, when the Nixon Administration officially nominated 41-year old J. Richard Lucas
to be its new director. Lucas was head of the mining engineering department at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, where he had headed a number of studies for the coal industry and
the Bureau. As an undergraduate, he had spent time working in an underground coal mine
in Pennsylvania. His nomination resulted in large part from the influence of Virginia
Governor Linwood Holton, who was acting on behalf of a coalition of operators who
opposed the 1969 mining law. The operators hoped that Lucas’s background in the coal
industry meant he would protect their interests.19
Representative Ken Hechler and Senator Harrison William led the attack against
Lucas, arguing that he did not have the correct qualifications for the position.
Representative John P. Saylor (R-PA) also criticized the administration’s choice. In a
letter to Nixon, Saylor charged that Lucas was “totally unqualified” for the position and
that his lack of experience was “a roadblock” to the effective functioning of the Bureau.
18
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The biggest threat to Lucas’s candidacy, however, was not political rhetoric, but a series
of damaging articles in the national press. According to reports, the Johnson
Administration had rejected Lucas for the same position in 1965, in response to a Federal
Bureau of Investigation report that alleged he plagiarized his doctoral thesis. During its
routine screening of Lucas, the F.B.I. had interviewed several professors at Columbia,
some of whom charged that he had copied sections of his thesis. Lucas’s doctoral
research challenged the popular conception that nuclear power was set to become the
main source of energy in the United States to the detriment of coal. Although a more
extensive F.B.I investigation showed the allegations were unfounded, Lucas was still
forced to deny them at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs on May 27. The allegations tainted Lucas’s public profile and jeopardized his
appointment as Bureau director.20
The pressure on Lucas continued to escalate. Writing to Senator Henry M.
Jackson, chairman of the Senate Committee, Ken Hechler stated that the new Bureau
director “must be a man with a thorough knowledge of the law, a capacity for leadership,
a man who places the highest priority on the health and safety of the miners. Dr. Lucas
has failed to demonstrate that he possesses the qualities enumerated.”21 Pressure from
Hechler and other members of Congress caused Jackson’s committee to twice delay its
vote on Lucas’s appointment. By July 7, Hechler was predicting that Lucas would either
reject the position or be turned down by the Senate Committee. Four days later, on July
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11, Lucas asked President Nixon to withdraw his nomination as Bureau director. In his
letter to Nixon, Lucas attributed his decision to personal reasons, including “financial
hardship.” Thus, four months after O’Leary’s departure, the Bureau was still without a
director.22
The

controversy

over

Lucas’s

appointment

emphasized

the

Nixon

administration’s attitude to coal mine health and safety. Clearly, Nixon did not see
rigorous enforcement of the Federal Mine Act as a priority. Many of his administration’s
decisions in the past six months had been indicative of a desire to weaken the
effectiveness of the act. The influence of Governor Holton and the Virginia operators’
coalition in the nomination of Lucas demonstrated that Nixon placed the interests of coal
companies ahead of the miners who extracted the coal from the ground. In a broader
sense, though, Nixon’s actions reflected the larger political climate of the early 1970s.
The liberalism that had prevailed just a few years earlier had collapsed, and the United
States was leaning towards a more conservative order.

The Fight Continues: The Revival of Coalfield Activism
The ineptitude of the Bureau of Mines and Nixon’s questionable attitude to
reform were not the only problems hindering health and safety enforcement in the early
months of 1970. Joseph Yablonski’s supporters also were faced with the problem of how
to deal with a corrupt and potentially dangerous union leadership. The funeral of the late
union activist and his wife and daughter in early January provided the vehicle for
continued rank and file activism against the Boyle regime. At a meeting in a local church
22
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hall after the funeral, a small group of activists decided to continue their fight against the
union leadership. Elmer Brown, the vice-presidential candidate on the Yablonski ticket,
reluctantly agreed to participate. After the murders had been perpetrated, but before they
had been discovered, he had received a death threat by telephone. Married with eleven
children, Brown feared for the safety of himself and his family. J. Davitt McAteer, a
young law student who was studying coal mine health and safety in West Virginia for
Ralph Nader, was also present. So too were Chip and Kenneth Yablonski and Harry
Patrick, a union activist who had supported Yablonski’s campaign.23
At first, they struggled to attract supporters. The majority of coal miners lived in
fear that they and their families would be the next targets of the same people who had
killed the Yablonski family. One black lung activist later commented, “Everything kind
of went underground. Everybody started carrying guns, getting floodlights for their yards,
running around with big dogs, that kind of thing. It was a very scary time.”24
Those willing to protest openly renewed their appeal to the Department of Labor
to investigate the irregularities in the union election. In a letter to Secretary of Labor
George Shultz, written on behalf of the Yablonski family, lawyer Joseph Rauh argued the
Department of Labor had contributed to Joseph Yablonski’s murder by failing to
investigate the election. Rauh demanded an immediate probe of the union leadership,
particularly its tactics during the election campaign. Elmer Brown took a more direct
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approach, writing to Shultz and John Mitchell of the Justice Department to request his
immediate appointment as union president. Brown believed that an investigation of the
election and Yablonski’s murder would show “that a new election is not necessary, but
rather that I should be appointed President.”25 Brown reaffirmed this belief in a letter to
the UMW International Tellers, the officials appointed to count the election votes. He
argued that the substantial evidence of irregularities on election day should bar Boyle
from continuing as president. Brown charged that Boyle had misused union funds to buy
votes, used violence and intimidation against Yablonski’s supporters, and unlawfully
instructed retired miners to vote.26
While Rauh and Brown’s letters touched on internal union politics, they also
indicated the activists’ growing hostility towards Tony Boyle. The activists aimed not
just to challenge Boyle’s leadership, but also to reform the United Mine Workers of
America. Their campaign ultimately sought to reshape the union so it was more
responsive to rank and file concerns. Rauh and Brown attacked seven years of corruption
under Boyle and declining safety standards in the mines. They still believed, however,
that the union was an effective vehicle for reform; it was the leadership itself they were
attacking.
The activists soon abandoned their initially cautious approach. In April 1970, they
formed a new organization, Miners for Democracy (MFD). During the meeting, Mike
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Trbovich was elected as leader of the organization. MFD saw itself as a viable alternative
to the UMW leadership. It pursued a number of tactics, such as putting forward
candidates for district elections, assessing occupational health legislation before
Congress, and actively seeking to overturn the 1969 election result. In early summer, the
activism in the coalfields started to escalate. The Miners for Democracy was by no means
the only organization involved. Several groups pushed for different, although not
incompatible, objectives. The Association of Disabled Miners and Widows played an
instrumental role in campaigning for black lung benefits for widows and retired miners.
A group called Designs for Rural Action also played a prominent role, by narrowing its
original focus on poverty and community work to black lung activism. Robert Payne, a
militant black miner, formed the Disabled Miners and Widows of South West Virginia
(DMW/SWV), a more radical organization than the Association of Disabled Miners. The
DMW/SWV was at the forefront of the protest movement that swept Appalachia in late
June and July.27
On June 9, Payne wrote to Boyle to request a meeting about the union’s Welfare
and Retirement Fund. The DMW/SWV opposed the union’s practice of seizing disabled
miners’ hospital cards after one year of care and not returning them until the miners had
reached the age of sixty-five. The union also refused to provide hospital cards to miners’
widows. The DMW/SWV also sought to improve the pension coverage provided by the
Welfare and Retirement Fund, especially given the lucrative pension plan Boyle had
established for himself, his family, and his colleagues. Boyle was set to retire with his full
annual salary of $60,000, while most retired miners were scheduled to receive only $125
27
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per month from the Welfare and Retirement Fund. Payne warned Boyle that, if he did not
respond to his letter by June 20, miners in the Appalachian coalfields would go on
strike.28
When Boyle did not reply, miners in southern West Virginia walked off the job at
midnight on Sunday, June 21. Led by Payne and the DMW/SWV, picket lines were
established by men, women, and children, including several disabled miners in
wheelchairs. The picketers bore placards with slogans such as, “We Want Justice” and
“Return Welfare Cards and Pensions.” Children, widows and disabled miners played a
pivotal role in the strike. In one county in West Virginia, a group of ten widows
successfully shut down an entire mine. The strike quickly spread across the state and into
eastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania. By the following day, Monday June 22, 18,000
miners had walked off the job. The activists threatened to “put out the nation’s lights” if
the union did not address their demands. This was not an idle threat, as national coal
supplies were already running low. Further shortages had the potential to jeopardize the
provision of coal-fuelled electricity.29
Miners for Democracy, the dissident union reform group, supported the strike,
although denied any involvement in its organization. Payne indicated that the major goal
of the strike was to improve hospital coverage for disabled miners and widows. MFD
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leader Trbovich said that many of the miners, in addition to demanding improved hospital
care, were striking because their employers were not taking adequate safety precautions.
A meeting on June 23 between coal industry representatives and Department of the
Interior officials fuelled miners’ suspicions that the federal government was
compromising safety for corporate demands. Walter Hickel had called the meeting in
response to numerous pleas from mining companies and operator associations to modify
the Bureau of Mines’ enforcement procedures. Since March of that year, operators had
filed over 2,000 appeals against safety enforcement actions. The purpose of the meeting
was to allow operators to suggest how the legislation could be changed. Before the
meeting, MFD representative Joseph “Chip” Yablonski commented, “I don’t claim to be
the greatest expert on mine safety… but I have the strong feeling that, at a closed meeting
of that kind, no-one will be in there fighting for the miners’ welfare.”30
Not all district and local union leaders supported the strike. James Leeber, the
head of UMWA District 29, urged the miners in his district to return to work
immediately. In an official statement, he commented that the strike action violated the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and the union constitution. Miners
participating in the strike action were not only jeopardizing their union membership, he
argued, but also stopping the flow of royalties to the Welfare and Retirement Fund. He
concluded, “This office is insisting that all officers and members of local unions involved
ignore the activity of such pickets since it is a subterfuge to undermine the United Mine
Workers of America.” Meanwhile, Carson Hibbits, president of UMW Districts 28 and
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30, claimed that none of his members were participating in the strike. Miners in Kanawha
and Logan counties in West Virginia ignored the pickets and continued to work.31
On Tuesday, June 23, some of the striking miners in Wyoming, Boone, and
Raleigh counties in West Virginia decided to go back to work, but this did not lessen the
impact of the strike, as several other mines closed down.32 Elsewhere in the state, 1,000
miners disobeyed an injunction issued by Judge Everett Cox of the Marshall County
Circuit. Ultimately, the strike petered out as quickly as it had started. On June 24, at a
meeting in Wyoming County, Josephine Roche, the head of the union’s Welfare and
Retirement Fund, agreed to explore the possibility of implementing the miners’ demands
on the condition they ended the walkout. Moreover, at a hearing in Wheeling, West
Virginia, Judge Ralph Pryor reiterated the ruling made by Judge Cox that the strike was
illegal under state law. In Pittsburgh, Federal Judge Wallace S. Gourley responded to a
petition for an injunction from four major steel companies by ruling that in the absence of
immediate danger underground, the miners’ dissatisfaction with their employers’
enforcement of the 1969 mine act was not sufficient reason to strike. Gourley emphasized
that the miners’ obligations under their contract with the steel companies had precedence.
The judge, however, also criticized Tony Boyle for not doing enough to promote unity
among the rank and file, and condemned the coal companies for not doing enough to
enforce safe working conditions.33
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By June 25, the miners had gone back to work; but the DMW/SWV vowed to
resume the strike in two weeks if Boyle did not meet its demands. The end of the strike
came one day before the start of the annual vacation period. Most of the miners were
scheduled to take a week’s paid leave starting on June 26, while others were set to begin
their holiday on July 11. The operators planned to use the vacation period to carry out
maintenance and repair work on the mines.34
Boyle failed to respond to the Disabled Miners and Widows of South West
Virginia before the two-week deadline, so the group resumed the strike as promised. ProBoyle union members and representatives of the coal companies used shotguns to
intimidate the strikers and protect mine property. The coal companies’ use of physical
violence against the strikers, combined with District 29 officials’ claims that they were
“welfare bums,” drew more support for the group’s actions. The strike, which at its peak
involved 25,000 miners, had become more than a protest over hospital care or unsafe
working conditions; it had evolved into a heated conflict between reform elements in the
union and the entrenched UMWA leadership.35
The U.S. District Court issued a temporary restraining order against the miners,
many of whom had started carrying guns to protect themselves. The order did little to
quell the strike. The federal government’s imprisonment of Robert Payne and several
others for contempt of court, combined with Boyle’s continuing refusal to meet the
protestors’ demands, however, brought an end to the industrial action. The activists had
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not obtained recognition from the legal system or the UMW. In addition, many of the
miners were compelled to go back to work because of financial difficulties. Barbara
Smith argues that the strike was symbolically important because it renewed the spirit of
activism and determination among miners who sought to overthrow Boyle’s leadership.
While Smith also acknowledges the community dimension to the strike, she underemphasizes its importance. The role of miners’ families and disabled miners was
instrumental in driving the momentum of the strike.36
According to George Hopkins, during the protests of 1970, the activists in the
United Mine Workers split into two disparate groups, one located in southern Appalachia
and the other in the north. The southern miners, represented most visibly by the Disabled
Miners and Widows of South West Virginia, sought tangible gains such as black lung
compensation and pensions for disabled and retired miners. Miners in the north,
epitomized by the Miners for Democracy, were more concerned with the reform of the
union itself. According to Hopkins, the northern faction did not disregard the issue of
health, but it was more concerned with working miners than those who were disabled or
retired.37 Hopkins’ analysis, however, oversimplifies the objectives of the activists
working for reform. The Miners for Democracy supported the strike action by the
Disabled Miners and Widows of South West Virginia; equally, the DMW/SWV, like the
MFD, supported the reform of the United Mine Workers.
In late July 1970, the release of a major report, sponsored by Ralph Nader, further
contributed to the criticism of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. The report was based
36
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on extensive research by a group of graduate students over a two-year period. J. Davitt
McAteer, a young law student from West Virginia who had contacted Nader after the
Farmington disaster, was head of the group.38
In setting up the study, McAteer knew that Nader’s typical method of carrying out
investigations, where “Nader’s Raiders” gathered in Washington D.C. for research, was
not conducive to a study of the coal industry. McAteer feared that mine operators would
accuse researchers from beyond the state of being “outsiders,” who did not have the
requisite knowledge about the industry to make sound judgments. To avoid this problem,
McAteer convinced Nader to employ students from West Virginia in the study. Once
Nader had given his support, McAteer formed a taskforce with colleagues from West
Virginia University Law School, which started raising funds for the study. The taskforce
had considerable financial backing from sources as diverse as the UMWA, political state
and federal political representatives, academic research foundations, the Bureau of
Mines, and even the Carbon Fuel Coal Company of West Virginia. McAteer was
convinced that the contribution of the latter was not an anomaly, but rather a conscious
effort to influence the outcome of the study. 39
The report condemned the administration’s “calculated indifference to the
unnecessary and avoidable hazards of life in the nation’s coal mines.” It also criticized
the Nixon administration’s failure to appoint a new director to the Bureau of Mines. The
report stated, “ To fail to appoint a Bureau director for the six most critical months in its
history is atrocious, but further to appoint a man [Lucas] who sadly lacked a history of
38

J. Davitt McAteer, telephone interview by author, May 11, 2009.

39

Ibid.

177
strong safety and health activities is despicable.” McAteer commented that he did not
think the new legislation had significantly improved miners’ chances of survival. He
empasized that 100 men had already died in the coal mines in the first half of 1970. A
federal official retaliated that the report had little merit. McAteer continued the study,
however, and eventually published a book entitled Coal Mine Safety: The Case of West
Virginia. 40 As McAteer and his research team conducted their study of the West Virginia
coal industry in 1970, the black lung movement protested the Nixon administration’s
mismanagement of the federal black lung benefits program.

Reigniting the Fuse: The Resurgence of the Black Lung Movement
The collapse of the miners’ strike in 1970 was not, by any means, a sign that
activism in the coalfields was in decline. In fact, the five-week long strike was only one
component of a burgeoning network of protest that summer. The black lung movement
also reemerged, now headed by an independent group called Designs for Rural Action
(DRA). Founded in West Virginia in 1968 by Gibbs Kinderman, DRA initially adhered
to the broad goal of tackling poverty and social inequality through community action.
Designs for Rural Action was one of several organizations fighting for social justice in
Appalachia in the 1960s and early 1970s, including the Appalachian Volunteers and the
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Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). The latter played a crucial role in the original
West Virginia Black Lung Association.41
The focus of Designs for Rural Action on black lung compensation resulted in
large part from the political and social circumstances of the summer of 1970. By this
time, the Appalachian Volunteers and other groups in the region were coming under
increasing attack from conservative forces. In 1968, for example, the Kentucky UnAmerican Activities Committee had brought several AV activists before public hearings
in the state legislature, under the premise that they were planning to overthrow the state
government and redistribute public wealth. The committee labeled the Appalachian
Volunteers as communists and outside agitators, concluding that the AV program “has
served as a tremendous detriment to the deserving people of this region.” In West
Virginia, AV members faced similar charges. As a result, the Appalachian Volunteers
lost much of their funding from state governments.42 Internal dissent also hindered the
work of the group.
By 1970, the radical social activism of the previous decade was in sharp decline,
and reformers began to focus more on legal and administrative issues. With few other
avenues of social action open, Designs for Rural Action made fair and equitable
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distribution of black lung benefits one of its primary goals. During a meeting with
representatives from the West Virginia Black Lung Association in summer 1969, DRA
leaders became aware of the impact of pneumoconiosis on miners and their families.
They also learned that a substantial number of black lung victims had been denied
benefits by the Social Security Administration. The DRA quickly began to allocate most
of the organization’s resources to the reform of the black lung program.43
While the Federal Coal Mine Act defined pneumoconiosis as a “chronic dust
disease of the lungs arising out of employment in an underground coal mine,” the Social
Security Administration used a much narrower definition of the disease to judge
claimants’ eligibility for benefits. To qualify for compensation, miners had to pass a
series of rigorous medical tests.

They first had to pass an X-ray examination by

displaying evidence of nodules on their lungs. If the X-rays did not show damage to the
lungs, the SSA terminated their application. The administration contended that miners
with severe breathing problems who did not match the X-ray criteria had contracted lung
disease through cigarette smoking or a non-occupational hazard.44
Miners who passed the X-ray requirement were required to undergo a pulmonary
function test to prove that they were “totally disabled” by black lung disease. A large
proportion of disabled miners discovered their applications did not advance beyond this
stage. Physicians generally interpreted their test results as evidence of only partial
disability. The small number of miners who passed the first two stages faced a long wait
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as a secondary physician scrutinized and analyzed the results. Employed by the SSA, the
physicians who reassessed the results rarely confirmed diagnoses. Many applicants who
assumed they would receive compensation had their applications turned down. Widows
in particular struggled to prove their husbands’ deaths were caused by black lung. They
had to prove that their husband had worked underground for at least three consecutive
years and had either died conclusively from black lung or had been receiving benefits at
the time of death.45
Aside from the rigorous medical criteria, the under-staffing and under-funding of
the SSA local offices prevented disabled miners from collecting benefits. The offices
were not prepared to deal with the huge volume of claims, over 100,000 in the first month
of the program.46 Because they were under immense pressure, staff members often did
not collect comprehensive medical evidence for each applicant, and they frequently
neglected to tell miners that the SSA was financially responsible for obtaining
background evidence beyond X-ray results. Frustrated miners took out their anger on the
local staff with verbal abuse and occasional physical violence, even though staffers were
only the ‘human face’ of a much larger bureaucracy.47
DRA activists planned to use miners’ frustration over the black lung
compensation program to create a new network of activism. They also supported Miners
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for Democracy’s campaign to overthrow Tony Boyle, because they believed that the
union was the only viable institutional mechanism for challenging the power of the coal
operators. One activist commented that the UMW had to be reformed before any pressure
could be placed on the coal operators to improve health and safety. Designs for Rural
Action made black lung disease its lead issue, however, because it was uncontroversial
and would easily draw support from the miners. In mid-1970, many people still felt too
intimidated by the established Boyle regime to risk openly opposing it.48
Establishing its headquarters in Charleston, Designs for Rural Action mainly
communicated with the public through the Black Lung Bulletin, which provided extensive
coverage of the campaign for more equitable federal compensation and the union
insurgents’ campaign to overthrow the Boyle regime. The DRA distributed newsletters to
publicize its cause and frequently held press conferences and media events. The
Charleston office hired Arnold Miller, who had been a key leader in the West Virginia
strike the previous year, to lead the new black lung movement.
Miller acted as a link between the BLA and the DRA.49 Born in 1923, Miller
started working as a coal loader when he was fourteen. After a period of service in World
War II, during which he lost part of an ear, he started participating in local union politics,
and eventually became the head of Local 2093. He used his experience at the local level
to involve himself in the national union leadership. He soon distanced himself from it in
opposition to Tony Boyle’s policies. Miller was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis in 1965
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and began devoting his energy to helping other miners afflicted by the disease. In early
1969, he was a key activist in the West Virginia black lung movement, notably in the
February 26 march on the Capitol Building in Charleston. The same year, he retired as a
coal miner; he was unable to continue working as a result of black lung disease, arthritis,
and high blood pressure.50 Dr. Donald Rasmussen, another notable black lung activist,
was also part of the ‘Charleston Office Crew.’51
In its previous incarnation in West Virginia in 1969, the Black Lung Association
had been spontaneous and unplanned, but the leaders of the revived movement
emphasized the importance of efficient organization and clear goals. Most notably, with
the assistance of VISTA workers and rank and file miners, they set up several county
chapters of the Black Lung Association across southern West Virginia and the wider
Appalachian region. Unlike the West Virginia Black Lung Association, the new
movement was focused at the national level, with the intent of challenging the federal
bureaucracy responsible for the compensation program. The individual chapters provided
disabled miners and widows with assistance in their benefits claims, worked to overhaul
the existing compensation system, and helped to organize dissident UMW members.52
Because the central office staff did not trust the large, bureaucratic structure of the
Social Security Administration, they tried to prevent the Black Lung Association from
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evolving into a centralized organization. As one office member commented, their main
goal was for the local chapters to guide national BLA policy:
It seems that it is done better when we work under the direction of the BLA
chapter offices… That way, our work can be guided better by BLA policies.
While this may make more work for you all, it will help insure that what is done
in the name of the BLA is actually always in accordance with policies set by the
members.53
When it was necessary to make decisions on regional and national policy issues,
the central office sought to involve representatives from each local branch. However, it
sometimes caused uncertainty among branches by failing to keep them informed of its
actions at the regional and national level.54 Furthermore, most chapters did not contribute
directly to the larger organization, with the result that it often lacked a clear sense of
purpose, and many of them were divided by internal conflict and differences of opinion.55
The local branches frequently disregarded the BLA charter, which stipulated that the
central office had to approve all expenses, that officials should be elected in a timely
manner, and that chapters should hold meetings at least twice per month. Most local BLA
meetings did not have a set agenda, but often focused on the organization’s struggle with
the Social Security Administration. Many people who attended the meetings wanted help
to obtain benefits. Applicants who were waiting on news of their claims often interrupted
the proceedings of local meetings to complain about their specific case.56 According to
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Bennett M. Judkins, the chaotic nature of the meetings fulfilled a key organizational
function, by providing members with a forum to raise their grievances and showing them
that others were having similar problems. Moreover, the meetings enabled BLA leaders
to help their constituents.57
The BLA was limited in its work by a lack of funding. The organization did not
have a constant source of finance, and relied mostly on donations from members. The
central office’s plan for a large central fund did not come to fruition, as local members
spent most of their time challenging the Social Security Administration for black lung
benefits. While the BLA received a limited amount of funding from the Appalachian
Regional Commission (ARC), it was not enough to fund organizing efforts across the
coalfields. Some members believed that the BLA destroyed its chances of becoming a
prominent nationwide organization by not devoting more time and effort to fundraising.
The centralized, bureaucratic nature of the Social Security Administration also
hindered the Black Lung Association’s efforts to obtain compensation for its members. In
contrast to the BLA, which stressed the importance of local autonomy, the SSA made its
decision regarding compensation at the central level. The director of the SSA office in
Beckley, West Virginia, commented, “It must be remembered that all decisions come
from the Baltimore office and that the local offices only get the claims filed and request
the necessary medical information and then send it to Baltimore – that is where the hang
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up is.”58 Am article in The Black Lung Bulletin stated, “Decisions are made on
bureaucratic convenience rather than on serving human needs. For efficiency’s sake
workers in the SSA operate almost like machines. A decision is made, a button is pushed,
and the workers do what they are told – losing the ability to understand the people with
whom they are talking.”59
Applicants for benefits did not always understand the enormous task faced by the
SSA. In a 1973 study on the dangers of coal mine work, the BLA asserted, “There
appears to be a need not only for a better understanding of the miners by the agencies, but
also a better understanding of the agencies by the miners.”60 Certainly, the SSA
encountered problems with black lung compensation it did not experience in the
administration of its other benefit programs. A large number of applicants filed for
compensation at the same time, overwhelming local branch offices and causing delays in
the processing of claims. Furthermore, because many of the applicants were from similar
economic, cultural, and geographical backgrounds, the SSA organizational and
bureaucratic network was too inefficient to manage the new black lung compensation
program, and there were not enough clinics throughout Appalachia to gather medical
evidence from applicants.61
Lay advocates, who came into direct contact with the miners and their families,
were the most important representatives of the new BLA. They advised claimants about
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their applications, accompanied them to SSA medical centers for testing, and, when
necessary, represented them in court. Lay advocates were mostly disabled miners,
widows, or people from coal mining families. Many of them had not completed high
school but became legal experts, as a result of extensive training provided by the
Appalachian Defense Fund. Their knowledge and skills provided applicants with vital
support in their quest for compensation. One advocate, a miner disabled by
pneumoconiosis, recalled:
I liked the work, I enjoyed it. It gave me something to put my mind to. When I’m
retired, I can’t do no physical work. Being a lay advocate was a lot of work, but it
seems like it takes your mind off your sickness. Now I just lie here. I have to take
three to six Davron a day, been taking them since 1957. When I’m here, I don’t
eat nothing til supper, but when I was on the road, I ate three meals a day. We
might – maybe I’ll talk to some of the others and just get this Black Lung
Association started all over again.62
His work as a lay advocate gave him a sense of purpose after he became too ill to
continue working in the mines. Eventually, his black lung disease became severe enough
that he was unable to work even as a lay advocate. Many of the disabled miners working
as lay advocates faced the same problem.
Helen Powell from West Virginia was one of the most prominent activists in the
revived black lung movement. Powell’s father had spent his life working in underground
mines until black lung disease made him too sick to work and he was laid off.
Subsequently, Powell gathered evidence for a compensation suit, which she passed to a
qualified lawyer. Her father successfully won compensation in court, which led many
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other people in Powell’s community to ask her for assistance. As a result of her work, she
was drawn into the black lung movement.63
Even in the male-orientated world of the Appalachian coalfields, Powell’s
experience was by no means unique for the early 1970s. As Kathleen M. Blee highlights
in No Middle Ground, women across the United States became actively involved in
radical protest movements in the decades after World War II. In employing the term
‘radicalism,’ Blee uses a broad definition, describing radical protestors as “those who
[sought] social, political, or economic changes meant to produce great equality within
society, or those who [sought] changes meant to restructure society in a less egalitarian
fashion.” While some of this protest occurred within formal organizations, much of it was
shaped by the informal environments of family, kinship, and neighborhood. Furthermore,
the protest was linked to women’s concerns about economic inequality.64
Powell, then, shared a common experience with many other women. In her role as
an activist, her family environment and the context of the black lung movement
intersected. Using her personal experience of witnessing close family members suffer
from black lung, she played a key role in one of the most visible social movements in
Appalachia in the early 1970s, helping a substantial number of miners to obtain black
lung benefits. In doing so, Powell helped to reduce the economic inequality on which the
black lung compensation system rested.
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Despite the commitment of its participants, the revived Black Lung Association
faced a number of obstacles. Individual leaders of county chapters, fiercely protective of
their territory, often refused to collaborate with other chapters. Moreover, as Helen
Powell recalls, it was difficult to maintain a sense of unity within each individual chapter:
We just kind of fell apart. And a lot of people left who were working with us and
supporting us. After they got their benefits… they went home and sat down. “I
have my part of the loaf and now you get yours the best way you can,” you know,
that kind of thing. So then our numbers fell off and we didn’t have as much
support as what we used to.65
Few members of the Black Lung Association were involved in the organization on a
long-term basis. Between meetings, each chapter typically experienced a membership
turnover rate of between 40 and 60 percent. In large part, this was because the majority of
attendees at meetings required help with their benefits claims. Once miners had started
receiving benefits, there was no incentive to keep attending the meetings.66
Furthermore, like its previous West Virginia counterpart, the new national BLA
struggled with the medical establishment over the definition of black lung disease and
who was eligible for disability compensation. Conservative physicians and SSA
representatives continued to argue that the term “black lung” should only cover advanced
pneumoconiosis, not other lung diseases developed as a result of underground mine work.
By adhering to such a restrictive definition of the disease, they precluded the majority of
miners from receiving compensation, as recent studies showed that only three percent of
miners suffered from advanced pneumoconiosis. Progressive physicians and activists
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challenged this line of thinking by arguing that miners were susceptible to developing a
range of diseases underground, many of which did not show up on X-rays. They also
emphasized that the majority of miners with simple pneumoconiosis had severe breathing
problems.67
The SSA did not respond to pressure from the black lung movement, as the
compensation program was a significant drain on its finances and resources. The
administration advocated what it described as “objective scientific evidence,” such as XRays, and not clinical examinations grounded in medical opinion, as the best mechanism
for proving black lung disease. As a result, observes Barbara Smith, coal miners’
pneumoconiosis came to exist independently of the miners’ symptoms. To the miners
who were so crippled by black lung disease that they became breathless from walking up
the stairs or moving from the bedroom to the kitchen, the Social Security
Administration’s position undermined their suffering. They attributed the disease not just
to many years spent underground in dusty conditions, but also to the coal companies who
had exploited them, and felt they deserved compensation.68
Reassessing the Federal Coal Mine Act: Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee
on Labor
In early August, the Senate Subcommittee on Labor resumed in Washington D.C.
the hearing it had opened in Centerville, Pennsylvania earlier in the summer. The
subcommittee’s main goals were to assess the effectiveness of the Federal Coal Mine Act
over the previous four months and to determine how its enforcement could be improved.
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As the hearing progressed, a consensus emerged that the legislation, despite its stringent
terms, had failed to improve health and safety in the coal mines. Although there was
some disagreement over who was responsible for this failure and the best way to address
it, several witnesses at the hearing singled out the Bureau of Mines for condemnation.
In his opening statement on August 6, subcommittee chairman Harrison Williams
lambasted the recent performance of the Bureau:
The record of the Bureau of Mines is outrageous. During 1968, the Bureau of
Mines conducted 9,000 regular inspections. Since the new law went into effect,
the Bureau has been conducting substantially fewer safety inspections than in
1968. In the past 4 months, the Bureau has conducted only 153 regular
inspections, an annual rate of less than 450 regular inspections per year. In my
judgment, this is just plain unbelievable… This decrease in the number of
inspections is all the more shocking in light of the fact that the Congress backed
up its far reaching health and safety law by almost quadrupling funds for
inspections from $9 million for the year beginning on July 1, 1968, to $33 million
for the year which began last month.69
The Bureau’s ineptitude, Williams went on to argue, had perpetuated the unsafe
conditions that caused injury and death to the nation’s miners. Therefore, one of the key
tasks of the hearing was establishing how the Bureau could improve its performance.
Williams also stressed the importance of passing a health and safety bill that would cover
the country’s entire workforce.70
Leading off the witness testimony, UMW President Tony Boyle strongly
criticized both the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Mines. He claimed that,
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over the past five months, the union had begged President Nixon to appoint a new
director to the Bureau, but without success. “This period,” he stated, “has been marked by
jealousy and bickering within the Bureau while the coal miners continue to suffer and
die.” For Boyle, the Interior Department’s reduction of the fine schedule for first-time
violations was also an obstruction to health and safety enforcement, as was the temporary
restraining order issued by a federal judge on behalf of small operators in Virginia. Later
that day, Boyle gave testimony with two UMW attorneys, Edward Carey and Charles
Widman. While they acknowledged they had not supported the rank-and-file strike in
Pennsylvania in June, they denied that the union had played an instrumental role in
obtaining the injunction against the strikers.71
UMW Safety Director Lewis Evans argued that the Bureau of Mines had hindered
its ability to enforce the law by delaying the appointment of new inspectors. According to
Evans, the Bureau should have started hiring and training new inspectors the previous
summer, rather than waiting until two months after Nixon signed the mine act into law.
The success of the Federal Mine Act, he asserted, was dependent on the Bureau swiftly
appointing a new director and expanding its inspection force. In response to Evans’
comments, Senator Jennings Randolph urged the subcommittee to send Nixon a telegram
requesting the immediate nomination of a new bureau chief. Evans closed his testimony
by highlighting problems in the federal black lung compensation program. He believed
that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had not established adequate
measures to protect miners’ privacy, which put them at risk from employers’ reprisals,
and that the Bureau of Disability Insurance needed to adopt more liberal criteria for
71
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miners’ X-ray examinations. Evans also disapproved of the Social Security
Administration’s decision to subtract the Pennsylvania workmen’s compensation
payment of $100 per month from the federal black lung awards.72
Consumer advocate Ralph Nader also attributed responsibility for the health and
safety crisis to the Department of the Interior and Bureau of Mines. He stated, “The
strategy of evasion, misfeasance, and malfeasance practiced by the Department of the
Interior, its Bureau of Mines, and other Federal officials reflects an institutional mutiny
against a law they have sworn under oath to uphold.” Like Boyle before him, Nader
argued that the Bureau had used the federal restraining order issued in Virginia as an
excuse to abandon its original penalty schedule and exempt operators from tough
sanctions. He also criticized the Bureau’s for neglecting to carry out regular spot
inspections, even in light of a massive budget increase, and its delay in publishing the
underground dust control standards. Nader condemned the United Mine Workers, the
White House, and Congress for not doing enough to address the Bureau’s dismal
performance. The UMW, he argued, had failed to file legal proceedings against the
Bureau in Washington, and to participate in the recent meetings between the Department
of the Interior and coal industry officials. The White House, meanwhile, “[had] done
nothing except to try and appoint a Director for the Bureau of Mines whose qualifications
and allegiances were such that they led to the withdrawal of the candidacy.” There had
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been little action on the part of Congress, too, with the exception of the lawsuit filed by
Representatives Hechler, Dent, and Burton.73
Summing up the poor record of the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of
Mines, Nader commented:
There is a total anarchy, institutionalized in the administrative branch of
Government and I think it requires something more than a telegram of concern by
any committee of Congress. I think it requires a demand for resignation, a demand
for repudiation of these officials who have violated their oath of office and
demand for disciplinary proceedings where such proceedings can be brought
under the civil service law and other precedents.74
As a long-term solution to the Bureau’s problems, Nader proposed the separation of its
two competing functions, the promotion of the coal industry and the enforcement of
health and safety. Senator Williams, responding to several additional short-term measures
advocated by Nader, agreed to authorize a General Accounting Office investigation of
how the Bureau had spent its funding increases, and indicated he would ask the Justice
Department to rule if the federal government’s poor enforcement the mining legislation
constituted a violation of the Federal Tort Claims Act. This was a legislative act dating to
1946, which allowed citizens to sue the United States for injuries resulting from the
actions or neglect of federal representatives.75
Nader’s suggestion that the UMW had not done enough to address the Bureau’s
inefficiency echoed his earlier criticisms of Tony Boyle. During the West Virginia black
lung movement in early 1969, Nader had condemned Boyle’s leadership on health and
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safety in a telegram to miners at a demonstration in Charleston, read by Ken Hechler.
Boyle had responded by labeling Nader a “fink.” Therefore, the fact that the two men
were united in their criticism of the Bureau showed just how ineffectual the beleaguered
agency had become.76
In the afternoon testimony on August 6, the strong criticism of the Bureau of
Mines continued. Industry representative John L. Kilcullen attacked the Bureau for
discriminating against the small mine owners he represented as counsel for the National
Independent Coal Operators Association. He complained that the Bureau had started to
issue violation and penalty notices when the legislation went into force on March 30,
only two days after the safety guidelines were published in the Federal Register.
Kilcullen explained:
Many small operators found themselves being cited for violations over which they
had no control such as failure to have automatic coupling devices on shuttle cars
and automatic brakes on coal hauling equipment. The fact that this equipment was
not available for purchase, and that no manufacturer actually manufactured such
equipment was not accepted as an excuse by the Bureau of Mines inspectors in
issuing penalty notices.77
Several small operators, reported Kilcullen, had shut down their operations rather than
accept financial penalties for violations beyond their control. However, in contrast to the
speakers before him, Kilcullen did not believe that the Virginia restraining order had
affected the Bureau’s performance. He argued that the restraining order merely prevented
it from issuing violation notices when operators were not at fault. Kilcullen actually felt
that the Bureau had been too severe about enforcement. Emphasizing that it was not his
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intention to defend it, he highlighted small operators’ disdain for the Bureau’s new
inspection procedures: “They feel that the Bureau has been extremely zealous, and has
greatly increased the stringency of its inspection methods and procedures. We know of no
instances where a Bureau of Mines inspector has condoned or deliberately overlooked
violations of the new standards.”78
Few others shared the coal industry’s views about the Bureau. When the hearing
resumed before the Subcommittee the next day, a delegation from the Miners for
Democracy (MFD) resumed the criticism of the Bureau’s poor record in health and safety
enforcement. All the members of the delegation held key leadership roles in the MFD,
and had attended the organization’s founding meeting in April 1970. In a series of
scathing testimonies, they argued the Bureau had been detrimental to the improvement of
coal mine working conditions. However, they also contended that much of the blame for
death and injury in the mines lay with the United Mine Workers. Joseph “Chip”
Yablonski said, “Coldly and calculatingly, this administration and the Bureau of Mines
have emasculated the toughest occupational health and safety bill ever enacted… The
men who work in the mines are being denied their right to earn their daily bread under
safe working conditions by a callously indifferent bureaucracy which is floundering in its
own fat.” Yablonski cited the lack of experienced staff in the bureau, including a
qualified director, as the main impediment to safe working conditions. Later, in response
to questions from the subcommittee, he argued that coal miners were highly qualified to
become mine inspectors, but that many refrained from taking the qualifying exam
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because of their fear that the Bureau might place them in a distant region of the country,
far from their families and community.79
Mike Trbovich, the MFD vice-presidential nominee, focused his statement on the
ineptitude of the United Mine Workers:
The leadership of the United Mine Workers is not interested in safety. Their
concern is to keep production going without consideration for the people who pay
their salaries and mine the nation’s coal… A law passed by the Congress of the
United States, signed by the President, is meaningless because the relationship
between the operators and the United Mine Workers is something like a cancer
that eats out the foundation of a structure that stands for decency in our
democracy.80
He also urged the federal government to appoint a Bureau director with no ties to either
the coal industry or the UMW. Leader Arnold Miller, meanwhile, commented that he had
not witnessed any improvement to working conditions since the passage of the act. He
alleged that the UMW leadership was refusing to support local safety committeemen who
insisted on enforcement of the law. In one instance, claimed Miller, a safety
committeeman had lost his job for trying to enforce safety himself without union backing.
He warned the subcommittee: “If we don’t solve the problems of mining today, we are
not going to have a coal shortage; we are not going to have any coal miners to mine
coal.”81
Harry Patrick, another founding member of the MFD, stated bluntly, “On the
question of the new mine health and safety bill and what it has done for the miners, I
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would say absolutely nothing. If anything, it has lulled many into a false sense of security
which simply is not there. In talking to the miners over my district, I hear the same story.
Conditions are as bad if not worse than before.” In Patrick’s view, spot-inspections were
ineffective: “On the question of spot inspections which is required by the new mine
safety law, it is a favorite joke among miners that the company knows exactly what spot
the inspectors are coming to.” He argued that one of the main causes of accidents was the
coal industry’s prioritization of production over health and safety. However, he also
cautioned against labeling all coal companies in the same way. Some employers, he
argued, were more attentive to safety than others -- for example, Bethlehem Steel his
present employer, was more conscientious about holding monthly safety meetings than
his previous employer Consolidation Coal.82
Following additional testimony from the Miners For Democracy representatives,
several witnesses from the Department of the Interior made statements. They vigorously
defended both the Interior Department and the Bureau of Mines from the charges against
them. Hollis M. Dole, the Assistant Secretary of Mineral Resources, criticized Congress
and the miners for having unrealistic expectations about the time required for the Bureau
to draw up new regulations:
Unfortunately, the publicity concerning the development – and eventually, the
enactment – of the new law centered almost entirely upon the improvements it
would bring about, and very little was said about the time that would be required
to achieve them. Consequently, the mineworkers and the public generally were
encouraged to expect the improvements in mine health and safety immediately,
and because they have not been achieved so quickly, they are dismayed. They
should not be dismayed, because the health and safety revolution in the mines is
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underway; their expectations will be fulfilled; but it will take longer than 90 or
180 days.83
Dole was convinced the Bureau had done everything possible to improve health and
safety with the limited time and manpower available. “It is not true we are dragging our
feet,” he said. “We believe that we have made as much progress as possible under the
circumstances and, more importantly, that our efforts are paying off in the form of
improvements that are already underway in the mines which makes the mines healthier
and safer now than they ever have been before.” To support this assertion, he showed that
the coal mine fatality rate had declined in the first six months of 1970 in comparison to
the same period the previous year.84
In his lengthy statement, Dole also claimed that the Virginia restraining order had
not significantly affected the Bureau’s ability to enforce the law, that ‘Partial But
Representative’ inspections, despite their flaws, were more effective than spot
inspections, and that the Bureau was entirely capable of handling its dual function.
Moreover, he revealed that the Interior Department was expanding the mine inspection
force by appointing new inspectors from civil service registers and by reducing the
training period for both safety and dust inspectors. He assured the subcommittee that the
Bureau would have a full complement of inspectors by July 1, 1972.85
James Westfield, Assistant Director for Coal Mine Health and Safety, explained
how recent advances in the methane monitor had given miners greater protection from
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dangerous accumulations of methane gas. In response to additional questions from
Senators Randolph and Schweiker, he also emphasized that the Bureau was moving from
PBR inspections to full examinations of underground mines as quickly as possible.86
The witness testimony on August 7 also included statements by Mazie B.
Gutshall, the Executive Deputy Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Mines and
Mineral Industries, and Paul C. Riley, Deputy Director of the West Virginia Department
of Mines. Both argued that better health and safety enforcement could be achieved
through greater cooperation between state and federal governments.87

Maintaining a Conservative Approach
On October 7, 1970, President Nixon appointed Elburt Franklin Osborn, a
geologist and vice-president of research at Pennsylvania State University, as the new
director of the Bureau of Mines. Osborn had been offered the position by the Lyndon B.
Johnson administration twice before, in 1966 and 1968, but had turned it down because
he felt the coal industry had too much influence over the Bureau’s affairs. After the
Senate confirmed Osborn later that month, he announced that his immediate priority was
protecting miners’ welfare. To that end, he went on a two-week long inspection tour of
the nation’s coal mining states. He also visited the National Mine Training Academy in
Beckley, West Virginia, the bureau’s college for training new inspectors. There he
announced the introduction of an intensive new course, which he predicted would
alleviate the bureau’s shortfall of inspectors by early the following year.
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Coal industry officials opposed the appointment of Osborn, especially in light of
his statement that the bureau needed to be more demanding of mine operators. Yet,
despite the industry’s concerns, Osborn’s scientific background made him more suited to
handling the bureau’s research programs than its role as an enforcement agency. As with
Lucas before him, Osborn’s credentials for the job were questionable. His assertive
stance did not necessarily mean that operators would experience tougher sanctions, or
that miners’ working conditions would significantly improve.88
The previous year, Nixon had halted proceedings to fire O’Leary to garner more
support for his new Anti-Ballistic Missile Program.89 The influence of defense strategy
and foreign policy on coal mine safety again became apparent when Nixon fired
Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel and six of his officials on November 25, 1970, the
day before Thanksgiving. The key reason for Hickel’s dismissal was his condemnation of
the U.S. invasion of Cambodia earlier in the year. In a letter to the president, Hickel had
said he was “terribly disturbed” by the administration’s decision to send American troops
from South Vietnam across the Cambodian border. He criticized Nixon for failing to
engage in a dialogue with America’s youth, who largely opposed the invasion. An
Interior Department staff member leaked the letter to the Washington Evening Star,
which printed it in full. H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s Chief of Staff, witnessed Nixon’s
reaction to the leak: “He was pretty calm about it last night, pretty cold-blooded today,”
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he wrote in his diary. “[Nixon] feels Hickel’s got to go as soon as we’re past this crisis
[the controversy over Nixon’s decision to invade Cambodia.]” 90
The president’s response to the letter reflected not only his emphasis on
aggressive foreign policy, but also his unwillingness to accept criticism that might
diminish his public profile. More importantly, it showed that Nixon could not
comprehend domestic issues independently, but rather viewed them as being inextricably
linked to his larger foreign policy goals. Hickel’s outspoken criticism of the American oil
industry’s disregard for environmental protection also played a role his dismissal. While
his less than convincing record in coal mine health and safety was not a contributing
factor, his departure had significant implications for the federal government’s
enforcement of the 1969 mine legislation. The Bureau of Mines had been paralyzed for
ten months by the absence of a director, and without direction from the Interior
Department, it potentially faced another period of inaction and uncertainty. After losing
his job, Hickel retreated to his home state of Alaska. On arriving at Anchorage airport, he
insisted before waiting reporters and supporters that his primary concern had always been
the welfare of his fellow countrymen. “I made my decisions keeping in mind the next
generation,” he said, “not the next election.”91
On December 30, 1970, Nixon extended protective legislation for the workplace
by signing the Occupational Safety and Health Act into law. With the exception of the
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coal industry, which was still covered by the 1969 Mine Act, the OSH Act applied to all
workplaces in the private sector. The idea of comprehensive legislation for the workplace
was by no means new; Lyndon B. Johnson had mooted a similar plan in his January 1969
“Manpower Message,” before abandoning it when he decided not to run for office again.
The act created two new agencies, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
NIOSH was located in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and
responsible for conducting research on accident and injury prevention. Over time, it
expanded its scope to include research on underground and surface coal mines. OSHA, a
separate agency, was responsible for setting health and safety standards and, in
conjunction with the Secretary of Labor, enforcing the law. Employers who violated the
legislation were subject to sanctions and financial penalties. The OSH Act also gave
workers the right to access information regarding conditions at their place of
employment, and to demand protective clothing and equipment where necessary.92
Rather than marking an important advance in workers’ rights, the terms of the
OSH Act affirmed Nixon’s conservative attitude to workplace reform. Ralph Nader
condemned the legislation because it did not include a compensation system or place
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employers under obligation to create health and safety committees. Yet Nixon’s omission
of a compensation system was not surprising, given his vigorous opposition to black lung
benefits. In Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA, Charles Noble argues that
the OSH Act merely expanded Nixon’s existing legislative approach rather than altering
it. In doing so, Noble touches on one of the key characteristics of the Nixon
administration’s policies. Clearly, President Nixon had little interest in supporting broad,
substantial workplace regulation, in the coal industry or otherwise.

Conclusion
Exactly one year after President Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act into law, there had been little improvement to coal miners’ working
conditions. The death of 38 miners in a series of explosions at the Finley Brothers’ mine
in Hyden, Kentucky, on December 30 1970, which will be discussed in the following
chapter, only confirmed that the legislation had not provided miners with greater
protection. In fact, the coal mine fatality rate for the whole of 1970 was significantly
higher than in 1969. Over the course of the year, 260 miners died, at a rate of 1.02 per
million man-hours of work time. In comparison, 203 miners died in 1969, at a rate of
0.85 per million man-hours of work time. The increase in the fatality rate was attributable
partly to the Hyden disaster, and partly to the persistence of isolated accidents such as
roof-falls and electrical shocks.93 The fatality rate, however, did not tell the whole story
about death among coal miners. Many of the victims of black lung disease were dying in
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severe discomfort and abject poverty, having failed to obtain compensation from the
Social Security Administration. Why should legislation that looked so promising on
paper have failed so completely? Just how committed was the Nixon Administration to
enforcing and upholding the Federal Mine Act? What role did the United Mine Workers
leadership play in perpetuating the cycle of death and injury in the mines? And why,
despite their determination, did social movements in the coalfields have only limited
success, particularly in light of the success of the coalfield activism in 1969?
First, the Federal Coal Mine Act failed because of the ineptitude and
mismanagement of the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Mines. To enforce
the act, the Bureau was required to undertake frequent and rigorous inspections of all
underground mines. However, it was unable to fulfill this task because it did not have
enough inspectors. Moreover, the Bureau clearly sought to avoid disrupting the coal
industry in its enforcement of the act. When a federal judge in Virginia issued a
restraining order, which prevented the Bureau from levying penalties against small
operators, the Bureau used the order to limit the penalties it imposed on larger companies.
As a result, by the end of 1970, it had issued few violation notices, and had not collected
any monetary penalties from operators. The absence of a director throughout most of
1970 further hindered the Bureau’s effectiveness. The Bureau’s abysmal record was, in
many ways, a reflection of the Nixon Administration’s lack of commitment to health and
safety enforcement. President Nixon did not fill mine-related staff positions in the
Interior Department or the Bureau swiftly or with the most qualified, appropriate
candidates.
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The United Mine Workers played a significant role in allowing the death and
injury of coal miners to continue. Despite his sharp criticism of the Bureau of Mines at
the Senate hearings in August 1970, UMW President Tony Boyle gave little indication
that he was truly committed to health and safety enforcement. To an extent, his disregard
for reform was reflected in his opposition to the Miners for Democracy, which made
improved working conditions one of its main priorities. More significantly, though, it was
borne out by his refusal to negotiate with the Disabled Mines and Widows of South West
Virginia, who charged that the union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund did not provide
adequate coverage for sick miners or coal mine widows. Boyle’s rhetoric may have
displayed a commitment to the miners, but in practice, he followed the same course of
inaction that had characterized his presidency to date.
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Chapter Five
The Limits of Regulation:
Coal Miners and the U.S. Bureau of Mines
Introduction
In the year after Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act into
law, there was an unexpected increase in the mine fatality rate. Rank and file miners and
liberal politicians attributed the continuing crisis in mine safety to the Bureau of Mines.
The lack of inspectors in the Bureau limited its ability to enforce the Federal Mine Act,
and often failed to issue citations and enforce penalties. In particular, coal miners were
convinced that the Bureau was neglecting to carry out full inspections of non-unionized
mines. Miners who transferred from non-unionized operations to union mines frequently
informed their co-workers and local and district leaders of the Bureau’s neglect of their
former workplaces.
District and local union leaders highlighted their concerns about the Bureau in
letters to their Congressmen and, to a lesser extent, the national leadership of the United
Mine Workers. Their correspondence revealed several important aspects of the miners’
fight for improved health and safety. First, district and local unions continued to act
independently of the national leadership. As in the 1969 black lung movement in West
Virginia, the rank and file regarded local unions and community organizations as more
effective vehicles for protest and achieving their objectives. Moreover, the letters show
that coal miners were not passive actors, but conscious protestors who actively
challenged the failures of the new federal coal mine legislation. Perhaps more
importantly, however, the correspondence highlighted the Nixon administration’s failure
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to enforce the legislation. Miners’ charges against the Bureau, particularly that it was
neglecting non-union coal companies, were justified, especially given the major disaster
at the non-union Hurricane Creek mine in Kentucky on December 30, 1970. While the
Bureau attributed responsibility for the disaster to the carelessness of the miners and the
lax policies of the mine’s owners, a congressional investigation found that the Bureau’s
neglect was a significant contributing factor to the explosion.
Miners also were concerned by Elburt F. Osborn’s reorganization of the Bureau in
mid-1971. Osborn’s stated goal was to improve the Bureau’s efficiency and provide
closer supervision of mines at the local level. However, miners viewed the reorganization
as further evidence that the Bureau was neglecting their concerns. They did not regard the
reorganization as a measure to improve the working environment in the coalfields, but
rather a political move to create more high-level administrative positions.
This chapter focuses specifically on the Bureau of Mines from December 1970 to
late 1971. The chapter presents original research of neglected primary sources to tell the
story of the Bureau’s relationship with the nation’s coal miners during this period.1 It
focuses in particular on letters from local and district branches of the United Mine
Workers, which are located in the United Mine Workers Safety Division Files in the
Special Collections library at Pennsylvania State University, local and national
newspapers, and government reports. It also incorporates material from the Historical
Collection at the National Mine Safety Academy in Beckley, West Virginia, and oral
interviews. The chapter shows that the Bureau actively discriminated against non-union
coal mines in its inspection procedures. Coal miners were aware of this discrimination,
1
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and protested by corresponding with labor and political representatives. Yet miners did
not envision an alternative method of health and safety enforcement to the Bureau. Their
letters emphasize that they still viewed the Bureau as a legitimate vehicle for the
enforcement of the Federal Mine Act. Rather, the miners wanted the Bureau to improve
its performance and to become more attentive to their health and safety concerns. The
chapter further shows that the reorganization of the Bureau in the spring of 1971 was
detrimental to its ability to enforce health and safety, a fact that the miners recognized
and again protested by corresponding with politicians and labor representatives.

Evading Responsibility: The Bureau of Mines and the Hurricane Creek Disaster
By mid-December 1970, miners were highly critical of the Bureau’s health and
safety enforcement record. In fact, a number of local and district unions were convinced
that the Bureau was actively evading the inspection of non-union mines. In a letter to
Representative Carl D. Perkins, Squire Feltner, the UMW Safety Coordinator for District
30, wrote:
… I am deeply concerned over the conditions that exist in the non-union coal
mines in this district. We have coal miners every day that are coming from nonunion mines and obtaining employment in our union operations who tell us of the
deplorable conditions that the non-union coal miners are working under. As I am
sure you are aware, the non-union coal miners do not have safety committees to
represent them or speak in their behalf for safety and the Federal Bureau of Mines
are certainly not making the inspections required by the new law in the non-union
operations.2

2
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His letter not only emphasized the Bureau’s neglect of non-union mines; it also showed
that local and district branches of the UMW were aware of the health and safety concerns
of their members. Feltner included with his letter a list of 140 non-union mines that he
alleged had not submitted new roof support plans by the December 8 deadline, as
required by guidelines in the Federal Register. In addition, he commented that the
Bureau’s lax enforcement procedures might “drive our union operations into the nonunion camp.” In doing so, he conveyed just as much concern for the union’s survival as
miners’ safety.3
Feltner also conveyed his fears about the Bureau’s enforcement policies to Bureau
of Mines District C Manager Joe Malesky in Norton, Virginia. He advised Malesky that
“we are having a large number of the non-union miners today coming into our local
unions and they are advising us that there is no effort whatsoever of the Federal Bureau
of Mines to enforce the Federal Mine Safety Law in the non-union operations, which if
true is not right.”4 He concluded that the Bureau should not distinguish between union
and non-union mines and should enforce the law evenly across all mining operations.
While this conclusion partly rested on Feltner’s desire to protect miners, it was also
grounded in his determination to ensure the continued existence of the UMW. As he
stated in his letter to Perkins, the Bureau’s neglect of non-union mines might encourage
union operators to relinquish their UMW contract and enter the non-unionized sector.

3
4
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Although based solely on the testimony of fellow district union members,
Feltner’s charges against the Bureau were by no means unusual. The leaders of UMW
local 1405, based at the Westmoreland Coal Company in Big Stone Gap, Virginia, shared
Feltner’s concerns. In a letter to Tony Boyle, President Haskell Swiney and Recording
Secretary J. D. Wheatley highlighted claims by some of their members, formerly
employed at non-union operations, that the Bureau was permitting non-union mines to
evade the law. They cited the Scotia Coal Mine in Kentucky, run by the Blue Diamond
Coal Company, as one of the worst violators of the law.5 (By way of confirmation, five
years later this non-unionized mine was the site of a major disaster that killed 26
miners.)6
Swiney and Wheatley predicted that if the lack of enforcement in non-union
mines continued, the Westmoreland Coal Company would ban the union so it could
evade the terms of the Federal Mine Act. They urged Boyle to make sure the federal
government was enforcing the law evenly across all mines. They emphasized that
immediate action was in the national union’s best interests: “We certainly do not want to
sit idly by and see our Union destroyed because the Federal inspectors are inspecting the
Union mines regularly and are not enforcing the law in non-union mines.” 7 Boyle did
not perceive an immediate threat to the United Mine Workers. In a measured reply, the
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UMW President merely thanked Swiney and Wheatley for writing and informed them he
had passed on their letter to UMW Safety Director Lewis Evans for further investigation.8
Local and district unions’ charges against the Bureau of Mines were valid. As
Squire Feltner rightly suggested, Bureau inspectors were more likely to spend time
inspecting unionized mines because of the presence of safety committees. J. Davitt
McAteer and UMW Safety Director Lorin Kerr trained and educated safety committee
members across Appalachia about the Federal Mine Act, with the result that the
committees were equipped with the knowledge to point out health and safety hazards to
inspectors.9 In non-union operations, where miners lacked such training, Bureau
inspectors often failed to recognize, and even ignored, such hazards. Yet, the union
leaders who protested the Bureau’s failure to inspect non-union mines were not seeking
to replace the Bureau, but rather wanted it to enforce the law consistently across all
mines, whether they were unionized or not. They still regarded the Bureau as a viable
enforcement mechanism. They petitioned high-profile figures such as Perkins and Boyle
in the hope they would address the Bureau’s inconsistent performance. The local and
district unions’ correspondence emphasizes that the miners were not passive actors who
always followed the lead of the national leadership, but rather conscious protestors who
realized they had a vested role in maintaining safe working conditions.
Miners’ suspicions about the Bureau’s inattention to non-union mines were
seemingly confirmed on December 30, 1970, when a major explosion occurred at the
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non-union Finley Brothers mine in Hurricane Creek, Kentucky. The explosion, which
occurred just after midday, instantly killed eighteen miners and trapped an additional
twenty deep within the mine. One miner, A. T. Collins, was thrown out the mineshaft by
the force of the blast. Collins referred to the dust that came spewing from the mine as “a
wheeze of wind” that carried rock dust for over 200 feet. “When I tried to get up, I
couldn’t stand. I kept falling down,” he commented.10
Hurricane Creek, located five miles east of the town of Hyden, was not a single
mining operation but two separate mines that were interconnected. For the purposes of its
investigation, the Bureau of Mines stipulated that both mines were involved in the
disaster. Investigators could not immediately determine where the explosion originated,
as the dead miners were spread across both mines. At 7.30pm, with grief-stricken
families waiting nearby, rescuers began removing the bodies of the eighteen dead miners.
The bodies were taken to a nearby school gymnasium for identification. Many had been
so badly disfigured by the blast that relatives had to identify them by the social security
numbers on their belts. Miners wore the numbers on their belts as a form of identification
if they were involved in an accident. Everett Bartlett, supervisor for the Hazard district of
the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals, believed the other trapped miners had
not survived. He told assembled reporters, “We’ve found 18 men, some in each of the
two shafts of the mine, all of them are dead. As to the chances of the others, we’ll say
this: Their chances are zero.”11
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The families of the trapped miners maintained a vigil near the mine entrance.
Laura Morgan, whose 33-year old son was among those missing, lamented, “Oh Lord, I
hope my baby’s alive. I only had two left, Lord, and I started with five. I had to give up
my youngest one two years ago. Oh Jesus, Jesus-children! He had a good education,
Lord, but he had to go into them mines. He just went up on his brothers’ graves on
Christmas day. I had a vision the other night… I told them boys I saw a new-dug grave.”
Similarly, the mother of 23-year old Elmer White said, “I never wanted him to work in
the mines. His grandfather and his uncle were both killed – his daddy and brothers have
all been mashed up. I never wanted him to work in the mines.” White’s 18-year-old wife,
struggling not to cry, added, “Seems like I don’t really believe he’s dead or anything. It
just doesn’t seem real to me. That’s why I’m so calm.” On December 31, rescuers
confirmed that the other twenty men had perished in the blast. By the end of that day,
they had recovered all the bodies. 12
The responses of the victims’ families emphasized that there was a clear
relationship between mine disasters and religion in the Appalachian coalfields. In Work
and Faith in the Kentucky Coalfields, Richard Callahan explains that work, religion, and
death were inextricably linked in Kentucky mining communities. For example, miners
and their families attached religious significance to dreams about coal mine disasters, and
interpreted them as a vision of future events. The folksong, “The Dream of the Miner’s
Child,” by the Reverend Andrew Jenkins, expressed fears that such dreams were an
indicator of reality:
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A miner was leaving his home for work
He heard his little child scream
He went to the side of the little girl’s bed—
“Oh! Daddy, I’ve had such a dream
Chorus:
Oh! Daddy, don’t work in the mines today
For dreams have so often come true,
Oh! Daddy, my Daddy, please don’t go away
I never could live without you.”13
The verses that follow contain images of the mines aflame and “sweethearts and wives”
crowded around the mine entrances. According to Callahan, folksongs like “Dream of the
Miner’s Child” gave miners a sense of control over the unpredictable conditions in their
work environment, by emphasizing that disasters were not just contingent and accidental,
but events they could avoid if they knew how to recognize the signs.14 The last verse of
Jenkins’ song emphasizes this point:
Go down to the village and tell your dear friends
That as sure as the bright stars do shine,
There is something that’s going to happen today;
Please, daddy, don’t go to the mines.15
Some relatives of the Hurricane Creek victims believed that they had known about the
disaster before it happened. Culture such as “The Dream of the Miner’s Child” reinforced
miners’ belief that they faced the constant risk of injury or death on the job. In the early
1970s, they viewed the Bureau of Mines as a tangible source of this risk. For non-union
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miners and their families, the Bureau’s lax inspection procedures increased the likelihood
that a disaster would occur. As the miners went to work each day, they anticipated
disasters such as the explosion at the Hyden mine.
Federal and state officials promised an extensive investigation of the Hyden
disaster, while President Nixon assured victims’ families they would receive substantial
federal aid. In a public statement that resembled his March 1969 special message on coal
mine safety, Nixon said, “Every appropriate step must and will be taken to identify the
causes of his tragedy and to prevent future mining accidents.” He continued, “I extend
our deepest sympathies to the families and friends of those who lost their lives in this
tragic accident.” Nixon announced he planned to visit the mine to consol the bereaved
families. When he cancelled the trip, his staff claimed that inclement weather prevented
him from traveling to Kentucky. Nixon did, however, send a task force to Hurricane
Creek to provide assistance to the families.16
Representative Carl D. Perkins announced that his Committee on Education and
Labor intended to carry out a separate investigation, pending the outcome of the Bureau’s
investigation. He also asked the Bureau to investigate the mine’s health and safety record
and to determine if its previous inspections had met federal requirements. Senator Henry
M. Jackson (D-WA), the Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and
Senator Harrison Williams (D-NJ), the Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, charged that the Bureau had not satisfactorily enforced the 1969 mining
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legislation. They urged the Department of the Interior to organize a hearing that would
include testimony from miners, widows, and federal mine officials.17
After twenty-four hours, the exact cause of the Hurricane Creek disaster was still
unclear.

Everett Bartlett speculated that the most likely explanation was a blown

electrical cable or the shooting of dynamite by the miners. It was clear, however, that the
Bureau of Mines had uncovered a series of health and safety violations in the mine over
the past seven months. In June, Bureau inspector Gordon Couch had discovered
“imminent danger” posed by loose coal, excessive accumulations of coal dust, faulty
electrical equipment, and illegal underground smoking. He ordered the closure of the
mine until the owners, Charles and Stanley Finley, rectified the violations, a process that
lasted three days. Couch inspected the mine again on August 14, when a non-fatal
accident injured two miners, but ultimately decided not to impose sanctions. On
November 9, the Bureau conducted another investigation of the mine after a worker was
crushed to death by operating machinery. As on its previous visit, the Bureau did not
issue a penalty notice. It justified its decision by arguing that its shortage of inspectors
prevented it from continuously monitoring every mine for violations.18
Couch visited the No. 15 mine again on November 19 to carry out a routine spot
inspection and found several violations, including excessive quantities of harmful coal
dust and an absence of qualified personnel for maintaining electrical equipment. He
ordered the Finley Brothers to correct the violations by 8:00 am on December 22, when
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an inspector would return to re-evaluate the mine. No one from the Bureau, however,
visited the mine on the specified date. The six men employed in the Bureau’s nearby
Barbourville office were either on holiday leave or engaged in more urgent duties
elsewhere, such as inspecting roof supports or ventilation systems in other mines. On
December 24, only one inspector was on duty, and on December 30, the day of the
explosion, four inspectors were still on leave. When this information came to light after
the disaster, the Bureau explained that the inspectors had faced losing accumulated
holiday time after December 31. Ralph Nader demanded a congressional investigation of
the Bureau to determine who was directly responsible for the missed inspection on
December 22.19
Representatives from the Bureau of Mines and the Kentucky Department of
Mines and Minerals began a full investigation of the disaster on January 1. Although they
had already conducted a preliminary inspection, their efforts to enter the deepest parts of
the No. 15 and No. 16 mines had been hampered by lethal quantities of methane gas.
Before the investigation, Everett Bartlett was convinced that explosives had played the
biggest role in the explosion. He commented, “Explosives were involved in it, probably
more than coal dust. The mine had been pretty heavily rock-dusted from what we could
see.” He acknowledged that coal dust also had been a factor, adding, “We feel like it was
too much of an explosion for it to have been the explosives alone.” Similarly, James
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Westfield, the assistant director of the Bureau of Mines, theorized that explosives had
ignited the coal dust inside the mine.20
Over the next three days, investigators uncovered evidence of blasting in the No.
16 shaft and discovered illegal primer cord in both sections of the mine.21 While they
provisionally concluded that a blasting operation had ignited the coal dust, they refused to
comment if the illegal device had contributed to the explosion. Referring to the primer
cord, Westfield said, “It is not practice in the coalfields. It is not permissible.”22 It was
typically used for blasting during strip mining and the construction of roads. According to
one expert, primer cord greatly increased the risk of explosions underground because it
flashed and flamed during operation. Westfield said the Bureau had sent the cord to its
Pittsburgh laboratory for analysis, but he did not say what role, if any, it had played in the
explosion.23
In an effort to determine the cause of the disaster, the Bureau of Mines and the
Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals held a public hearing in Hyden on January
6. Bureau director Elburt Osborn presided over the one-day hearing, with the assistance
of James Westfield and Henry P. Wheeler, the Bureau’s deputy director of health and
safety. Harreld N. Kirkpatrick, the commissioner of the state agency, and his assistant J.
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H. Musgrove, also participated in the questioning of witnesses.24 Osborn cast doubt on
his ability to lead the hearing objectively by commenting, “This disaster wasn’t
unexpected. We’ve had two good years since the last disaster… and I think we can expect
almost one of these a year.”25 Osborn’s callous attitude mirrored the comments made by
Tony Boyle after the Farmington explosion, that disasters were an inherent risk of coal
mining and could not be prevented. Furthermore, it implied that he wanted to protect the
reputation of the coal industry, not the health and safety of miners.
At the hearing, the state and federal officials questioned Finley employees if they
had witnessed explosives shooter Walter Bentley, who died in the blast, using illegal
primer cord or detonating explosives without the necessary safety precautions. Most
denied having seen illegal or unsafe working practices, but three, including A. T. Collins,
the sole survivor of the explosion, reported having noticed primer cord inside the mine.
On the morning of the disaster, alleged Collins, a fellow employee had warned him to
expect “a small explosion,” then “punched [him] with his elbow like it might be a lie.”26
Carl D. Perkins and Ken Hechler attended the hearing, although Perkins departed at
lunchtime to inspect the Hyden mine with his own technical advisers. While Hechler was
convinced that the mine’s long history of safety violations had contributed to the blast,
officials focused mostly on the events immediately beforehand.27
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On January 21, the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals published its
report, in which it concluded that two of the miners, Walter Bentley and day-shift
foreman Walter Hibbard, were partially responsible for the explosion. The report stated
that Bentley had used explosives in a “non-permissible” manner, used illegal primer cord,
and failed to evacuate the mine before detonating the explosion. Bentley was criticized
for failing to compact the dynamite properly and for setting off 100 sticks with a single
detonation, ten times the lawful amount. Commenting on the report, Harreld Kirkpatrick
said, “He [Bentley] could have gotten all of these men out and had them eating their
lunch, and the man who set off the shot, who was supposed to be the expert, would have
killed himself and all this wouldn’t have happened.”28 The report also claimed that
Charles and Stanley Finley were unaware of Bentley’s working methods that day and
therefore should not have to face penalties.29 However, it based this claim on testimony
directly from the Finley Brothers, which raised doubts about its accuracy.
The Bureau of Mines published its own report on the explosion the following
week. The report concluded that the improper use of explosives, combined with excessive
quantities of dust, had primarily caused the disaster. “The explosion occurred,” stated the
Bureau, “when coal dust was thrown into suspension and ignited by Primacord or by
permissible explosives used in a non-permissible manner or by use of non-permissible
explosives during the blasting of roof rock for a loading point (boom hole).”30 According
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to the Bureau, the accumulation of coal dust in the mine, combined with inadequate rock
dusting, facilitated the rapid spread of the explosion. The Bureau also cited electrical
faults in the mine as a possible cause of the explosion.31
The Bureau did not reveal who was responsible for the violations. In previous
disaster reports, it had always cited the guilty parties or assessed who was responsible.
Bureau officials announced, however, that they were intending to ask the Justice
Department to bring charges against the guilty parties.32 One representative stated,
“There are one or more criminal violations involved in connection with the disaster
which warrant a recommendation for prosecution.”33
The Department of the Interior imposed a fine of $53,000 on the Finley Company
that covered both the disaster and the violations preceding it, a considerable reduction in
the fine of $77,000 it had originally intended to levy against the company.34 Prior to the
report’s publication, Undersecretary of the Interior Fred J. Russell had deleted all
references to the fine from the report, enabling the Department to change the amount of
the fine.35 Michael Sabaugh, an assessment officer for the Bureau, claimed that Russell
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removed the information about the fine because the Finely Brothers were in the process
of appealing it. However, Ken Hechler wrote to Elburt Osborn, informing him that such
action violated federal mine law, resulting in the Bureau’s announcement of the fine
shortly after it published the report.36
In both its report and its announcement that it intended to press charges, the
Bureau absolved itself of any responsibility for the events at Hurricane Creek. Despite
absolving itself, coal miners firmly believed that the Bureau was to blame. In the
aftermath of the explosion, several local and district unions renewed the charge that the
Bureau was overlooking non-unionized mines. In a strongly-worded letter to
Congressman Carl D. Perkins, members of UMW local 5741, based at Kentucky’s
Bethlehem mine, argued the Hyden disaster was proof that small and non-union mines
were able to “get by with murder.” The local 5741 members alleged that the bureau shut
down major mines for safety violations, while only giving warnings to non-union mines.
Most significantly, they charged that if the bureau had shut down the Hyden mine after it
had discovered the violations on November 19, it would have prevented significant loss
of life. For the miners of local 5741, the solution was clear:
It is time that someone with the authority tell the Federal and State Inspectors to
treat ALL MINES ALIKE AND SHOW FAVORE TO NONE and it will help
prevent things like this from happening again.
They holler that they don’t have enough Inspectors, FOOEY [sic], They
inspected this mine [Hyden] and found severe violations, didn’t they? Why wasn’t
it corrected before he was allowed to operate again. If they had a MILLION
INSPECTORS it wouldn’t help any, if, after an inspection and severe violations
were found and nothing was done to correct them. This also goes to prove that
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ALL MINES SHOULD BE CLASSED AS
ACCORDINGLY. [Emphasis in original letter] 37

GASSY

AS

RULED

The members of local 5741 attributed the disaster to the federal government’s
failure to apply the Federal Coal Mine Act equally to ‘gassy’ and ‘non-gassy mines.’
Under the terms of the act, all coal mines were classified as ‘gassy,’ regardless of their
size and the quantity of methane they produced. The miners believed that the Bureau of
Mines had failed to classify the Hyden mine as a ‘gassy’ mine during its inspections.
Furthermore, the members of local 5741 reiterated that the Bureau was remiss in its
inspections of non-union mines. Moreover, they obviously did not accept the Bureau’s
claim that a shortage of inspectors prevented it from fulfilling its duties. They argued that
the Bureau had an obligation to shut down unsafe mines regardless of how many
inspectors it employed. The letter by the local 5741 emphasized that miners were actively
engaged in the issue of coal mine health and safety. They had a clear understanding of the
federal legislation, and they were knowledgeable enough to critically analyze the
Bureau’s lax inspection policies.
In a letter to Joe Malesky, Carson Hibbitts, the president of District 30, also
challenged the Bureau’s record in enforcing the law at non-union mines. Its continuing
focus on union mines, he argued, would push those mines “to go non-union,” so they
could evade federal inspections. According to Hibbits, Squire Feltner, the District 30
Safety Coordinator, had visited the Hyden mine before the disaster and witnessed several
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violations even outside the mine.38 Hibbits also wrote to Lewis Evans, director of the
UMW Safety Department, inviting him to a meeting of District 30 Safety Committeemen
on January 9.39
It was not just coal miners who felt the Bureau of Mines had contributed to the
Hyen disaster. The Labor Subcommittee in the House of Representatives was dissatisfied
with the Bureau’s report, and on March 9 opened its own hearing in Washington, D.C.
The committee members focused largely on the Bureau’s inspection practices at the
Finley mine in the months prior to the disaster. On March 10, Carl D. Perkins, addressing
Bureau inspector C. E. Hyde, said the Bureau could have saved lives by carrying out
more extensive investigations of the mine. He criticized Hyde for not inspecting the mine
when he visited on December 21 to deliver ventilation instructions. Perkins stated, “You
knew something was wrong with that mine but you did not inspect it. Do you need a
directive to inspect a mine?” Hyde replied that the Bureau “only [investigated] accidents
after they [happened].”40
Representative John H. Dent, meanwhile, alleged that inspector Gordon Couch
had not followed up on his November 19 inspection because of a “special arrangement”
with one of the mine owners, Charles Finley. The previous day of the hearing had
revealed that Couch and Finley both lived in Manchester, Kentucky, a small town of
38
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4,000 residents, and they had once worked together at the same mine. Couch explained
that he did not return to the No. 16 mine on December 22 because Finley reported that he
had closed it down because of roof problems.41 He further testified that the Washington
headquarters of the Bureau had established more urgent priorities elsewhere.42 In
response, Dent noted that Bureau investigators had uncovered evidence of illegal blasting
on December 22. He commented, “Somebody knew you wouldn’t be there. Didn’t that
call make you suspicious? It sounds to me like some kind of working arrangement.”43 In
his 1973 publication, Coal Mine Health and Safety, J. Davitt McAteer criticized the
subcommittee for not posing additional questions about the priorities that had prevented
the Bureau from returning to the Hyden mine in December. He wrote, “This failure of the
subcommittee to examine the overall attitude of the bureau’s administrators in
Washington is inexplicable in view of the obvious permissiveness of the bureau since
O’Leary’s removal.”44 For McAteer, the evidence of the Bureau’s failure to enforce
health and safety warranted further investigation by the subcommittee. He felt the
subcommittee had a responsibility to examine how the incompetence of the Bureau’s
administrators in Washington D.C. had contributed to the disaster.
On March 11, Charles Finley failed to attend the hearing as scheduled. The
subcommittee issued a subpoena for him to testify at the hearing when it resumed at

41

Ibid.

42

McAteer, Coal Mine Health and Safety, 195.

43

New York Times, March 11, 1971. 78.

44

McAteer, Coal Mine Health and Safety, 195.

226
Hazard, Kentucky.45 Appearing before the subcommittee in the Hazard district court on
March 12, several Hyden widows said their husbands had spoken of dangerous working
conditions and unlawful inspection practices at the Finley mine. Emily Gibson, who lost
her husband in the explosion, said, “We was laying there before going to sleep, and my
husband said, ‘If they don’t straighten up over there we’ll all get killed.’”46 Gibson said
her husband also had noticed explosives in the mine “that wasn’t supposed to be in there
– that wasn’t safe.”47 Another witness, Nancy Gray, said that her husband Lawrence had
talked about “inspectors standing outside in their suits but they wouldn’t go inside the
mines.” According to Gray, her husband had witnessed this five or six times. She also
claimed that Charles Finley had purchased a cart to “haul the dynamite into the mine.”48
Daisy Young said the Finley brothers were aware of inspection dates in advance. “They’d
tell my husband to chew instead of smoke tobacco that day,” she said. “That was the only
time he’d ever buy chewing tobacco.”49
On the final day of the hearing, Charles Finley denied that he had been aware of
miners using primer cord, or that survivor A. T. Collins had warned him about its
dangers. He insisted that he kept the primer cord, which he used for road work and
surface mining, concealed in a trailer, to prevent miners from using it deliberately or by

45

New York Times, March 12, 1971, 74.

46

New York Times, March 13, 1971, 35.

47

Ibid.

48

Ibid.

49

Ibid.

227
accident.50 Finley said that while he could personally supervise every shift, he had
knowledgeable, well-paid foremen to oversee his 100 employees. “I thought this was the
safest mine I ever ran,” he commented.51 The Hyden owner rejected the subcommittee’s
claims that he was acquainted with inspector Gordon Couch. During his testimony,
Finley complained that small mines could not adhere to the Federal Mine Act without
jeopardizing their profits.52 His testimony provided direct evidence that mine operators
prioritized profit margins ahead of the welfare of their workforce. It also revealed,
however, that smaller mines had greater difficulty in enforcing the Federal Mine Act.
The subcommittee published its final report on the hearing on June 19, 1971. It
attributed much of the responsibility for the Hyden explosion to the Bureau of Mines,
because it had ignored the dangerous working conditions in the mine. The subcommittee
concluded that the Bureau “should have been on notice as to the dangerous atypical
conditions in the mine, should have inspected it with greater frequency, carried out more
complete inspections and perhaps most importantly, been present to insure that cited
violations were actually abated when required.”53 Furthermore, the subcommittee
accused the Bureau of betraying the miners who depended on it for the enforcement of
safe conditions. It asserted that “[it] would be derelict if it did not acknowledge the
glaring fact that the Bureau of Mines must bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the
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Hyden tragedy.”54 However, the subcommittee attributed no specific blame to the Finley
brothers for the explosion.
Unconvinced by the Bureau and Labor Subcommittee’s overall assessment of the
disaster, the Coal Miners’ Legal Defense Fund released its own report, pointedly titled
“The Hurricane Creek Massacre.” The Fund explicitly blamed both the Finley Brothers
and the Bureau of Mines for the events at Hurricane Creek. In the conclusion, the authors
stated, “Since the explosives were purchased by the mine operator, and since the
operators made no attempt to keep them under lock and key, he is responsible for the fact
that they were used, and must be imprisoned under Section 109 (b) of the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act…”55 They also listed several other violations committed by
the Finley brothers that endangered their employees’ health and safety. The report
condemned the inspection practices of the Bureau of Mines. It surmised that, if the
Bureau had fully inspected the Finley mines in 1970, it would have uncovered the illegal
blasting practices.56 It also criticized the Bureau’s hearing in Hyden on January 6:
“Despite the presence of Bureau of Mines director Osborn and a supporting staff of
Interior Department attorneys, the January 6 hearing constituted an astonishing display of

54

Ibid.

55

Coal Miners Legal Defense Fund, “The Hurricane Creek Massacre: A Report on the
Circumstances Surrounding the Deaths of 38 Men in a Coal Mine Explosion in Eastern
Kentucky, December 30, 1970,” (Charleston, West Virginia: Coal Miners Legal Defense
Fund, 1971), 47. This report is located in Folder 15 (entitled ‘Hyden Disaster’), Box 46,
Miners for Democracy Collection, Walter Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs,
Wayne State University, Detroit.
56

Ibid., 49.

229
downright incompetence that casts doubt on the ability of the Bureau to investigate any
matter relating to mine safety.”57
The Hyden mine disaster reflected the dangers faced by coal miners, particularly
those working in small, non-unionized operations. In the absence of a union presence at
the mine, the Finley brothers committed serious health and safety violations to limit
expenditure on labor and increase their profits. They bore a large degree of responsibility
for the explosion that killed 38 miners. However, the behavior of the Finley brothers was
consistent with that of many other coal mine operators over the past several decades.
More significantly, the Hyden disaster reflected the complete failure of the Bureau of
Mines to enforce the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act.

Politics Before Partisanship
Beyond the controversy surrounding the Bureau’s role in the Hyden disaster, by
late January 1971 the Nixon administration had moved toward the appointment of a new
Secretary of the Interior. The administration announced it was considering Rogers C. B.
Morton for the position. On January 25, Morton testified at a Senate hearing on his
impending appointment as Interior Secretary. He stated that he would make
environmental issues a top priority, but stressed he would not allow them to jeopardize
economic and defense policies. Environmental groups were skeptical of Morton’s
concern for the environment, particularly in light of his voting record in the House and
his solicitation of corporate donations while he was head of the Republican National
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Committee.58 In the recent past, the Sierra Club had accused him of “a dismal, lackluster
performance” on environmental policy and of representing oil interests in Congress. The
president of the Sierra Club, Phillip Berry, said, “The list of his votes against the
environment is a very long one. We believe we should have a man in this job who has
shown himself to be a committed and dedicated conservationist. The record of Rogers
Morton does not show he is this man.”59 If appointed, the position of Interior Secretary
would give Morton a unique voice, not to mention significant authority, in the Nixon
administration’s environmental policies, which was precisely why environmental groups
opposed him.
On January 26, after the conclusion of the hearing, the Senate Interior Committee
gave unanimous consent to Morton’s appointment. The committee members scrutinized
Morton’s financial records before granting their approval. While Morton had limited
shares in the oil industry, he already had informed the committee of his intent to sell
them, as they might be a conflict of interest. The Department of the Interior, for example,
controlled offshore oil leases and the Alaska pipeline.60 Two days later, the full Senate
confirmed Morton’s appointment. Despite his optimistic rhetoric, Morton’s appointment
reinforced the Nixon administration’s conservative stance on coal mine health and safety.
Morton’s rejection of the Federal Coal Mine Act in the final congressional vote,
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combined with his history of voting against progressive environmental policies, meant
that any improvement in the Bureau of Mines was unlikely.61
In late January 1971, Edward D. Failor, appointed by the Bureau of Mines to
oversee enforcement procedures, imposed fines totaling $5,000 on 200 mine operators for
400 violations of the Federal Mine Act. Failor announced that the Bureau planned to
issue fines for an additional 30,000 violations that had occurred since April 1970.62 This
was the Bureau’s third attempt in the past ten months to impose penalties for violations of
the law. The federal injunction against the Bureau in April 1970 had thwarted its first
effort to collect fines. The Bureau tried again to collect fines from operators once the
injunction expired, using a new fee schedule drafted by Undersecretary of the Interior
Fred J. Russell. Inspectors, however, failed to adhere to the new schedule and told
operators guilty of infractions that the Bureau would impose fines later. Even Failor’s
limited third attempt to collect fines did not represent significant progress. The Bureau’s
paltry fines for only a small fraction of violations emphasized the Bureau was not
upholding its mandate for tough health and safety enforcement.63
While the new penalty schedule gave the Bureau the authority to impose fines of
between $5,000 and $10,000 for serious violations, it also exempted operators from
financial sanctions when “[a violation] clearly could not have been avoided at the time
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the violation was cited.”64 Bureau officials defended this strategy, claiming that the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 contained a similar clause and reflected
Congressional thinking on workplace safety. UMW Safety Director Lewis Evans
complained that the “absence of fault” clause rested on the discretion of individual
inspectors. He said the UMW only agreed with exempting operators from violation
notices when the unavailability of equipment, personnel, or technology prevented them
from adhering to the law. The union, he emphasized, opposed exemptions for operators
who were simply unaware of violations in their mine.65
By questioning inspectors’ freedom to interpret the law, Evans was touching on a
fundamental problem within the Bureau of Mines. In many cases, the decisions of
individual staff members, particularly at the management level, prevented it from
uniformly enforcing the Federal Mine Act. Bureau managers frequently decided not to
act on the violation notices issued by coal mine inspectors. They could avoid acting on a
violation by classifying it either as “vacated” or “void.”66 By labeling a citation notice as
“vacated,” managers were stipulating that it had been wrongfully issued, even if the
inspector was able to provide compelling evidence to the contrary. “Vacated” citations,
however, remained part of the Bureau’s official record. “Void” citations were those
deemed by managers to have been issued in error, or on reassessment had been addressed
by mine owners. While the Bureau filed “void” citations, they did not remain part of the
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official record. Managers frequently overturned the citations issued by mine inspectors
using one of those classifications.67 They also exercised their autonomy in other ways.
Some employed family members and friends as inspectors, even when they had no
mining experience and lacked the appropriate qualifications.68
The significant influence of the Bureau’s management over safety enforcement
had been revealed previously in the responses to a 1970 inspector questionnaire devised
by W. R. Park, a district Bureau manager in West Virginia. In the responses, the majority
of inspectors claimed that the upper levels of Bureau management hindered their
effectiveness by limiting their authority. They cited the provisions of the 1969 legislation
as a key factor impeding their performance. The inspectors specifically cited the Bureau’s
“middle managers” as the main obstacle to their work. One commented, “It’s not Park or
O’Leary [Bureau director]; it’s someplace in between them. Those fellows in between
have lost track of what is going on out there.”
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Even decisions by inspectors on the ground prevented the Bureau from
consistently enforcing the Federal Mine Act. According to former mine inspector Richard
McDorman, well-qualified inspectors did not always understand the mandatory standards
of the Act, which were often complex and ambiguous. The inspectors often had to make
their own interpretations of the Bureau’s annual inspection manual, which contained too
many generalizations and not enough specific guidelines. In addition, many inspectors
lacked the requisite knowledge to interpret the guidelines for themselves. The Bureau’s
inspector training program course provided only rudimentary education, particularly from
1970 to mid-1971, when the Bureau was more concerned with addressing the shortage of
mine inspectors.71
The Bureau’s ongoing shortage of inspectors further impeded its enforcement of
health and safety. Despite the shortfall in its inspection force, the Bureau was rigid in the
qualifications and physical requirements it demanded of inspectors. On March 26, 1971,
Michael F. Widman, a national leader in the United Mine Workers of America, wrote to
Senator Richard S. Schweiker (R-PA) regarding Norman Rumburg, whose application to
become a Bureau inspector had been rejected. Widman complained that the Bureau had
denied Rumburg the opportunity of becoming an inspector because he was slightly
overweight. He emphasized the Bureau’s urgent need for inspectors and Rumburg’s ten
years of previous experience as a federal mine inspector from 1953 to 1963, and urged
Schweiker to intervene on Rumburg’s behalf.72 Widman also wrote to Representative
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John P. Saylor (R-PA), who addressed the matter by writing to Bureau director Elburt F.
Osborn. On April 15, 1971, Osborn responded to Saylor, informing him that Rumburg
had failed to meet the stringent physical criteria required for underground inspection
work. He wrote, “Mr. Rumburg has been unable to meet the physical requirements for
appointment as a Federal Mine Inspector… Because of the arduous nature of our
inspector positions, the stamina and other physical requirements are necessarily rigid to
help make certain that the one appointed can perform his duties adequately without
hazard to himself or others.”73 In all likelihood, the Bureau’s rigorous physical
requirements for inspectors were not solely connected to the strenuous demands of
inspection work. The Bureau may have adopted these requirements to ensure a pliable
labor force. By rejecting skilled, well-qualified applicants for minor physical reasons, the
Bureau avoided employing inspectors who sought to issue tough sanctions for health and
safety violations. In turn, the Bureau avoided alienating itself from the coal operators.
Widman also engaged in correspondence with Osborn. He informed Osborn that
he had reviewed Rumburg’s qualifications and perceived him to be well qualified for the
position of federal inspector. He asked Osborn to hold a meeting with Rumburg and
union representatives, but Osborn’s response precluded such a measure.74 In his reply to
Widman, he stated that such a meeting would have no utility, particularly given
Rumburg’s employment record with the Bureau. Osborn went on to reveal that from
April 1 1960 to March 31, 1961, Rumburg, while employed as a Bureau inspector, had
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been rated deficient in quality of work, work habits, and work attitude, despite receiving
an overall rating of satisfactory. Osborn continued, “On April, 1961, he was officially
reprimanded by the Director, Bureau of Mines. On November 28, 1962, Mr. Rumburg
was separated for cause from the Bureau.”75 Despite this, the Bureau had given Rumburg
another opportunity to qualify as an inspector, on the condition that he passed the
physical examination. According to Osborn, Rumburg’s past employment record,
combined with his failure of the physical examination, had prevented him from obtaining
employment with the Bureau.76
Rumburg’s case was by no means unique, as a significant number of applicants
for the Bureau’s inspection team failed to gain employment. An examination of
correspondence in the United Mine Workers Safety Division Office Files reveals that
many candidates, such as James DeFail of Loyalhanna, Pennsylvania, were turned down
because they did not meet the required standards of physical fitness.77 However, the
Bureau turned down other candidates for more abstract reasons. John Chiesa, for
example, an experienced miner from Blairsville, Pennsylvania, passed the qualifying
requirements but did not receive an offer of employment. The Bureau determined that
“other applicants were better suited.”78
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At first glance, it might be argued that the Bureau had stringent criteria for
applicants who wished to qualify as an inspector and sought to conduct its mine
inspections by the highest standards. A closer examination shows this was not the case.
The Bureau’s rejection of applicants for minor technicalities, including slight
discrepancies in weight and physical fitness, makes little sense, given that it did not
provide comprehensive training to new inspectors. It also relied on “Partial But
Representative” inspections, which did not require inspectors to undertake a full
examination of the mine. Moreover, the Bureau should have accounted for unqualified
candidates in its hiring procedures by interviewing more people. Ultimately, the Bureau’s
rejection of a large number of candidates accounted for its ongoing shortage of inspectors
and in turn its failure to enforce federal mine legislation.
In the spring of 1971, the Bureau embarked on a program of extensive
reorganization, creating new inspection districts and redrawing the boundaries of existing
ones. The purpose of this reorganization, according to Elburt Osborn, was “to provide for
closer supervision, lend better technical assistance, and to make all districts more
manageable.”79 By late March, local unions in western Kentucky were concerned by the
Bureau’s plan to transfer its jurisdiction for the region from its Madisonville office, run
by William Craft, to new offices in Morganfield and Beaver Dam, overseen by Donald
Martin. They were particularly worried that William Craft would no longer be in charge
of enforcing safety at their mine. When the Bureau proceeded with the opening of the
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Madisonville office, miners were outraged. Several local unions wrote letters to Elburt
Osborn to convey their opposition to the new office.80
Local 1071 leader James Smith, writing to Osborn on behalf of his fellow miners
at the Uniontown mine, asserted, “During the time that Mr. Craft was in charge of the
Madisonville office we made more progress safety wise, than we ever made in a like
period of time. Mr. Craft knew the federal code, and made strong effort to see that the
coal company complied with it.”81 According to Smith, safety conditions had been
deteriorating ever since the Morganfield office opened under Donald Martin’s control. He
contended that the Bureau’s lax enforcement policies made it easier for the mine’s
owners to evade the law. Smith believed that “the company knows who is coming, when
he will be there, and what section of the mine he will visit.” Articulating his frustration
about the situation, Smith wrote:
Somebody in the Bureau of Mines is playing politics and they are doing it at the
expense of our safety. We resent it. We don’t feel that we have to tolerate this and
we don’t intend to. We cannot believe that you would condone such action and
we don’t believe the Secretary of the Interior, Roger Morton [sic], knows of what
is going on. If he did, we believe that the Madisonville office of the Bureau of
Mines would again assume jurisdiction over our mines and all other mines in
western Kentucky and restore the degree of safety and confidence which Bill
Craft built up in Western Kentucky.82
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Smith’s letter shows his conviction that low-level Bureau officials were carrying out the
reorganization without the knowledge of Elburt Osborn and Rogers C. B. Morton.
Further, by stating that the miners did not intend to tolerate the Bureau’s political
maneuvering, Smith hinted at the possibility of future strike action. He also conveyed an
implicit assumption that Morton would place the western Kentucky mines back under the
control of the Madisonville office.
Like James Smith, President James Jones Jr. and the Safety Committeemen of
Local No. 1636 framed the institutional reorganization in political terms. In an agitated
letter, they wrote, “The Bureau of Mines is now playing politics instead of promoting
safety. We have a good director of the Bureau of Mines in the Madisonville KY office
[Craft], but it looks as though that doesn’t make any difference to the powers that be;
they want to create a new office in Beaver Dam, Kentucky to make a job for someone
who may have some influence either in the Bureau or politically. We don’t like it.”83
Similarly, miners of local union 1740, based at the Hamilton No. 2 mine in Union
County, complained about the deterioration of conditions at their mine and the nearby
Uniontown mine, both operated by the Island Creek Coal Company. They felt that the
opening of the Morganfield office had restricted the Bureau’s enforcement of the 1969
Federal Mine Act. The authors of the letter, local president Raymond Tate and safety
committeeman Walter Adams, wrote, “We have confidence in Mr. Craft and we say to
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you, if you are sincerely interested in safety, you will put Mr. Craft back in charge of all
the mines in western Kentucky.84
In late April, miners wrote to Osborn in an effort to prevent the opening of the
new Beaver Dam office. President James Dukes and safety committeemen Walter Swain
and Luther Grayson of local union 9925 pleaded, “Bill Craft who is in charge of the
Madisonville office of the Bureau of Mines has proven himself and we assure you that he
has our cooperation and the last thing we would want would be to see a change made in
the present arrangements in regard to the Bureau of Mines Safety Division.”85
Meanwhile, the representatives of local union 1178 contended, “This report [about the
opening of the Beaver Dam office] seems to have received considerable enthusiasm
among the coal companies in this area and we can see that well it might have the support
of the coal companies. Under the present director, Bill Craft, the Federal law is
enforced.”86
Even in the light of the Bureau’s reorganization and the expansion of its
inspection force, Department of the Interior representatives still tried to minimize the
Bureau’s responsibility for health and safety enforcement. At a department meeting on
July 1, Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton argued that most accidents were the result
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of miners’ carelessness or operators’ failure to implement safe working practices. Morton
stressed that educating miners was of the utmost importance, particularly in small mines
where companies did not have the resources to provide such educational programs.
Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-KY) defended Morton’s initiative in Congress, arguing
that while the Bureau had failed in many of its obligations, much of the criticism against
it was unjustified. He launched a scathing attack on former Bureau director John F.
O’Leary for imposing fines on operators that did not have the necessary safety equipment
required by the new regulations. According to Cooper, the strict regulations had forced
many small mines in Kentucky to close, in turn leading to an increase in surface mining
and related environmental problems. 87
The Department’s lack of support for the Bureau’s enforcement role also was
emphasized by its budget from 1970 to 1971. In 1970, the Department spent a total of
$23 million on health and safety, including $12 million for inspections, investigations,
and rescue work, and $11 million for health and safety research. The following year, it
almost doubled its expenditure for health and safety, allocating a total of $42 million for
that purpose. That same year, however, it spent $47,698,000 on mineral and resource
production, the other component of its dual function.88 Moreover, according to McAteer,
the Bureau’s Conservation and Development Division, which focused on the business
and production aspects of the mining industry, employed more people than its Health and
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Safety Division. In 1971, the former employed 2,564 people, compared to the Health and
Safety Division’s employment of 2,242 people, of which 618 were field inspectors.89
An article in Coal Patrol, a bi-weekly newsletter that reported on coal industry
developments, further emphasized the Department of the Interior’s efforts to downplay its
role in the coal industry’s fatality record and to blame miners for accidents. The article
reported that Rogers C. B. Morton was considering a proposal by Harry Treleaven, an
advertising magnate from New York who ran Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, to
enhance the Interior Department’s public image. The proposal’s central premise was that
Treleaven’s company should undertake an expensive publicity campaign with the
message that miners would not get killed or injured if they were more careful.
Treleaven’s proposal was based on a “fact-finding” study of the department’s information
programs he had undertaken shortly after Morton’s appointment in January. The article
noted that Treleaven’s business partner, Harry Allison, had worked with Morton on the
Republican National Committee.90
Coal Patrol went on to provide a starkly critical assessment of the proposal. It
noted that just months earlier, President Nixon had sent a memorandum to government
agencies ordering the termination of “self-serving and wasteful public relations efforts,”
and the end of “inappropriate promotional activities.” Therefore, Morton’s consideration
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of Treleaven’s proposal directly violated Nixon’s instructions. More significantly, the
article contended that the biggest impediment to safe working conditions was the
bureau’s failure to make operators comply with the 1969 Coal Mine Act, not recklessness
on the part of miners. The newsletter attacked the proposed move as a conflict of
interests, noting that Morton was considering a proposal by a man who was not only in
partnership with one of his former colleagues, but who had also run the 1968 presidential
campaign.91
In a public address in Lexington, Kentucky, on September 16, 1971, Bureau of
Mines Director Elburt Osborn outlined some of the problems the Bureau had encountered
over the previous eighteen months. He opened his address by quoting Assistant Secretary
of the Interior Hollis M. Dole’s statement at the Senate hearing on mine health and safety
in August 1970. Dole had emphasized to the hearing that the health and safety act
required “a safety revolution in the coal mines within 90 days and a health revolution to
follow within 90 days.”92 In Osborn’s view, the significant lack of inspectors hindered
the Bureau’s initial efforts to enforce the new federal mine act. He explained, “Our
principal asset was the inspection force, which at that time consisted of 210 inspectors, 30
inspector trainees, and 60 specialists in such technical areas as roof control, ventilation,
electricity, and other areas of mining technology. We had a force of 300 all told, less than
a third of the number needed to meet the minimum requirements of the law.” Osborn was
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convinced, however, that the Bureau had made significant progress in rectifying the
shortage of inspectors, by reducing the length of the training program and opening a new
academy in temporary headquarters in Beckley, West Virginia. 93
Furthermore, Osborn claimed that since the beginning of 1971, the number of
Bureau inspections in all types of mines had markedly increased. He asserted: “The
Bureau, to the limit of its resources, has enforced the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act rigorously and fairly. As of the beginning of September, 48,346 penalties,
totaling more than $6.3 million, had been proposed for violations of the Act, and over
$800,000 of that amount has been paid.”94 While Osborn highlighted recent
improvements in the Bureau’s performance, he glossed over its many failures, which he
attributed to intrinsic weaknesses in its bureaucratic and political structure.
By late October 1971, however, there were signs that the Bureau’s performance
was improving. During the summer, it had expanded its qualified inspection staff to over
1,000 people, a significant increase on the 250 inspectors employed the previous year. It
had also started construction on the new National Mine Academy in Beckley, which
would provide more comprehensive training for inspectors.95 Harrison Combs argued that
the new inspection districts were more efficiently organized than their predecessors, with
improved management of personnel and faster approval of operators’ roof support and
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electrical plans.96 In conjunction with the Department of the Interior, the Bureau also had
created a team of mining engineers for touring the coalfields, with the purpose of
ensuring that inspectors were uniformly implementing the Federal Mine Act.97 The
Bureau was also in the process of replacing several of the managerial staff at its
Washington, D.C. office. Its main goal, wrote Elburt Osborn in a memorandum to the
Assistant Secretary of Mineral Resources, was to “professionalize top level management
in the Washington office of Coal Mine Health and Safety as well as in the field.”98
By the end of the year, there was further evidence that the Bureau’s performance
was gradually improving. Throughout 1971, there were 180 deaths in the coal industry,
equivalent to a rate of 0.71 fatalities per million man-hours worked and 0.12 fatalities per
million tons of coal extracted in the bituminous and anthracite sectors combined.99 It was
a marked decrease in the fatality rate for 1970, when there were 260 deaths in the coal
industry. The 1970 frequency rate was 1.02 deaths per million man-hours worked, and
1.26 deaths per million tons of coal mined.100 There had been a significant improvement
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in coal mine health and safety in 1971. As with previous years, falls of roof, face, and
ribs in underground mines were the primary cause of death, rather than explosions, major
disasters, or other accidents. Of the 180 deaths in 1971, 60 were attributable to this cause.
Fatalities from the collapse of the internal mine structure occurred in three percent of all
coal mines inspected by the Bureau that year.101

Conclusion
Despite the notable reduction in coal mine fatalities by the close of 1971, the
Federal Coal Mine Act still did not afford miners the safer conditions it had promised
when Nixon signed it into law in December 1969. Miners faced the constant danger of
being crushed to death by a falling roof or collapsing ribs, or perishing in a disaster such
as the Hurricane Creek explosion. Much of the responsibility for the continuing hazards
in underground mines was attributable to the Bureau of Mines. The Bureau was lax in its
inspections and, as the Hurricane Creek disaster showed, frequently neglected to follow
up on health and safety violations. The Bureau’s performance was attributable to a
shortage of inspectors and poor training for the inspectors who qualified. Moreover, illinformed decisions by middle-level managers detracted from the Bureau’s health and
safety policies. While the Bureau sought to improve its performance through an extensive
program of reorganization, this program had a negligible impact. Although it had
addressed the shortage of inspectors and contributed to a decline in the fatality rate by the
end of 1971, many believed that the Bureau was a major impediment to safer conditions
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in the mines.
The Bureau’s dismal performance was, in many ways, a reflection of the Nixon
administration’s labor policies and its conservative stance on coal mine health and safety.
The administration’s appointment of Elburt F. Osborn as the head of the Bureau of Mines
and Rogers C. B. Morton as Interior Secretary limited the Bureau’s ability to engage in
significant reform. Osborn and Morton both lacked real mining experience and were
more supportive of the coal industry than miners. In fact, from October 1970 to
December 1971, the Bureau of Mines actively undermined many of the legislative gains
that miners and their supporters had fought so hard to achieve.
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Chapter 6
Making Amends:
The Black Lung Benefits Act, New Union Leadership, and the Mine Enforcement
and Safety Administration

Introduction
By early 1971, the Black Lung Association consisted of fourteen chapters across
Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia. The BLA chapters continued to
protest the Social Security Administration’s management of the federal black lung
compensation program, particularly its denial of benefits to tens of thousands of black
lung victims and widows. On January 11, 1971, around 50 miners marched to the SSA
office in Logan County, West Virginia, to present a list of demands by the Logan County
and Mingo County chapters of the BLA. The director of the office sent the list to the
central SSA office in Baltimore. Later that month, SSA officials from Baltimore and
Washington, D.C. met with representatives from the Logan County and Mingo County
chapters to discuss their grievances. While the officials promised to investigate the
miners’ concerns, the meeting did not result in direct changes to the Social Security
Administration’s management of the compensation program.1 In their quest to achieve a
more equitable compensation system, the local BLA chapters believed that persistence
was the most effective tactic. Their main priority was to get the SSA to legitimize
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applicants’ claims for compensation.2 To that end, local chapters of the BLA continued to
engage in protests, which although organized locally, were targeted at high-level officials
of the Social Security Administration. Such protests, however, did not yield tangible
results.
The same day as the march in Logan County, Dr. Buff publicly attacked a new
breathing test recently introduced by the Social Security Administration. Buff argued that
the test, administered for claimants who exhibited positive X-ray evidence of black lung
disease, was “at its best very inaccurate.” Complaining that the breathing test often
showed normal results for miners with severe black lung, Buff argued it was created to
deny benefits to miners. His charges reinforced the Black Lung Association’s conviction
that the SSA was making arbitrary decisions about compensation payments based on
flawed evidence.3
For the Black Lung Association and its supporters, the Social Security
Administration was a significant obstacle to miners’ receipt of federal black lung
benefits. The large number of miners who were denied compensation was not only
attributable to the individual decisions of the SSA. It also stemmed from inherent
weaknesses in the black lung compensation legislation in the Federal Mine Act of 1969.
This chapter focuses on the Black Lung Association’s campaign to amend the federal
black lung benefits program. It shows that the association’s sustained grassroots activism
was instrumental in the passage of the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, which provided
a more liberal compensation system. In addition, the chapter examines how Miners for
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Democracy won control of the United Mine Workers in the presidential election of 1972.
The new UMW president, Arnold Miller, was more attentive than Tony Boyle to miners’
working conditions and issues such as compensation. Furthermore, this chapter discusses
how the Nixon administration, conscious of the failures of the Bureau of Mines, created a
new health and safety enforcement agency called the Mine Enforcement and Safety
Administration.
The passage of new federal black lung legislation, the ascension of Miners for
Democracy to the UMW national leadership, and the Nixon administration’s creation of
MESA were significant advances in coal mine health and safety. Yet, as this chapter also
shows, there were limitations to those advances that had negative consequences for the
nation’s rank and file coal miners.

Grassroots Resurgence: Challenging the Black Lung Benefits Program
In the realization that the Black Lung Association’s local demonstrations were not
working, Don Bryant, the president of the Logan Country chapter, began to plan a march
on Washington. He complained, “We have waited two months for social security to move
on their promises but we see no evidence of changes… Thousands of disabled miners and
widows are being treated like dirt… We have tried to work things out but all we get is
unkept promises and no action. We want what is right and we will get it even if it takes a
trip to Washington.”4 The activists were particularly frustrated by senior officials’ refusal
to meet with them. Commissioner Robert M. Ball, head of the Social Security
Administration, Bernard Popick, chief of the Bureau of Disability Insurance, and Elliot
4
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Richardson, head of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, all denied the
activists’ requests for meetings. Bernard Popick eventually agreed to meet with BLA
representatives in April, but he failed to attend the meeting. The activists’ decision to take
their campaign to the nation’s capital was, in large part, driven by the refusal of SSA
officials to acknowledge them. One black lung activist remembered:
On April 29, leaders from 10 BLA chapters were supposed to meet with Popick,
the head of the Bureau of Disability Insurance, which handles the Black Lung
Program. This meeting was originally set for March 15, but the Social Security
pencil pushers kept stalling. April 29 came – but Popick did not show up. Instead
he sent his assistant Bill Rivers and some other flunkies. Some men thought we
should walk out, but we decided to give the messenger boys the word to take back
to their boss.5
The BLA members wrote down a list of demands for Rivers and his associates to
give to Popick, with a deadline of two weeks to implement them. Popick’s failure to
address their demands was one of the key factors that convinced the activists of the need
to widen their campaign. The Black Lung Association’s main priority was the reform of
the federal black lung compensation program.6 Representatives from the BLA central
office in Charleston planned to visit Congress and establish pickets at the UMW-owned
National Bank of Washington, the United Mine Workers headquarters, and the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. While the central office provided
instructions, much of the organization of the demonstration fell to local chapters. Leaders
of the local BLA chapters distributed forms to obtain more information on who planned
to attend the demonstration, and what they wanted to achieve on the trip.7
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As the BLA organized its march, Congress began to address the weaknesses in the
federal black lung compensation program. On May 10, the General Labor Subcommittee
in the House of Representatives opened a hearing to consider legislative amendments to
Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Act. The subcommittee had introduced a number of
Democrat-sponsored bills, which, among other things, prohibited the denial of claims
solely on the basis of X-ray evidence, prevented the deduction of black lung benefits
from other compensation payments, and mandated benefits for double orphans.8 The
Subcommittee acknowledged, therefore, that X-rays did not provide definitive proof of
black lung and that miners should receive black lung benefits without having other
benefits reduced. Furthermore, it recognized that several of the miners who died from
black lung were the only surviving parent of their children or had been raising their
children alone. The subcommittee felt it was necessary to provide financial assistance to
children who became ‘double orphans’ as a result of black lung disease.
Testifying before the subcommittee, Ken Hechler explained why miners in
Kentucky and West Virginia experienced the highest rate of denials by the Social
Security Administration. In his testimony, he emphasized the lack of medical facilities in
those states and the administration’s reliance on X-ray exams as evidence of
pneumoconiosis: “Many doctors examining these X-rays have historically down through
the years been individuals who have denied that pneumoconiosis as a disease actually
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exists. There has been disagreement between doctors and radiologists reading the same
X-rays.”9
In addition, Hechler charged that the Nixon administration had ordered the SSA
to adopt a conservative approach in its implementation of the 1969 Federal Mine Act, in
order to limit the amount of successful compensation applications.10 Hechler contended,
“I have never seen this order in writing, but it seems to me that when you have this kind
of repeated denial of applicants who are short of breath, and obviously disabled, who
cannot qualify, that such an order must have been handed down, because otherwise we
would have had the provisions of the act carried out with the intent of Congress.”11 Given
that President Nixon had almost vetoed the Federal Mine Act for its black lung benefits
provision, Hechler’s claim made sense. Hechler’s statement emphasized his ongoing
mistrust in the Nixon administration’s commitment to coal mine health and safety. More
importantly, his testimony highlighted one of the most contentious issues of debate
surrounding the program, the validity of X-rays as a source of medical evidence.
Bernard Popick, the head of the Bureau of Disability, defended the record of the
Social Security Administration. He commented, “With the limited knowledge available in
the early months concerning the specific criteria for eligibility, it was to be expected that
this all-out effort on our part to protect individual benefit rights would result in
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applications from a very substantial number who were eventually found not to meet the
requirements of the law.”12 According to Popick, there had been 290,000 applications for
compensation since the program began, and 190,000 of those had been successful.13 Yet,
he also argued that the SSA needed to acquire more knowledge about the scientific and
medical properties of pneumoconiosis so it could improve its procedures for identifying
the disease.14 Like Hechler, Popick highlighted the divisions over the definition of black
lung disease and the most effective means of identifying it. Additionally, he criticized the
Federal Coal Mine Act for its failure to award compensation to double orphans. To that
end, he voiced his support for legislative bill H.R. 42.15
Representing the Black Lung Association, Arnold Miller testified at the hearing
with a delegation of six witnesses. Miller complained that the SSA was undermining the
compensation program by defining pneumoconiosis more narrowly than Congress had
intended. One of the witnesses, Verlan Golden of the Economic Opportunity Council in
Knox County, Kentucky, was far more scathing in his attack of the SSA, protesting, “We
people that go down to the Social Security Office are misled, abused, lied to, and you
name it we can furnish it.”16 Golden further stated that the hearing should have taken
place in southern Kentucky or West Virginia, as the people most severely affected by
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pneumoconiosis were too sick to travel to Washington.17 He claimed that the SSA clinics
were not equipped with the necessary medical equipment and that they rushed the
medical examinations of coal miners. To exemplify his point, he related a story about a
miner who had been denied black lung benefits:
And I have a man that told me that he went and was X-rayed and turned down.
The doctor told him he had two perfect lungs. He said, “Doc, did you see the 18inch scar on my back that I had one of my lungs removed?” This is the type of
thing that you have got going on in the black lung services and this has come from
the Social Security Administration.18
Golden implied that the doctors working on behalf of the SSA were willfully denying
miners the opportunity to collect black lung benefits. His testimony provided support for
Hechler’s claim that the Nixon administration had issued the SSA with instructions to
limit the number of miners who received compensation.
Miller submitted anonymous written testimonies for the official record of the
hearing. Written by disabled miners and widows who were unable to attend, the
testimonies encapsulated the true human cost of pneumoconiosis, as well as applicants’
negative experience of the federal compensation program. One widow who had written to
Miller described the effects of black lung disease on her husband. She wrote, “He had
shortness of breath his last month of life he lived in the hospital under oxygen he coughed
large blackish clots of blood, had chest pains, weakness and could not work, he
developed a viral pneumonia, had 3 blood clots go into his heart and died of a
Myocardical Infarction [sic].”19 She also stated that an autopsy of her husband had
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revealed black scarring on his lungs. Doctors were unable to determine, however, if this
caused his health problems. The widow conveyed to Miller her fear that she would not be
able to obtain compensation because her husband worked in the mine for less than six
years. She hoped, however, that her testimony might help another widow in her position
to obtain benefits.20 Her letter confirmed that even clear evidence of black lung from an
autopsy was no guarantee that the SSA would award compensation to miners’ widows.
Moreover, it conveyed the immense physical suffering caused by pneumoconiosis.
A 52-year old miner, who had spent twenty-five years underground, wrote to
Miller after being denied benefits. Despite exhibiting clear signs of black lung disease,
the Social Security Administration did not award him compensation. He explained that
Dr. Donald Rasmussen had examined him twice, in 1966 and 1969, and found evidence
of the disease on both occasions; in fact, the disease had worsened by the second
examination. The miner wrote, “I had to hire a lawyer to get on disabled social security
even though I had black lung, a heart murmer and arthritis of the neck and spine that was
caused by a mine injury.”21 His application for black lung benefits was denied because
the SSA determined that he was not ‘totally’ disabled. Yet, in making this assessment, the
Social Security Administration had failed to obtain his medical records from Donald
Rasmussen. The miner commented, “I believe a big factor in the failure of some miners
to get their rightful benefits is caused by the Social Security office not getting their
records.” At the time of writing to Arnold Miller, the unnamed miner was in the process
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of making an appeal.22 The Social Security Administration’s failure to obtain the miner’s
medical records was as much attributable to its bureaucratic disorganization as its
conscious effort to evade paying compensation.
Another miner wrote to Miller to complain about the Social Security
Administration’s system for determining eligibility for black lung benefits. In his letter,
the miner stated:
… So one more thing that I want to call your Attention to is this, there is some of
the Miners all around me Here that they filed thay Claims the same date of the
same month that I did and Thay was payed for thay Claims and diden have to go
no where to Get no Proof of Eligibelty for to get it comeing to them So I’M
saying right here that this Mr. Robert M. Ball Knows All About these Matters as
he has the records right There at his Finger tips for to check so this makes Me feel
like that I’M being given Some Discrimination on getting my Claim
Settled…[sic]23
The letter conveyed the miner’s belief that the SSA was making arbitrary decisions about
compensation payouts. Moreover, it conveyed the suspicion of many coal miners that the
administration was awarding benefits to some applicants without full medical evidence.
The letters that Miller submitted for the record depicted the disarray in the federal
black lung compensation program. Moreover, they showed the important contribution of
miners and their families to the national debate on the compensation program. The letters
also emphasized the applicants’ belief that the central black lung office in Charleston,
particularly its leader Arnold Miller, could resolve their individual disputes with the
Social Security Administration. Conversely, the letters also showed that the applicants
were becoming disillusioned with local protest as a means of resolving their grievances.
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By writing to Miller, they were bypassing their local Black Lung Association chapter and
seeking action from the centralized main office. The letters emphasize the short-term
failure of local black lung chapters to address the failures of the compensation program.
In his testimony at the subcommittee hearing, Dr. Donald Rasmussen criticized
X-rays as a method of detecting pneumoconiosis. He described how his medical team
frequently encountered miners with severe breathing difficulties that rendered them
almost inactive. Yet the X-rays of those miners either displayed simple pneumoconiosis
or did not show evidence of pneumoconiosis at all. Rasmussen also dismissed the Social
Security Administration’s breathing test, previously criticized by Buff, as an effective
method of determining black lung disease.24 “In our opinion, then,” said Rasmussen, “the
use of these tests alone is inadequate. Our experience with the chest X-ray leaves us to
conclude, again, that pneumoconiosis of coal workers is difficult to identify.” According
to Rasmussen, slight differences in X-ray technique, including the voltage used to take
pictures, had a significant impact on the detection of pneumoconiosis, and thus in
calculating disability and compensation.25
The House Labor Subcommittee hearing clearly showed the failure of the black
lung compensation program, but also demonstrated the emerging movement for reform at
the national level. A hearing before the full House Committee on Labor on May 19
revealed many of the same tensions. Carl D. Perkins, the chairman of the Labor
Committee, highlighted the disparity between states, claiming that 72 percent of
applicants in his state of Kentucky were denied benefits, compared to 52 percent in West
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Virginia and 31 percent in Pennsylvania. He identified the X-ray examination as the
cause of this injustice. “I hate to see disabled people robbed this way, in one sense of the
word. To undertake to deny black lung benefits solely on X-ray evidence as they are
doing was never intended by the Congress and it is a disgraceful situation.” He further
condemned the way that miners were “lined up like sheep” for X-ray examinations.26
The hearings in the House of Representatives brought national attention to the
black lung benefits program, creating a favorable climate for the Black Lung
Association’s planned demonstration. On June 7, 1971, after almost two months of
preparation, the association undertook an extensive lobbying campaign in Washington,
D.C. Around 150 people, consisting mostly of retired and disabled miners and widows,
participated. The majority of the protestors were from West Virginia, although the group
also included people from Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania. The group visited
several Congressmen, emphasizing the risk of disease that miners faced and the problems
that applicants, particularly widows and orphans, encountered in their pursuit of
benefits.27 Christine Warwick of Red Star, West Virginia, led a delegation of 30 people to
see Ken Hechler, who told them that their failure to obtain compensation stemmed from
President Nixon’s dislike of the program. Hechler repeated the claim he had made at the
hearing on May 10, that Nixon had ordered the SSA to apply the law as selectively as
possible, “with the result that you and others are being denied your rights under the law
that we in Congress passed.”28
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Another group of activists visited Senator Robert C. Byrd in the U.S. Capitol
Building. The activists emerged confident that he planned to advance the federal
compensation laws. Also present at the meeting were Hugh Johnson, Assistant to the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, and Bernard Popick, Director of the
Bureau of Disability Insurance. They explained the compensation law to the ten delegates
permitted to enter Byrd’s office and promised to evaluate their individual situations.29
Senator Jennings Randolph, meanwhile, was back in his home state of West Virginia, but
his staff assured the black lung activists that he fully supported amending Title IV of the
1969 Federal Mine Act. The activists informed Randolph’s staff that they supported an
amendment to provide compensation to the orphans of coal miners. They highlighted two
children in Mingo County, aged 10 and 13, whose father was certified to have died from
black lung, but who were receiving no benefits, because their mother had abandoned
them.
At a news conference later that day, John Mendez, an activist from Chapmanville,
West Virginia, criticized the Social Security Administration for denying claims on the
basis of a single X-ray test.30 The BLA delegation threatened to disrupt the provision of
America’s coal-generated electricity by going on strike unless Congress acted on their
complaints. The activists displayed a number of posters at the conference, including one
that stated: “President Nixon: We aint got much, but we sure got electric power. Give us
our black lung pay.”31 This threat was particularly resonant given the impending energy
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crisis in the United States. That summer, a number of East Coast cities were facing the
threat of power “brown outs.” Disruption to coal supplies would further jeopardize the
provision of electricity. Existing supplies of coal, oil, and natural gas were barely meeting
Americans’ demand for energy.32
Although the Black Lung Association had invested considerable planning in the
lobbying campaign for June 7, the relatively small attendance called into question its
ability to persuade Congress of the need for legislative change. This was confirmed the
following day, when the House Labor Subcommittee failed to pass a bill granting black
lung benefits to orphans. Yet the activists increased the national focus on their cause and
consolidated alliances with powerful Congressman. The demonstration might not have
brought immediate results, but the activists laid an important foundation for future action.
The events of June 7 also showed that criticism of the program was, increasingly,
specifically targeted at President Nixon.33

Clearing the Air: The Black Lung Amendments Act of 1972
The House Labor Subcommittee’s rejection of the bill that provided compensation
to black lung orphans did not stall the process of reform in the House of Representatives.
The following week, on June 16, 1971, Carl Perkins introduced bill H.R. 9212 to the
Committee on Education and Labor, which contained a number of legislative measures to
amend the compensation program in Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Act. Specifically,
it advocated benefits for double orphans, extended federal management of the
32

New York Times, July 6, 1971, 1 and 24.

33

New York Times, June 9, 1971, 23.

262
compensation program until January 1975, and clarified that black lung benefits did not
constitute state workmen’s compensation.34 The latter provision was important, because
the Social Security Administration erroneously classified federal black lung benefits as
workmen’s compensation. Under its guidelines, the SSA reduced injury disability
payments to miners if they also received state workmen’s compensation payments,
especially if the combined benefits exceeded 80 percent of a worker’s total earnings.
Thus, miners receiving both disability insurance and black lung benefits often found their
disability payments reduced.35
The bill also included a ‘presumptive’ clause, which stipulated that miners with
fifteen years of underground experience and outward signs of a “totally disabling
respiratory disease” had work-related pneumoconiosis, even if X-rays did not confirm
this diagnosis. Furthermore, the bill expanded the range of evidence for detecting black
lung to include blood gas studies, electrocardiograms, and other diagnostic tests. The bill
even stipulated that lay testimony was an acceptable form of evidence.36 Whereas Title
IV of the Federal Mine Act stipulated that miners were not disabled if they could perform
light work, Perkins’ bill included an amendment that tied the definition of disability to a
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miner’s ability to perform his regular job. Finally, the bill called for a review of all
previously denied claims for black lung benefits.37
The Black Lung Association viewed Perkins’ bill as the key to the liberalization
of Title IV of the Federal Mine Act and campaigned for its passage. One activist
commented that the campaign was “the most effective grassroots lobbying he had ever
seen.” The activists regularly organized carpools to Washington D.C., where they lobbied
congressmen and picketed the offices of the Social Security Administration.38 Helen
Powell, one of the most prominent leaders, later recalled, “We would go around to
different Congressmen and Senators’ offices. They didn’t know us from Adam, we would
make them believe we were from our home state and… we would put demands on them,
because they had no way of knowing who we were. So we got a lot of help that way.”39
Powell also recalled that it was not always easy to sustain the momentum behind the
campaign. She stated, “We would plan trips to D.C., sometimes without a dime in our
pockets, and [when we got there] we lived off baloney, peanut butter and jelly, the
churches would take us in and they’d fix meals for us.”40 Despite the obstacles they
faced, the network of BLA chapters persisted with their lobbying efforts, determined to
persuade Congress to pass Perkins’ legislative bill. They engaged in more planning and
organization than the 1969 black lung protest movement in West Virginia, in the hope of
finally winning the passage of an adequate compensation bill.
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The lay advocates in the Black Lung Association were key participants in the
lobbying campaign for the amendments. Their experience of assisting coal miners and
widows with benefit claims enabled them to merge complex legal and technical
arguments with a humanitarian approach.41 The Appalachian Research and Defense Fund
provided limited financial support for the advocates, while Designs for Rural Action
helped them to coordinate their lobbying efforts.42 Even the coal operators supported the
activists’ campaign for Perkins’ bill, because it would absolve them from having to pay
towards black lung compensation. Under state compensation laws, employers were liable
for a substantial part of the cost. The coal operators sought to evade responsibility for
black lung benefits payments.43 Some politicians opposed the amendments because they
would delay the transfer of the compensation program to the coal industry.
The House of Representatives began deliberations on the Perkins bill on October
18, 1971.44 Perkins took the unusual step of announcing that members would be voting
on the bill as written, without being given the opportunity to propose amendments. The
bill needed to gain a two-thirds majority, however, to pass the House in this manner, or it
would be subject to debate under the normal congressional regulations.
Much of the opening debate centered on the amendment that prohibited the denial
of claims solely on the basis of X-ray results. The validity of the X-ray as a form of
medical evidence was one of the most contested issues in the struggle over black lung
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compensation. Representative John N. Erlenborn (R-IL) led the Republican criticism of
the amendments. Erlenborn had fronted the Republican opposition to the compensation
plan (Title IV) in the original Federal Coal Mine Act. While he supported benefits for
orphans, Erlenborn was adamant that X-rays were the only reliable method to distinguish
victims of pneumoconiosis from miners with conditions such as emphysema and
bronchitis. The amendment on medical evidence, he insisted, would enable miners
without black lung to collect benefits. “That is not the real purpose of this bill,” he
maintained. “It is not a matter of simple justice. It is a matter of extending benefits and
giving them to people who are disabled for reasons other than the fact they have coal
workers pneumoconiosis. There is no social justification for doing that. There is no
medical justification.”45 He also cited findings by the British Medical Society that it was
possible to determine conclusively from an X-ray if a miner was suffering from
pneumoconiosis.
Erlenborn was unable to respond, however, to a comment by Representative
Frank Evans (D-CO) that some miners with negative X-rays exhibited substantial
evidence of pneumoconiosis when autopsied after their death. He merely responded that a
miner could simultaneously have black lung disease and other ailments.46 Responding to
Erlenborn’s comments that the extension of federal benefits was a “windfall” for coal
operators, Phil Burton argued that virtually none of the states had implemented the
necessary measures to update their worker compensation programs. In fact, only three
small states, none of them coal producers, had taken the necessary measures. He argued
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that two years was a reasonable time extension for the states to update their programs and
implement the appropriate legislation.47
Representative Tom Bevill (D-AL) said the amendments were “one more step
towards the resolution of an enormous debt which the people of this Nation owe to coal
miners.” Drawing a stark connection between the nations’ growing energy consumption
and the suffering of its coal miners, Bevill stated, “We have involved a number of our
citizens in the hazardous task of extracting coal under conditions which we now consider
unacceptable in order to use this coal for the production of energy to benefit us all.”
Noting the failure of Congress and the coal industry to protect the miners who created
such benefits, he continued, “The conditions of coal mining were so hazardous that many
of these miners became disabled or died as a result of preventable accidents or
diseases.”48
Bevill argued that the federal government should not view coal miners’ lives as an
expendable resource in the production of energy. He felt the miners were entitled to a
more equitable compensation program because of the significant risks they faced in their
work. Moreover, his statement highlighted the importance of coal miners to the nation’s
energy supply. Bevill also argued that a negative X-ray should not be used to deny
compensation to miners. He opposed Title IV’s stipulation of uniform testing criteria on
all miners, as “individuals respond in different ways to an attack by a disease and the dust
of a mine affects individuals in different ways.”49

47

Ibid., 1779.

48

Ibid., 1767.

49

Ibid., 1767-1768.

267
In support of Bevill’s claim, Ogden Reid (D-NY) explained that other testing
methods for black lung disease were readily available, such as the pulmonary function
test or the blood gas test developed by Dr. Donald Rasmussen. Such testing, he argued,
could detect black lung where previously there was no evidence of it. Reid disapproved
of miners not receiving compensation solely “because medical facilities and detailed
records are unavailable. I say that coal miners, who risk their lives almost daily, are
entitled to the best medical tests, not the cheapest or the easiest.” Reid acknowledged that
he supported the bill as written; he did not adhere to Erlenborn’s suggestion of debating it
under normal regulations.50
Representative Robert Michel (R-IL) expressed his concern about widening the
black lung benefits program without adequate protective mechanisms against increased
costs. He proposed debating the bill under regular Congressional procedure to allow for
the addition of such mechanisms. More significantly, however, Michel proposed an
amendment not included in H.R. 9212, the extension of Title IV to all coal miners,
including surface coal workers and strip miners. He argued that strip miners were entitled
to benefits because they inhaled the same coal dust as underground miners. He noted
there some strip miners in his district had been inhaling coal dust for years at the coal
tipple or crusher.51 With his proposed amendment, Michel brought into focus a segment
of coal miners that had been neglected by the 1969 legislation. Although strip miners did
not work in the confined environment of underground mines, they were still exposed to
significant quantities of coal dust, particularly if they worked at the tipple, where the
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loading of coal into railroad cars generated large clouds of dust. Michel recognized that
all coal workers, not just those working underground, were susceptible to
pneumoconiosis.
John Dent rejected the cost arguments against bill H.R. 9212, asserting that the
profits from coal production in the following six years would far outweigh the cost of
implementing the bill. Similarly, Kenneth Gray (D-IL) condemned the members of the
Republican Party who opposed the bill for its financial cost. He argued they would
support the bill if they worked underground for thirty or forty dollars a day, while facing
the constant threat of disaster. Gray advised them to talk with families affected by black
lung disease, which would convince them of the need for more equitable black lung
compensation.52 The testimonies of Dent and Gray emphasized that most of the
Republican opposition to the black lung bill was attributable to its financial cost. In that
regard, the hearing echoed the legislative debate over the original black lung benefits
program, embodied in the Federal Mine Act of 1969. Many Republicans argued the
program would be too expensive, while President Nixon nearly vetoed the Federal Mine
Act for the cost of the black lung program.
Commenting on his own state of West Virginia, James Kee (D-WV), said, “A
third of the black lung benefits claims which have been turned down to date have been
disallowed because the miner was not totally disabled. In fact, what the Federal
Government is saying to these miners is that they do not qualify because they are not
totally dead. I have contended from the very beginning that the requirement for
determining ‘total disability’ should be made more realistic. To that end, Kee indicated
52
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that he was fully supportive of the bill and its improvements to the original 1969 Act.” In
his argument for a more realistic definition of ‘total disability,’ Kee advocated the
payment of benefits to miners who had stopped working as a result of black lung disease,
not just those who were completely incapacitated by it. He recognized that miners were
not only affected by the physical discomfort of black lung, but also by the loss of income
that came with unemployment. 53
When the members of the House voted on the bill, it did not gain the two-thirds
majority necessary to pass. The deliberations on October 18 stressed a clear line of
division in the House, between the largely Republican faction that opposed liberalizing
the benefits program and the Democrats who sought to compensate miners for the
dangers of their labors. The House agreed to deliberate the bill again in November under
the standard rules, which meant that there would be an opportunity to propose
amendments.54
The House reopened debate on the bill on November 10, 1971. Perkins reaffirmed
his main complaint with the existing legislation. He argued that the Social Security
Administration was “setting off black lung benefits against social disability payments,
even though the law states that the payments are not to be treated as workmen’s
compensation.” He maintained that some miners received less benefits after filing black
lung claims if they were already receiving social security disability.55
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John Erlenborn criticized the bill’s amendment that prevented the classification of
black lung benefits as state workmen’s compensation. He argued the federal black lung
program should only be a stop-gap measure to allow the federal government to make
payments to miners not covered by other compensation programs. A number of state
governments, he explained, failed to recognize how coal dust affected miners’ lungs and
consequently did not have adequate compensation measures. Erlenborn also renewed his
opposition to the expansion of medical evidence beyond the X-ray exam. He argued that
this would allow miners with other breathing disorders such as emphysema and asthma to
claim benefits.56
John Dent retorted that Erlenborn’s objection to the bill was merely about its
financial implications and that it was impossible to place a cost on human lives. He
believed that medical evidence had clearly shown the need to go beyond X-rays when
determining the existence of pneumoconiosis. Furthermore, he replied to Erlenborn, “If
the X-ray is all that you say it is, then the additional testing will also correlate with the Xray findings. We are not proposing to pay benefits to ineligible miners. We just want
them to have the benefit of the doubt, and the benefit of the division of medical opinion
on the subject.” In contrast, Representative Albert Quie (R-MN) agreed with many of
Erlenborn’s objections, particularly the extension of federal control of the program. He
argued that the states had been given ample time to prepare for the transfer of the
program. 57
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Towards the end of the day’s proceedings, both Hechler and Erlenborn proposed
amendments to bill H.R. 9212. Hechler’s amendment focused on protecting the rights of
minor children to collect benefits, while Erlenborn’s amendment was designed to provide
further clarification on benefits for double orphans. The House passed both amendments.
More significantly, it passed Robert Michel’s earlier amendment to extend Title IV of the
Federal Mine Act to strip miners. The members rejected an additional proposal by
Erlenborn to remove the X-ray provision from the bill. The House then voted to pass the
amended bill by a majority of 311 to 79.58
Having passed the bill, the House submitted it to the Senate Committee for further
deliberation. During six days of public hearings, in December 1971, the Senate
Subcommittee on Labor deliberated several different bills, including S. 26875, introduced
by Jennings Randolph, S. 2289, introduced by Senator Hartke, and a compromise version
of H.R. 9212. The latter included many of the original measures from the House version,
as well as several amendments. As in the House version, it provided black lung benefits
for double orphans, prohibited the denial of compensation claims on the basis of a
negative X-ray, included a ‘presumptive clause,’ and mandated the extension of benefits
to all coal miners. The bill only extended federal management of the black lung benefits
program for one year, in contrast to the two-year extension in the House bill. While it
stipulated that federal black lung benefits should not be classified as workmen’s
compensation, it limited the benefits miners could receive to 100 percent of their total
earned income.59
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Lorin E. Kerr, the Safety Director of the United Mine Workers, made a statement
before the Senate Labor Subcommittee on December 1, 1971 that reflected the distance
between the UMW and the Black Lung Association. He stated, “We have been impressed
with Congressional wisdom in assigning the administrative responsibilities for title IV to
the Social Security Administration… The concern manifested for people by the Social
Security Administration has been a refreshing contrast to the usual adversary attitude
encountered in most state workmen’s compensation agencies.”60 Kerr announced the
union’s support for bill S. 2675. He further announced that the union favored a ten-year
presumptive clause for miners with serious pulmonary impairment.61 While he indicated
that the union supported the prompt implementation of state compensation programs, he
also urged Senator Williams to establish Title IV “as a permanent federal program.”62
With regard to the management of the compensation program, the union was, at least, on
the same page as the BLA activists. Kerr stated, “Seventy years of experience has clearly
indicated that with rare exception the employers’ costs of compensation, as with all other
production costs, are ultimately paid by the consumer. This is not new or startling, but it
was initially envisioned that increased compensation costs would hasten the elimination
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of all occupational health and safety hazards.”63 Kerr also proposed the incorporation of
the strip miners’ provision in H.R. 9212 to the Senate bill.
Black lung activists continued the momentum of their campaign by testifying at
the hearing. BLA President Arnold Miller used his appearance before the subcommittee
to repeat many of his grievances with the SSA. He condemned its lack of medical testing
facilities in the coalfields and denial of claims based on X-ray evidence. He urged, “We
must solve this problem among our coal miners in the near future or we won’t have any
coal miners to mine coal that is vital to the economy of this country.”64 Representatives
from the Association of Disabled Mines and Widows, Inc., also gave testimony at the
hearing. Claims advocate Willa Omechinski, whose husband was disabled by
pneumoconiosis, explained how the Social Security Administration’s medical evaluations
did not match coal miners’ physical experience of black lung disease:
The men that I work with, and the widows of the deceased miners, are not the best
educated people in the world, because they had to go to work in the mines early,
and this is the only work they have ever known, and now when they go for their
X-rays, when they go for their medical examinations, they are denied their black
lung disabilities… We only ask for what we feel this man is entitled. With his
breathing gone, he cannot work, but he still has to live. I feel this man has done
the hardest work there is, and he should be able to live as a person as he is.65
Omechinski’s testimony cemented support for the black lung amendments and, in the
formal setting of Congress, gave credence to the black lung activists’ campaign.
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In late February 1972, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, after
making further amendments, passed the bill unanimously and sent it to the Senate floor.
In a report published in April 1972, the Senate stressed the importance of amending the
original provisions of Title IV of the Federal Mine Act of 1969. According to the report,
356,857 claims had been filed for benefits between December 30, 1969 and March 1972,
and only 166,593 of those claims had been approved. Of that number, 91,784 claimants
were disabled miners and 74,809 were widows. The Senate deduced from the statistics
that problem of pneumoconiosis was much wider than Congress initially believed and
that the black lung compensation program was not as broad as originally intended under
Title IV.
The Senate approved H.R. 9212 by voice vote on May 4 and sent it to the House
of Representatives for further approval and final passage. The House and Senate reached
a compromise by extending federal control of the black lung program for 18 months. The
bill obligated the Social Security Administration to continue paying compensation until
June 30, 1973, at which point the Department of Labor would temporarily assume
responsibility for claims. The states and coal operators would assume control of the
program on January 1, 1974. In addition, the final version of the bill mandated black lung
benefits for double orphans and stipulated that miners with fifteen years of experience
and a ‘totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment’ had pneumoconiosis.66
Both the Senate and the House argued for the importance of the president signing the new
bill, even though President Nixon vehemently opposed extending federal coverage of
black lung compensation. His administration estimated that the new black lung bill would
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cost the government an additional $4 billion per year, and coal operators $2 billion per
year.67
On May 10, the House passed the legislation by 275 to 122. Opponents
immediately announced their opposition, arguing that compensation for disabled miners
and their dependents should be the responsibility of state governments and operators.
They also argued that the legislation would provide the foundation for broad
compensation measures for other industries. There was speculation among the media that
President Nixon would veto the bill. The Black Lung Association sought the immediate
enforcement of the bill, so when President Nixon delayed signing the bill it took
immediate action. On May 19, it shut down two large coal mines in Mingo County, West
Virginia, and established picket lines.68
Nixon signed the Black Lung Benefits Act into the law the following day, May
20, despite his objection to it. In justifying his signing of the bill, Nixon claimed that
pneumoconiosis was too large a problem for him to ignore, particularly given that so
many miners and their families were in need of financial support.69 It was also a
presidential election year. By refusing to sign the Black Lung Benefits Act, Nixon risked
losing a sizeable portion of blue-collar support. The president advised all states to ensure
their worker compensation programs covered pneumoconiosis before they assumed
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control of black lung compensation in January 1974. Nixon explained that he had
misgivings about the bill not because it provided support for miners and widows, but
because it placed the onus for compensation on the federal government. He commented,
“This legislation departs from the U.S. tradition that compensation for work-related
accidents and diseases should be provided by State workmen’s compensation laws,
financed by the industries containing the hazards. Responsibility for black lung
compensation clearly should lie with the owners and operators of the mines.”70 Despite
Nixon’s conviction that the federal government should not be responsible for federal
black lung benefits, his signing of the bill marked a significant victory for the Black Lung
Association. The association’s long campaign for the improvement of the black lung
compensation program had succeeded.
The amendments to the Title IV of the Federal Mine Act did not occur in
isolation. Rather, they were part of a broad expansion of the social security program. In
1972, Congress implemented the largest increase in benefits in the program’s history.71 In
“The Politics of Social Security Expansion,” Edward Berkowitz and Daniel Fox argue
that there was a consensus in Congress in the 1960s and 70s over the need to expand
social security disability benefits across the board. Subsequently, Congress began to
focus its energies on constituents who were previously denied benefits, including
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dependents and young workers.72 Congress, therefore, enacted a broad legislative
program in 1972 to provide benefits to injured and disabled workers. In doing so, it
sought to improve the lives of people who were suffering from occupational injury and
disease.
The positive impact of the black lung benefits program was evident by late 1972.
By December 1972, 88,100 retired miners and 169,100 widows and dependents were
receiving benefits, a significant increase from the previous year.73 Ed Jewell, a retired
coal miner, commented, “Before black lung (benefits) we just couldn’t make it without
help from the children. Now we can really enjoy our family. I had four sons and I never
told them what to do with their lives, but I’m glad none of them went into the mines.”74
Activist Helen Powell witnessed directly how the Black Lung Amendments Act
improved the lives of coal miners and their families. She remembered, “It was kind of a
horrendous time, but in the end, it all paid off, and that made you feel good. When I could
go into a store or walk down the street and somebody said, “Oh, Ms. Powell, thank you
for helping us to get benefits, I was able to buy this, that and the other, and we plan to
buy us a little house.” 75 Powell felt her efforts on behalf of the Black Lung Association
had been worthwhile, as compensation had a positive impact on the lives of black lung
victims and widows. She further commented, “Just small thank yous, for me that was just
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like saying, “Here’s a million dollars for you,” because it helped you feel that you had
done something good for somebody else.”76
Congress continued to search for ways of improving the federal black lung
compensation program. In July 1973, the House General Labor Subcommittee convened
to discuss four separate bills designed to amend further Title IV of the Federal Mine Act
of 1969. Bill H.R. 3476 mandated the continuation of federal responsibility for black lung
benefits for an additional two years, effectively delaying the transferal of the
compensation program to state governments and the coal operators from its scheduled
date of January 1974. The rationale behind this bill was that most states still did not have
effective apparatus in place to distribute black lung compensation. Operators, determined
to avoid responsibility for black lung compensation, testified in favor of this measure.
Bill H.R. 8834 was designed to prevent the duplication of black lung benefits to
individual widows. The two other legislative bills, H.R. 8835 and H.R. 8838, respectively
eliminated and restricted the fees that lawyers were eligible to collect for assisting black
lung claimants. Legal fees were a burgeoning problem in the coalfields, with attorneys
collecting sizeable government payments as reimbursement for their work with black
lung victims. 77
The hearing revealed further weaknesses in the black lung benefits program. It
showed the subcommittee was convinced that the state legislatures were unprepared to
administer compensation for pneumoconiosis victims, and that a large proportion of
76
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lawyers had clearly exploiting the program for their personal financial gain. Bills 8834,
8835, and 8838 did not advance beyond the subcommittee. Bill 3476, however, became
the foundation for the extension of the federal government’s management of the black
lung benefits program.
Despite the ongoing weaknesses in the federal compensation program, the Black
Lung Benefits Act of 1972 significantly improved the ability of coal miners and widows
to obtain federal compensation for pneumoconiosis. The Act passed as a result of a
sustained campaign by the Black Lung Association, which engaged in protests and
lobbying to convince Congress of the importance of stronger legislation. As with the
passage of the West Virginia black lung law and the Federal Mine Act of 1969,
grassroots, community-based protest played a significant role in legislative change. There
were still obstacles, however, to effective health and safety enforcement in the coalfields,
not least UMW President Tony Boyle. Miners for Democracy (MFD) actively
campaigned for control of the union, not only to reform its approach to health and safety,
but also to reinstate democratic practices and procedures.

Miners for Democracy: Challenging the Union, Reforming Health and Safety
With regard to health and safety issues, the UMW rank and file challenged the
union hierarchy in a number of ways. First, they contested the union’s management of the
Welfare and Retirement Fund through a major legal case. The UMW Welfare and
Retirement Fund had been denying health benefits and pensions to a significant
proportion of its members, even if they had actively been paying union dues. In response,
over 5,000 miners formed an “organization of living dead men trying to help each
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other.”78 In 1969, the Disabled Miners and Widows Association, Inc. (DMWA) brought a
suit against the UMW known as the Blakenship case, after retired miner Willie Ray
Blakenship. The DMWA planned to use the case to obtain benefits for those the WRF
had deemed ‘ineligible.’ Under the direction of lawyer Harry Huge, the DMWA argued
that the Fund’s regulations were “unjust,” and prevented 70,000 miners, widows, and
dependents from claiming benefits to which they were entitled. The association filed for
breach of trust in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before Judge
Gerhard Gessel.79
Blakenship, who had worked for more than 20 years in the coal industry, applied
for a pension. He was denied. The union argued he had been a self-employed partner at
several mining operations, which meant not all of his working time could be accepted.
Similarly, 60-year old Robert White of Gordon, West Virginia, failed to receive his
pension from the WRF because he had not paid his dues for 90 days after he retired.
Despite the fact he had worked in the mines for 23 years and had to quit because of black
lung disease, he was still subject to inflexible rules.80 Originally, miners had one year to
pay the extra dues after leaving, and White claimed he was not aware of the switch to the
new deadline of 90 days. The Blakenship vs. Boyle law suit charged that the Fund, jointly
administered by the coal industry and the UMW, had been improperly administered. P.
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W. Hendricks of the Disabled Miners and Widows Associaiton claimed the union had
denied pensions to around 70,000 retired miners.81
Attorney Harry Huge wanted to determine if the WRF trustees had managed the
fund in the best interests of the beneficiaries. He found that, in many cases, they had not.
For instance, the trustees had placed funds in non-interest bearing accounts, had failed to
pursue delinquent royalty payments by operators, and had implemented President Boyle’s
unauthorized pension increase in 1969. After gaining access to the files of the Welfare
and Retirement Fund, Huge made the Fund’s “liquidity” the central issue in the case.82 At
the legal hearing for Blakenship vs. Boyle, Josephine Roche, one of the Fund’s managers,
admitted that the Fund’s income was significantly higher than its expenditure. Judge
Gerhard Gessell, presiding over the hearing in the U.S. Court of Appeals, concluded that
a breach of trust had taken place. He argued that the UMW had mismanaged the Fund by
using it to limit the union’s tax payments.83 Money added to the Welfare and Retirement
Fund was not classified as taxable income. While Judge Gessel argued there was no
evidence of a conspiracy, he believed that the practices introduced and maintained by
former UMW President John L. Lewis had been detrimental to the miners’ best interests.
Gessel ordered a change in the Fund’s administration.84
The outcome of the Blakenship vs Boyle legal case further undermined Tony
Boyle’s leadership of the UMW and offered hope to sick and disabled miners who had
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been denied benefits by the Welfare and Retirement Fund. The victory was indicative of
the activism occurring in the Appalachian coalfields. Like the Black Lung Association,
which employed the services of legal advocates to challenge the Social Security
Administration’s compensation policies, the Association of Disabled Miners and Widows
engaged in legal action to challenge the union’s management of its health and pension
benefits for members. In the early 1970s, legal action, more than strikes and spontaneous
demonstrations, was the key to improving compensation and benefits for miners and
widows.
Boyle’s leadership of the UMW was beginning to unravel. On March 31, 1972, a
federal jury convicted Boyle on thirteen charges of conspiracy and making illegal
political contributions with union funds. Specifically, he was convicted of one conspiracy
charge, eleven charges of violating the Corrupt Practices Act, and a further charge of
violating the Landrum Griffin Act by converting union funds into political campaign
contributions. Boyle faced thirty-two years in prison and $120,000 in fines. Under the
terms of the Landrum Griffin Act, he risked losing his position as union president and the
right to hold office for five years. A union associate said that the union would launch an
appeal once Boyle was sentenced. Boyle was freed on personal bond until the sentence
was issued. One of his colleagues told reporters, “We’re all shocked they threw the book
at him.”85
Boyle’s convictions were a direct result of the investigation the Department of
Labor had started in January 1970, shortly after the Yablonski murders. They also
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followed the order the previous year by the U.S. District Court for Boyle to stand down
from his position as the head of the union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund. In contrast, the
jury acquitted John Owens, the union’s secretary-treasurer, and James Kmetz, its chief
lobbyist.86 Just weeks later, on May 1 1972, the Department of Labor overturned the
results of the December 1969 election of the United Mine Workers. Stating that there had
been massive irregularities in the voting procedures, the Department scheduled a new
election with full government supervision for December of that year.87
Miners for Democracy immediately began preparing for the new election. On
May 27, 1972, the organization held a nomination convention at Wheeling Jesuit
University in West Virginia. J. Davitt McAteer, a former student of the university, had
gained permission from the priest in charge of the university to use the campus for the
convention. He later recalled, “We couldn’t get anybody to host the convention because
they were afraid that the union and coal companies would be displeased because they
hosted a dissident union movement convention.”88 Five hundred people attended the
convention to vote for a candidate to oppose Boyle in the forthcoming election. There
were delegates from Illinois, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia, and Alabama. Mike
Trbovich, the leader of the Miners for Democracy and a close friend of the late Jock
Yablonski, entered the convention as favorite for the presidential nomination. However,
the delegates voted for Arnold Miller as presidential candidate, with Trbovich as vice-
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presidential candidate and Harry Patrick as the nominee for Secretary-Treasurer.
McAteer, who attended the convention, witnessed how the delegates made the decision
regarding the slate:
Mike Trbovich obviously held the mantle because he had been very close to
Yablonski. But Mike was of Polish descent and it was feared that the name alone
and the ethnic background would not fly in places like Kentucky, Alabama, and
southern West Virginia. And so we were in a kind of deadlock, and Harry Patrick
was there, but he was considered too young. It came down to the day of the vote
and Miller’s name was put up as the compromise candidate, someone who was
not objectionable. Since he had not much of a track record he had not made
enemies.89
As McAteer explains, the MFD delegates chose Miller not because he was more qualified
than Trbovich, but to ensure the widest possible support for their candidate in the
forthcoming election. In The Miners’ Fight For Democracy, Paul Clark explains that
Miller’s position as head of the Black Lung Association facilitated his nomination, as he
was able to use the BLA as a political base. Furthermore, prior to the convention Miller
had enhanced his reputation in Miners For Democracy and among the rank and file by
campaigning on behalf of the MFD cause.90
Having nominated its election slate, Miners for Democracy ran on a reform
platform. The organization proposed district autonomy, including the right of districts to
elect their own officials and representatives. It also advocated the overhaul of the union’s
administration, including the reduction of leaders’ salaries and the end of nepotism, as
practiced by Boyle and other high-level officials. More importantly, however, MFD
emphasized the importance of dealing with membership priorities such as organizing and
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health and safety. According to Paul Clark, the Miners for Democracy had three
advantages over the previous insurgent campaign led by Yablonski. First, the election
was to be organized and monitored by the Department of Labor. In the December
election, voting was to take place over an eight-day period, to allow the Department to
monitor voting at every local union. The Department ordered the UMW to publish MFD
campaign material in the United Mine Workers Journal, and instructed candidates to file
reports of their expenditure.91 Second, among the rank and file there was much stronger
support for reform than in mid-1969. Paul John Nyden estimates that the MFD campaign
gained the support of an additional 37,214 young, reform-orientated miners over the
Yablonski campaign. Third, the increasing litigation against Boyle, including the April
1971 ruling by the U.S. District Court that he was guilty of embezzling union funds, and
the Department of Labor’s voiding of the 1969 election, gave the MFD an advantage over
their opponents.92
Boyle’s legal troubles and the intervention of the Department of Labor gave
renewed confidence to the rank and file who desired a change in the union’s leadership.
At a campaign meeting in late July 1972, retired miner Casimir Shuck told reporters,
“We’re not afraid now. We used to have to whisper it to friends. But now we talk up.
Boyle didn’t run the union right.”93 Shuck’s comments emphasized that much of Boyle’s
support was attributable to his use of intimidation. With Boyle now under scrutiny from

91

Ibid., 27-38.

92

Ibid., 36-38.

93

New York Times, July 31, 1972, 11.

286
the Department of Labor, the rank and file members of the UMW were increasingly
speaking out against him.
The MFD candidates started the election with a slight lead over Boyle. The ballots
opened on December 1, and voting extended over the following eight days. On December
15, the Department of Labor announced that Arnold Miller had won the election,
obtaining 56 percent of the ballot to the 44 percent obtained by Boyle. In his victory
speech, Miller reaffirmed his campaign pledges to move the union headquarters back to
the coalfields and to attend to key issues such as health and safety.94 The victory of
Miners for Democracy was a significant development, particularly for the rank and file
miners in the coalfields. It showed that democracy had returned to the coalfields, after
several years of corruption under President Boyle. The victory was the direct result of the
Department of Labor’s monitoring of the election, which prevented Boyle from rigging
the ballot and, more importantly, enabled miners to vote freely. In addition, it meant the
UMW would now be more attentive to miners’ working conditions and issues such as
compensation. Miller’s victory promised to improve health and safety in the Appalachian
coalfields.
The victory of the Miners of Democracy, however, did not bring immediate
changes to working conditions in the coalfields. After the MFD election victory, the
Department of Labor was responsible for orchestrating the transfer of power within the
United Mine Workers headquarters. According to McAteer, the process of installing the
new leadership was “very acrimonious, there was a great deal of weeping and gnashing
of teeth and anger and mean-spiritedness on both sides. There was a very contentious and
94
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cantankerous transfer of power that meant the other side was left out, angered, mean, and
unhappy.”95 Once the MFD had assumed control of the union, it encountered several
other problems.
First, Arnold Miller lacked the experience for his position and faced an enormous
workload. His only previous leadership roles were head of UMW local 2093 and
president of the Black Lung Association. He did not possess the administrative skills
necessary to manage the national leadership of a major union. Second, the new union
leadership dismantled Miners for Democracy as an insurgent organization. Miller and his
colleagues believed that MFD had become the institutional union and that it was
unnecessary to maintain it as a separate organization. The new union leaders were
worried that, if allowed to continue, Miners for Democracy might pose a threat to the
stability of the United Mine Workers by creating a power struggle. To keep the MFD
alive would have required a concerted effort, as it had always been a small network of
committed activists. In addition, most of the original activists from the Miners for
Democracy were now too preoccupied with running for office in the UMW districts to
keep the organization alive. By abandoning the framework that had enabled them to take
over the UMW, however, the new leaders created a significant problem. They effectively
removed the mechanism by which the rank and file could have held their leaders
accountable for their policies and decisions.96
Another problem was that Miners for Democracy had to divert its attention from
its platform issues such as health and safety to tackle the deeply entrenched corruption in
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the union. Thus, the new leaders could not immediately focus on the real issues that
affected the rank and file miners. Because corruption and mismanagement were so
endemic in the United Mine Workers, the leadership had to reconstruct the entire union
from the ground up. Miller even acknowledged that the entire union apparatus had
stopped working. Furthermore, the new leaders were divided over how to tackle this
problem. They could not agree if they should redefine the union’s relationship with the
coal operators, rewrite the union constitution, or remove all traces of Boyle’s
leadership.97
Once Miller and his colleagues had taken measures to address the institutional
problems in the United Mine Workers, they started to implement the key measures in
their reform platform. Health and safety was a key priority, but the union’s stringent
approach to this matter caused concern for operators. In a letter to Arnold Miller, Guy
Farmer, the President of the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association, said many coal
operators were concerned about the union’s health and safety policies as reported in the
local and national press. He wrote, “They are especially apprehensive and somewhat
alarmed at some of the published reports which seem to imply a unilateral program of
enforcement [by the union] which goes so far as to preempt the government agencies and
the mine operators’ responsibility for health and safety.”98 Farmer’s letter reiterated the
close relationship that had existed between the coal operators and Tony Boyle. With a
new president leading the UMW, the operators feared the union’s tougher stance on
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health and safety. Farmer’s letter further implied that some operators were spreading
propaganda about the union’s new health and safety policies. It was completely untrue,
not to mention unrealistic, for the union to supersede the federal government in health
and safety enforcement.

The Mine Safety and Enforcement Administration (MESA)
In May 1973, the Nixon administration tackled the poor enforcement record of the
Bureau of Mines by creating a new agency, the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MESA). Located in the Department of the Interior, MESA was solely responsible for
enforcing health and safety in all coal, metal, and non-metal coal mines. Unlike the
Bureau of Mines, it did not conduct research on mineral production or promote the
interests of mining industries. Although the coal mine fatality rate had improved in the
past two years, the Nixon administration acknowledged that the Bureau was ineffective at
enforcing health and safety.
James Day, a 42-year old Korean War veteran, became head of the Mine
Enforcement and Safety Administration. Day graduated from Piedmont College in the
early 1950s with a degree in Business Administration and Accounting, and he was a
former employee of the C.I.A. He had a law degree and had spent time in private practice
as a specialist in international law. Since March 1970, he had been director of the Interior
Department’s Office of Hearings and Appeals, which had been created specifically to
oversee the management of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. On
accepting that position, he later commented, “I took the job because it sounded highly
challenging. The office had just been created to meet the requirements of the 1969 Act,
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and the job called for organizing the office, assembling different groups that had been in
other Interior Department offices, such as in the Bureau of Land Management and the
Solicitor’s Office, and setting up procedures and standards.”

99

Day planned to improve

health and safety enforcement by giving more support to federal mine inspectors and
encouraging them to make swift decisions about penalties for violations. Under the
Bureau of Mines, inspectors were over-worked and frequently under-qualified.
Furthermore, their decisions about penalties were often over-ruled by Bureau managers.
Day, therefore, planned to enhance inspectors’ ability to enforce the Federal Mine Act.
Yet, coal mine inspectors’ work was complicated by the fact that they were now
responsible for inspecting both coal and non-coal mines. In fact, Day sought to introduce
similar inspection standards for all types of mine.
The creation of MESA was accompanied by the reorganization of the federal
inspection system. Under the Bureau of Mines, there were nine inspection districts for
coal mines and six inspection districts for metal and non-metal mines. The new system in
the Mine Safety and Health Administration contained six autonomous regions that were
each responsible for all types of mining. Each region had its own administrator who was
responsible for reporting to the MESA associate administrator in Washington, D.C. The
reorganization of the federal inspection system was accompanied by a significant
increase in the mine inspection force.100 Although the Mine Enforcement and Safety
Administration was not responsible for mining research or upholding corporate interests,
99
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from the outset its structure limited its ability to enforce health and safety in the coal
industry. Like the Bureau of Mines, it was located in the Department of the Interior,
which did not convey a strong commitment to mine health and safety. Moreover, the
agency’s responsibility for mines in all mineral industries prevented it from focusing on
hazards specific to the coal industry.
During 1973, the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration levied 76,000
violation notices against coal operators. The operators argued that the law was applied
too stringently and complained that inspectors did not make assessments based on the
circumstances of individual operations. By the end of 1973, operators across the country
had already lodged 15,000 appeals before the courts. Day contended that MESA would
not be able to enforce health and safety if operators kept filing appeals. Although Day
was employing several attorneys to pursue unpaid fines, lawyers for the National
Association of Coal Operators advised operators not to pay and to file legal complaints
instead. The effectiveness of MESA as an enforcement agency only stretched so far. In
1974, the number of mine closures was fifty percent higher than the previous year.
Moreover, there was a fifteen percent increase in the number of citations issues by the
federal government, while the number of extensions granted to operators for the payment
of fines declined by approximately thirty percent. Yet, the overall number of inspections
conducted by the federal government actually declined. There were fewer inspections in
1974 than there were in 1973. 101
In late 1974, James Day proposed a number of amendments to the Federal Mine
Act. The United Mine Workers especially objected to his proposal of modifying the
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system of mandatory fines. Day argued that operators who committed only minor
violations should be issued a warning ticket, and then fined substantially if they did not
permanently rectify the violation. He further proposed that operators should have the
right to appeal only through the U.S. Court of Appeals, and not district courts. In
retaliation, the UMW argued that MESA was ineffective at collecting fines. The union
alleged that the agency settled for thirty-five to forty percent of the original amount
assessed for violations. Day replied that this measure only applied to old violations issued
prior to May 1973. He claimed that, for new citations, MESA typically collected eighty
to ninety percent of the assessed amount. Moreover, he claimed that operators’ lawyers
typically used delaying tactics to prevent collection of the fine.102 Despite his claims, Day
pursued a weak enforcement strategy.
The union’s frustration with the policies of the Mine Enforcement and Safety
Administration prompted it to adopt its own health and safety measures, with the goal of
reducing mine casualties and fatalities. The UMW gave additional support to local safety
committees by providing safety seminars and affirming the right of these committees to
remove workers from hazardous conditions. The safety division also began to take more
decisive action over the issue of dust control. After the passage of the Mine Act in 1969,
a federal organization called the Interim Compliance Panel had issued permits to some
coal companies that temporarily exempted them from fulfilling the minimum dust
requirements. The companies who held permits now sought an extension. The safety
division, along with the union’s legal department, made their objections about an
extension known before the Interim Compliance Panel. The safety division pursued other
102
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measures, such as providing all its members with a safety manual and monitoring the
performance of the Bureau of Mines and MESA.103
The action taken by the United Mine Workers underscored the limits of the
federal government’s health and safety enforcement efforts. Despite the Nixon
administration’s creation of the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration, the UMW
leadership was convinced that it was continuing to evade strong enforcement measures,.
While the decline in coal mine fatalities from 1973 to 1975 suggests otherwise, the
federal government’s enforcement policies were still flawed. MESA frequently did not
order closure notices for particularly dangerous mines and failed to enforce the strict
regulations for dust control.
It was not only the UMW leadership that protested the federal government’s
approach to mine health and safety in the mid-1970s. Only three years after the passage
of the Black Lung Benefits Act, rank and file miners were questioning the federal
government’s management of the black lung compensation program. The transfer of the
program from the federal government to the states had not taken place in 1974 as
originally planned, because the Nixon administration realized that too many state
legislatures were unprepared to administer black lung benefits. Despite the liberal terms
of the Black Lung Benefits Act, many coal miners still were not receiving compensation.
On September 16, 1975, around three hundred miners demonstrated in McPherson
Square in Washington, D.C.104 The following day, nearly 1,500 miners protested on
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Capitol Hill, adamant that the benefits distribution system was unfair. They demanded the
passage of an amended black lung benefits act, written by Representative Carl Perkins
(D-KY). Perkins’ bill automatically awarded benefits to miners with at least fifteen years
experience. Otho Sisk, aged sixty-three, was among the demonstrators. Sisk’s father had
worked as a miner and died of lung disease in 1953. Now Sisk himself was suffering
from pneumoconiosis, having labored as a miner since the age of sixteen. Despite the fact
that four doctors had verified his illness, he had not been granted compensation.105
Developments in the House of Representatives in 1976 demonstrated that the
miners’ goal of more equitable black lung compensation was still far from a reality.
While the House was not averse to Perkins’ proposal of automatic compensation, it
abandoned Perkins’ original bill in favor of a more restrictive bill. The bill stipulated that
only coal miners with thirty years underground experience should automatically qualify
for some benefits. A number of Congressmen argued that the bill should be modified to
include only miners who had worked for this amount of time before the 1969 legislation
came into force. The bill did not advance through the House. 106
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Conclusion
From early 1971 to May 1972, the Black Lung Association demonstrated the
power of collective protest and community-based activism to generate legislative change.
Although the BLA had expanded into a national organization, it continued to operate at
the grassroots level: local chapters, composed of lay advocates, disabled miners, and
widows were crucial to its activism. In contrast to its spontaneous campaign in West
Virginia in early 1969, the Black Lung Association’s lobbying campaign against the
federal government in 1972 was planned and organized in advance. The efforts of the
BLA directly contributed to the Nixon administration’s passage of the landmark Black
Lung Benefits Act of 1972.
The significance of collective activism in the coalfields was further exemplified
by the victory of Miners for Democracy in the 1972 United Mine Workers election. The
candidates on the MFD election ticket – Arnold Miller, Mike Trbovich, and Harry Patrick
– orchestrated an effective campaign across the coalfields, aided considerably by Tony
Boyle’s conviction of fraud under the Landrum Griffin Act. A large number of coal
miners, no longer intimidated by the national leadership of the UMW, supported the
MFD in the election. The Association of Disabled Miners and Widows’ successful
lawsuit against the UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund further demonstrated the
growing momentum of reform elements in the coalfields. Yet, the flaws of coalfield
activism were also evident. The Miners for Democracy developed a platform on health
safety that, once in power, they were unable to implement because of the endemic
corruption at every level of the UMW national leadership. In addition, the Black Lung
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Benefits Act did not fulfill its original promises. By 1975, the federal government was
still denying benefits to many black lung victims and widows.
During this period, the Nixon administration, as well as passing the Black Lung
Benefits Act, created the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration for the
enforcement of mine health and safety. The creation of MESA emphasized the poor
enforcement record of the U.S. Bureau of Mines. As a result of its dual responsibility for
enforcing health and safety and promoting corporate interests, the Bureau had failed to
uphold the terms of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. Although
MESA adopted a tougher approach to enforcement than the Bureau, there were still flaws
in its policies. For instance, typically it failed to collect the entire amount of fines
assessed for health and safety violations. The new leadership of the United Mine Workers
was particularly critical of the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration’s policies.
From 1971 to 1975, there were significant developments in coal mine health and
safety in the United States. Responding to activism by the Black Lung Association, the
federal government passed major legislation in the form of the Black Lung Benefits Act.
Further, it created the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration as a result of the
failures of the Bureau of Mines. Miners for Democracy gained control of the United
Mine Workers and, with their ascension to power, reformed the union’s approach to the
working conditions of the rank and file. Yet, as shown in this chapter, such developments
did not solve the health and safety crisis for rank and file coal miners. They still labored
in dangerous conditions, and many who were afflicted by pneumoconiosis were unable to
obtain black lung benefits.
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Chapter Seven
Progress and Decline:
The Energy Crisis, Legislative Reform, and Deregulation

Introduction
Early on the morning of February 26, 1972, after several days of heavy snow and
rain, a coal slag dam high above Buffalo Creek in the Appalachian region collapsed,
sending millions of gallons of thick, black sludge crashing through the valley. Owned by
the Pittston Coal Company, the 200-feet long dam was designed to hold waste products
removed from coal after its extraction. Bituminous coal companies removed impurities
from coal to turn it into a commercially viable product. The collapse of the dam was
triggered by twenty inches of snow and three inches of rain. The torrent of coal sludge
carried away cars and houses with its force. Within a few hours, 37 people had officially
died, either drowned or buried by landslides. There was some confusion, however, over
the exact death toll. The time of the disaster, combined with the lack of warning about the
oncoming water, meant residents had little time to escape. Lieutenant Ellis of the Beckley
police said the presumed death toll was 90 people, a figure that Governor Archer Moore
described as “a catastrophic loss of life.” In light of these events, Moore declared Buffalo
Creek a disaster area.1
As the water surged through the valley, over 400 people had fled their homes.
Lorado, a small community closest to the disaster site, was wiped out. The black, sludge-
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filled water, which some eyewitnesses claimed was twenty feet high, destroyed roads and
demolished bridges in its path. As refugees fled to emergency shelters further down the
valley, high winds and heavy rain thwarted rescuers’ efforts to gain access to Lorado.
Three private helicopters eventually brought the most seriously injured people out of the
settlement.2 One survivor at Lorado, Henry Kilgore, reported that he and his family fled
to the hills when they saw the water rushing past the house. When they turned back, “the
house was floating down through the coal camp.” Other survivors fleeing from the water
told a state trooper they had counted 52 bodies in the hollow. The water cut a seventeenmile path through the valley, causing devastation to several other communities. State
officials evacuated people living near the Guyandotte River when its level became
dangerously high. The water lost much of its force when it reached Accoville, a
settlement twelve miles from the slag dam where the valley widened.3
By the following day, February 27, at least 60 people were confirmed dead, and
more than 4,000 of the 7,000 people living in the Buffalo Creek area were homeless.
After touring the area, Governor Moore announced that 80 percent of the homes in a
dozen mining communities had been destroyed. He announced his intention to ask the
state legislature for $1 million in relief. Later, after meeting with representatives from the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the governor announced the state would
transport mobile homes for the victims. Over 400 people were still missing, but it was
unclear if they were dead or had gone in search of family members and relatives. South
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Man Elementary School had become a temporary morgue, although only ten bodies had
been positively identified. Amid the confusion, it became apparent that the people living
along the Creek had been given virtually no warning about the impending disaster. Otto
Mutters, the Logan Country Deputy Sheriff, said an official of the Pittston Coal Company
had assured him at 6:30 a.m. that “everything was okay” with the dam.4
The lack of stable roads and bridges hindered efforts to rescue survivors and
recover bodies. Members of the National Guard used bulldozers and earth-moving
equipment to hunt for bodies buried in the wreckage, while the homeless sought refuge in
schools and churches. A group of more than hundred survivors arrived in Wharton,
Boone County, after walking over the hills to safety. Volunteers and relief organizations,
including the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, helped to provide relief and to
administer vaccines and medical treatment.5
There was conflict over the exact cause of the disaster. Some people claimed that
the earthen dam collapsed from the pressure of heavy snows and rain, while others said
that Elk Lick, a Buffalo Creek tributary, broke through the slag dam, causing it to break.
Ben Tudor, the general superintendent of the Buffalo Mining Company, a subsidiary of
the Pittston Coal Company, claimed that the West Virginia government had contributed
to the disaster. He argued that it had prohibited the company from dumping excess coal
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sludge in the valley, resulting in increased pressure on the dam. Tudor did not mention,
however, that the Pittston Company had failed to maintain the dam properly.6
Several weeks passed before the full scale of the devastation became apparent. Of
the 5,000 people living in the valley, 125 were killed, 1,121 were injured, and 4,000 were
left homeless.7 The Buffalo Creek disaster was significant for several reasons. First, it
showed that the coal industry threatened the welfare of entire mining communities, not
just the miners who labored underground. Throughout Appalachia, similar impoundment
dams jeopardized the property, safety, and lives of people living in mining camps.
Second, the disaster emphasized that the coal industry posed a threat to the natural
environment. The collapse of the Pittston dam not only caused significant loss of life and
widespread homelessness, it also damaged the landscape by polluting water supplies,
destroying trees and vegetation, and contaminating valley streams. Third, the events at
Buffalo Creek highlighted the failure of the federal government to regulate the
environmental hazards of the coal industry. Despite the fact that the U.S. Geological
Survey had compiled substantial evidence that coal dams were a significant human and
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environmental hazard, the influence of the coal industry in state politics was an obstacle
to legislative action.8
The Buffalo Creek disaster reflected the broader human and environmental
hazards of coal mining in the early 1970s. Mining communities and the environment
were under threat from the widespread practice of surface mining. This form of mining,
which involved extracting coal directly from the ground with machinery, threatened the
health and safety of miners and their families and caused widespread pollution and
devastation to the natural landscape. Surface mining was by no means new. As Chad
Montrie shows in his book To Save the Land and People, the practice of surface mining
in Appalachia pre-dated World War I. 9 In the early 1970s, however, the practice became
more widespread not just in Appalachia, but in western states.
The expansion of surface mining in the United States was driven primarily by the
energy crisis. As domestic oil reserves began to decline and the price of imported oil
continued to rise, the country renewed its emphasis on coal as a source of electrical
power. The federal government, scientists, and the United Mine Workers stressed the
versatility of coal, not just as an energy source in its own right, but also as a substance
that was easily converted into oil, petroleum, and other fuels. Coal operators increasingly
turned to surface mining to extract the coal as cheaply and efficiently as possible.
This chapter will examine the complex relationship between the energy crisis,
miners’ health and safety, and the environment in the coal industry during the 1970s. It
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will argue that the federal government and the coal companies focused on increased coal
production as an immediate solution to the energy crisis, while giving little regard to its
long-term effects on coal miners, their communities, and the natural environment. In
addition, the chapter will focus on coal mine health and safety during the Jimmy Carter
and Ronald Reagan administrations, from 1977 to 1988. It will show that President Carter
addressed many of the environmental and health and safety hazards of the coal industry
by signing the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 and the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. The chapter will further demonstrate, however,
that his legislative achievements were undermined by the Reagan administration’s
policies of deregulation.
From 1972 to 1988, there were notable advances in coal mine health and safety.
The fatality rate declined in this period, while President Carter strengthened legislative
measures designed to protect coal miners and the environment. Yet, other factors
undermined the improvements in coal miners’ working conditions. The energy crisis
prompted operators to prioritize coal production ahead of health and safety, while
President Reagan’s deregulatory philosophy led him to make significant cuts in federal
enforcement and the black lung benefits program. The sixteen-year period from 1972 to
1988, therefore, was marked by both progress and decline.

Coal Mining and the Energy Crisis
As early as the summer of 1971, President Richard Nixon warned the United
States that an energy crisis was imminent. In an address to Congress, he explained that
the country was experiencing energy shortages because of a sharp increase in demand
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over the previous four years. He announced that the nation could avert the crisis by
limiting the importation of foreign oil, developing nuclear power, and increasing coal
production. He emphasized the importance of excavating coal located under federal
lands. Nixon believed that coal would not only fuel the nation’s power plants, but that it
would provide an important source of home heating and could be converted into natural
gas.
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In the early 1970s, coal accounted for a growing share of the electrical energy

market, while the place of oil in the market declined. In 1969, coal generated 706 billion
Kilowatt-hours of electricity, while petroleum accounted for 138 billion Kilowatt-hours.
In 1973, coal generated 848 billion Kilowatt-hours, while petroleum accounted for 314
billion Kilowatt-hours. To compensate for the decline in imports of oil, the United States
turned to coal as a viable alternative.11
The administration’s plan for increased coal production was dependent on the
growing sector of surface mining. Many of the country’s new surface mines were located
in western states such as Colorado, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana. In the early
1970s, surface mining became more widespread in the United States than traditional
underground mining. In 1968, underground coal mining accounted for 346.6 million short
tons of coal production, while surface mining accounted for 210.1 million short tons.12
Just four years later, in 1973, surface mining represented almost half of the nation’s coal
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production. That year, underground mining accounted for 300.1 million short tons of
production, while production at surface mines amounted to 298.5 million short tons.13
Surface mining was more cost effective and required less manpower than underground
mining. Supporters also emphasized that surface mining was twice as productive per man
as underground mining and much safer.14 Statistically, surface mining resulted in fewer
injuries and fatalities than underground mining, but that was largely because it required a
much smaller workforce. In the Eastern and Appalachian coalfields, 200 men were
typically required to produce one million tons of coal per year. In the surface mining
industry, the same amount of coal could be produced with just ten miners.15
The growth of surface mining was partly attributable to the stringent terms of the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. According to Daniel Curran, from
1969 to 1974, the Federal Mine Act caused a twenty-two percent decrease in the number
of underground mines in the United States and an eighteen percent increase in the number
of surface mines. Small underground mine operators could not afford the cost of
installing new equipment and of paying penalties for health and safety violations. During
this period, 588 underground mines closed, 70.7 percent of which were located in
Kentucky and West Virginia. The majority of the underground coal mines in those states
were small marginal mines, which, prior to the passage of the 1969 act, were typically
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classified as ‘non-gassy.’

16

James Day, the head of the Mine Enforcement and Safety

Administration, claimed that more than half of the remaining mines formerly defined as
“non-gassy” were still not in compliance with the legislation regarding methane levels
and, therefore, faced the risk of closure.17
The accessibility of western coal enabled large energy conglomerates to lease
enormous reserves. Peabody Coal had leased more than 8.7 billion tons of coal, while
Continental Oil had leased 8.1 billion tons, and Union Pacific had leased more than 10
billion tons. UMW President Arnold Miller predicted that this represented only a tiny
fraction of future coal production if the energy cartel was allowed to continue leasing
coal without regulatory controls. The industry, claimed Miller, was waiting until oil
supplies were exhausted before selling its coal. He wrote, “The biggest oil-coal combines
are sitting on vast reserves of readily recoverable coal. But that coal will come out of the
ground only when the men who own it can be sure of the price they will get for it.”18
With demand for coal at a premium, as a result of the country’s increasing energy
requirements, there was little incentive for the major corporations to focus on health and
safety.
Like underground mining, surface mining presented a number of health and safety
hazards to the labor force. In particular, miners risked being crushed, maimed, or
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electrocuted by machinery.19 Despite the open-air environment of surface mines, miners
also risked developing black lung disease. The large mechanical shovels and draglines
used to excavate the coal from the ground created a permanent cloud of coal dust over
surface mine operations. Congress included surface miners in the Black Lung Benefits
Act of 1972, recognizing that the disease had a significant impact on them. Organized
labor, however, did little to address the health and safety hazards of surface mining. In
fact, the growth of surface mining undermined the position of labor unions in the
coalfields.20
Historically, the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) was the main organizing
force in the western coalfields. Founded in 1893 by miners from several states in the
Rocky Mountain region, the WFM achieved significant gains in wages and hours,
particularly in Colorado after the Cripple Creek strike of 1894. The union’s affiliation
with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1911 further augmented its bargaining
power, and enabled it to establish a strong presence in the Lake Super copper region,
which it had previously struggled to organize. In 1918, the WFM changed its name to the
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. Its declining power in the
ensuing decades prompted it to merge with the United Steel Workers in 1967. By the
19
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zenith of surface mining in the early 1970s, the union lacked the political and economic
capital to organize western miners on a substantial level.21
The United Mine Workers scarcely had more success in organizing western
surface mines. Although originally founded in Montana, much of the union’s power was
located in Appalachia and its headquarters in Washington D.C., far from the western
coalfields. Geography was not the only factor that limited its organizing efforts in surface
mining operations. By the 1970s, the UMW was averse to expending its resources on
such organization. Since World War II, district leaders had pleaded with the national
leadership to become more active in strip mines, but to no avail. Part of the union’s
aversion to organizing surface mines stemmed from John L. Lewis’s 1946 agreement
with the coal operators not to protest mechanization, in return for their support of the
Welfare and Retirement Fund.22 Because surface mines were dependent on machinery,
the union was not in a strong bargaining position. Surface miners, therefore, found little
union support in health and safety issues.
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President Nixon’s emphasis of coal as a solution to the energy crisis also had
negative environmental implications. Environmentalists argued that the practice of
surface mining was ecologically harmful. Brock Evans of the Sierra Club fumed,
“[Nixon] is really calling for massive strip mining for coal, massive destruction of the
land, and pollution of the land and water.” Similarly, Rod Cameron of the Environmental
Defense Fund contended that Nixon’s plan allowed for the wanton destruction of the
natural landscape.23 The environmentalists were outraged by the administration’s plan to
increase coal production. They argued that surface coal mining left deep scars on the
sides of mountains and destroyed tens of thousands of acres of streams and forests. The
dumping of ground waste from surface operations caused landslides, the silting of
streams, and the pollution of domestic water supplies, as well as widespread damage to
property. Furthermore, the exposure of waste substances containing sulfur to the air
caused acid mine drainage, which contaminated water supplies and streams.24 A
Department of the Interior report published in 1971 revealed that 1.8 million acres of land
across the country had been strip-mined. Only 58,000 acres had been “restored” to their
approximate original condition. At this time, federal law did not mandate the restoration
of strip-mined land to its original condition.25
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Critics of surface mining, led by Ken Hechler, emphasized the damage it caused
to the natural environment.26 Hechler rejected the coal industry’s claims that strip mines
could be converted into golf course or camping grounds. Writing for the Los Angeles
Times, he stressed, “such projects become prohibitively expensive when undertaken on a
broad scale.” To further support his argument, he asserted that “…even on ‘reclaimed’
sites, shallow grasses are scarcely acceptable replacements for hardwood forests – and
acid pollutants will often show up several years later as far away as 30 miles from a
stripped area.”27 Hechler also criticized the supporters of strip mining who argued it made
good economic sense. He cited the Bureau of Mines’ estimation that only 45 billion tons
of coal could be recovered economically through strip mining, as opposed to 356 billion
tons through underground mining.28 For local citizens, challenging the coal industry’s
environmental injustices was difficult, not least because the coal companies were
typically from outside the region and colluded with local politicians. One group in
Tennessee charged that the state government was failing to levy local taxes on outside
companies, causing huge losses in state revenue.29
President Nixon’s main priority was to avert the impending energy crisis, rather
than to address the human and environmental hazards of surface mining. On April 18,
1973, he informed Congress that he planned to give priority to the development of coal as
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fuel source. He described coal as “our most abundant and least costly source of energy.”
Nixon explained that coal provided less than twenty percent of the country’s energy and
that its use was continuing to decline. He stressed the importance of placing coal at the
center of the country’s energy strategy to avoid dependence on foreign oil. 30
President Nixon was aware, however, that recent federal mining regulations and
escalating public concern about the environment were obstacles to increased coal
production. He stressed that mine operators would have to adhere to strict environmental
standards and that it was important to achieve a balance between protecting the
environment and fulfilling America’s economic and national security interests. While the
president acknowledged that the Clean Air Act of 1970 would limit the burning of coal as
a source of energy, he advocated placing less emphasis on the less important standards in
the act. In addition, Nixon supported the Environmental Protection Agency’s policy of
granting states the right to burn more coal during energy shortages.31
Nixon did not mention coal mine health and safety during his address. This
omission cast doubt on the sincerity of his commitment to miners’ working conditions. It
again suggested that Nixon had supported the Federal Mine Act of 1969 and the Black
Lung Benefits Act of 1972 primarily to obtain blue-collar support for the 1972 election
and the Democrat’s backing for his defense and foreign policies. Yet, Nixon’s emphasis
on coal as an energy source was prescient. In October 1973, an oil embargo by the
30
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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) resulted in the energy crisis that
he had been trying to avoid.
Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton shared Nixon’s faith in coal as a
viable solution to the energy crisis. In an article entitled “Coal: Our Ace in the Hole to
Meet the Energy Crisis,” Morton cautioned, “The mighty American economy, strongest
in the world, is quite literally running out of gas.” He highlighted the country’s
dependence on oil and natural gas, claiming that those fuels accounted for 77 percent of
the national energy supply. In contrast, only eighteen percent of the country’s energy
came from coal, four percent from hydroelectric power, and one percent from nuclear
power. Morton cautioned against continued dependence on foreign oil imports. He
argued that that if the United States was unable to import oil in sufficient quantities then
“we would, as a nation and a world power, trail off into impotence.”32 Morton was
dismissive of alternative energy sources, such as solar energy, geothermal energy and
atomic fission. He also believed that, in the short-term, domestic oil was not a viable
solution, although he noted that, in the near future, oil would be available through the
Trans-Alaska pipeline. For Morton, coal was the key to resolving the energy crisis:
... I believe that our best path to self-sufficiency by 1980 lies underground – in
coal. Coal – three trillion tons of it, composing 89 percent of all our fossil-fuel
resources – is literally our “ace in the hole.” In fact, we have enough coal in the
ground to supply all our energy requirements until well into the second quarter of
the 21st century.33
Morton recognized that coal was more costly to produce and distribute than oil
and natural gas, caused air pollution when burned, devastated the natural environment
32
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through the practice of surface mining, and “[remained] one of the most hazardous
occupations in the nation.” He explained, however, that coal could be converted into both
gas and synthetic oil. Moreover, he claimed that America had enough coal reserves for
conversion into four trillion barrels of oil, ten times the world’s total oil supplies.34
Establishing a program for converting coal into gas and oil, Morton argued, was
imperative if the country was to become self-sufficient.35 He revealed that the Bureau of
Mines and the Office of Coal Research both were researching economically feasible
conversion processes. Technological advances of this nature, argued Morton, depended
on changes in existing labor practices.36
Emphasizing the dangerous nature of underground work, Morton argued that, by
the year 2000, underground coal mines should be completely automated, with machines
doing the most dangerous work. Men’s duties, he cautioned, should be limited to
maintenance and control.37 In the short term, further strip mining was necessary, but it
would require tough legislation from Congress to protect the land. On paper, Morton’s
proposals accounted for the protection of both workers and the land. They were little
more than political rhetoric, however, not a framework for substantial policy. Morton’s
past record did not reveal a genuine concern for coal mine health and safety or
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environmental conservation. Prior to becoming Secretary of the Interior, his policies
typically favored industry and business.38
A similar article in the Saturday Evening Post promoted the benefits of coal as a
long-term solution to the energy crisis. In “Coal: An Answer to the Energy Crisis,” Jep
Cadou argued that the United States had enough coal to last for the next 800 years under
the current rate of consumption. Like Morton, he stressed that coal was “enormously
versatile.” It could provide the basis for many other energy supplies, he argued, including
petroleum, natural gas, and electricity. Cadou asserted that the United States could use
coal to eliminate its energy shortfall in the next two or three years. In contrast to Morton,
who proposed replacing miners with technology, Cadou advocated the rapid expansion of
the coal mine labor force, through a program designed to train an additional 100,000
additional miners. According to Cadou, this effort would require a substantial publicity
campaign to make mining a more attractive career option to American youth. He argued
that the image of a miner hacking coal out of the ground with a pick shovel was outdated.
He wrote, “You are likely to find today’s miner pressing buttons or pushing levers to
operate expensive equipment which removes the coal from the earth, cleans and sizes it
and ships it to the user.”39 Cadou’s article emphasized the prevalence of surface mining,
with its reliance on large mechanical draglines to scoop the coal from the earth.
In his urgency to make coal the foundation of national energy policy, Cadou
completely ignored the risks of mining to labor and the environment. He stated, “Mining
is still a hazardous occupation, but it is growing safer all the time. The miners say so.
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And so do the cold statistics. There were 325 fatal injuries in coal mining in the United
States in 1960, according to the Bureau of Mines of the Department of the Interior. There
were 260 such deaths in 1970, and 180 in 1971, the last year for which statistics have
been reported.” 40 Cadou did not mention that the number of fatalities had increased from
1969 to 1970, nor did he frame the statistics in terms of man-hours worked or the
quantity of coal produced. Further, despite highlighting the new dust regulations to
prevent black lung disease, Cadou ignored the fact that many employers were still failing
to implement them. Finally, he wrongly credited the UMW with the recent major
advances in health and safety. He further dismissed the environmental impact of strip
mining. He cited the AMAX Coal Company, based in Indiana, as a leader in the
restoration of strip-mined land. One of its subsidiaries, Meadowlark, had generated
enormous profits from the sale of livestock and crops developed on reclaimed land.41
Cadou’s assessment ignored millions of acres of land were simply abandoned by mining
operators or not properly restored.
Despite the aspirations of the Nixon administration and the media to resolve the
energy crisis through coal, the militant attitude of the nation’s coal miners complicated
matters. By early March 1974, a wildcat strike was spreading rapidly among the miners
of West Virginia. The strike was directly related to the energy crisis, as the miners had
walked off the job in response to the gas allocation policies of the federal and state

40

Jep Cadou, “Coal: An Answer to the Energy Crisis,” Saturday Evening Post, April
1974, 24.
41

Ibid., 26.

315
governments.42 The industrial walkout not only hindered production of 75 percent of the
country’s metallurgical coal, but also forced steel companies who used such coal in their
production to lay off workers. In just a few days, the strike caused the loss of production
of 2.5 million tons of coal. The Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association and the major
steel companies, many of which owned coal mines, accused the United Mine Workers of
staging the strike for its own political reasons, a claim the union denied. The federal
government and the operators were concerned that UMW President Arnold Miller had
made promises to rank and file miners that he could not deliver, including an increase in
wages and pensions and significant improvements in mine safety. Miller’s promises
exceeded what he could reasonably expect to obtain during the bargaining process. 43
The government and mine owners were particularly concerned about the
impending contract negotiations between the UMW and the coal industry. They worried
that another strike during the negotiating process would further jeopardize the nation’s
coal supply. In the hope of limiting coal shortages, Secretary of Labor George Schultz
established an intergovernmental group under the control of the Cost of Living Council to
develop a national coal policy for the rest of 1974. According to Business Week, the
federal government advised operators to make a substantial wage offer to the miners to
avoid unrest.44 The Nixon administration also sought to alleviate potential coal shortages
through improved productivity among the miners, particularly by reducing absenteeism.45
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Rank and file coal miners were concerned about the impact of the energy crisis on
their economic position and their working conditions. They were less concerned,
however, with its impact on the environment. In article entitled, “The Energy Crisis As A
Coal Miner Sees It,” published in Center Magazine, UMW President Arnold Miller
claimed that the several thousand strip miners that belonged to the union did not like to
hear him “talking like an environmentalist.” He warned, however, that complacency was
fatal, in both health and safety and environmental matters:
…There is a tradition of speaking out in my union, and the westward trend of coal
mining creates an issue we all have to confront. In West Virginia and Kentucky,
all over Appalachia, we found out, as our fathers found out before us, that when
the companies no longer need you or want you, all you have left are the scars and
the dust in your lungs. And in our hills, what we have left are the scars and the
mud slides and the streams choked with silt where we used to fish.”46
Miller recognized the threat that the coal industry posed to both the health and safety of
miners and to the fabric of the natural environment. He argued that it was important to be
wary about the expansion of surface mining into western states.
Miller also mentioned the Farmington and Buffalo Creek disasters, noting that
fifty years earlier, the coal operators had promised to develop Appalachia and had instead
left it in ruins through by exploiting its coal for profit. Moreover, Miller contended, it was
necessary to find a common ground between western miners who wanted to protect their
jobs and the “eagle freaks,” or conservationists, who sought to protect their land and
property. For Miller, the expansion of coal mining in the West thus presented a
significant dilemma.47
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Supporters of strip mining argued that tough environmental policies would
destroy the benefits it created, both in Appalachia and the West. Operators and
community organizations, including “Save Our Jobs,” an Appalachian advocacy group,
contended that surface mining was a vital source of employment in Appalachian
communities.48 They neglected to mention that surface mining eliminated underground
mining jobs and relied on minimal labor. Miller was wary of the argument that
environmental protective measures would threaten jobs. He feared that rapid
development of western mining would result in the loss of between 25,000 and 40,000
mining jobs in the eastern part of the country. Yet, he also recognized the importance of
protecting miners’ jobs in the west. To maintain a balance in employment between the
eastern and western mining regions, he advocated a National Energy Policy that cut back
the power of the large corporations.49
The rapid growth of surface mining in the 1970s was a viable to solution to the
energy crisis in the United States, providing the country with a cheap and reliable source
of fuel. Surface mining had negative consequences, however, for the coal mine labor
force and for the environment. Although in decline at this time, underground mining was
still a prominent method of coal production. The renewed emphasis on coal production
also jeopardized the safety and lives of miners who worked in underground mines,
particularly marginal and non-union mines.
The strict measures of the Federal Coal Mine Act meant that underground mines
played a less significant role in the energy crisis than surface mines. In 1973, an industry
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representative claimed that in some underground mines, production had declined from
twenty tons per day to eight tons per day as a result of the legislation, while one
government official argued that operators faced the dilemma of increasing production
while adhering to health and safety standards. Arnold Miller argued that the federal
government should offer the smaller companies short-term loans for implementing safety
and training measures, which would enable them to continue operating without
significant financial losses. Many small operators were unable to afford the cost of
installing the safety equipment mandated by the Federal Mine Act.50
Despite the obstacles they faced, small marginal coal mines continued to thrive.
Moreover, their operators continued to violate the law, despite the enforcement
procedures of the Bureau of Mines. Rising demand for coal placed increased pressure on
such mines to increase their production. Moreover, several independent operators with
little experience or background in mining saw a chance to profit from the energy crisis.
Their lack of knowledge about operating a coal mine had significant implications for the
health and safety of miners. J. Davitt McAteer, who carried out extensive research on
coal mine health and safety in the 1970s before becoming a safety adviser for the United
Mine Workers, explained that many new mine operators were simply concerned with
profiting from the immediate demand for coal in the United States and that safety was not
a top priority for them.51 Similarly, large underground mining operations, which were
mostly owned by corporations and oil interests, continued to endanger their workers
through neglect. UMW Arnold Miller drew a close relationship between the large mining

50

Ibid., 38.

51

J. Davitt McAteer, telephone interview with author, May 11, 2009.

319
corporations and the federal government. He wrote, “I would not claim that industry and
government are one and the same, because my experience with the federal bureaucracy is
that it is a world all to itself. But I do believe that industry and government are much
closer together and much less distinguishable than they have a right to be.”52
The dangers of underground coal mines were exemplified by a massive explosion
at the Scotia mine in Kentucky on March 9, 1976. Fifteen miners perished in the disaster.
The mine, located near the small community of Oven Fork in Letcher County, Kentucky,
was owned by the Scotia Coal Company, a subsidiary of the Blue Diamond Coal
Company based in Tennessee. A further eleven men, mostly MESA representatives and
rescue workers, lost their lives during a second explosion on March 11, as they searched
for possible survivors.53 The Scotia mine produced high-quality metallurgical coal, which
was used in the production of steel and electrical power. According to records maintained
by the coal industry, production at the mine had been increasing over the past five years.
The rise in production was arguably connected to a decline in health and safety standards
at the mine. The Keystone blue book, the formal industry record of production, showed
that the mine produced 936,384 tons of coal in 1974. By early 1976, the blue book
recorded that production at the mine was roughly 6,000 tons per day, equating to 2.19
52
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million tons annually. The Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) gave a
more conservative estimate of production, citing daily production at the mine in 1975 as
2,500 tons per day.54
From 1974 to 1976, MESA repeatedly cited the mine for violations of health and
safety legislation. From the beginning of 1974 until the date of the disaster, MESA
inspectors discovered sixty-two violations of the ventilation standards in the Federal
Mine Act. The penalties that MESA levied against the Scotia Company, however,
consistently declined while the number of violations increased.55 In its report on the
disaster, the federal government concluded that inadequate ventilation caused the
explosion. It also cited the secondary cause of faulty electrical equipment sparking the
methane gas inside the mine.56 MESA criticized the mine owners for not conducting preshift examinations of equipment and methane levels. The report stated, “MESA
investigators conclude that the explosion of March 11, 1976, resulted from a lack of
sufficient air to ventilate the area in 2 Southeast Main inby No. 22 crosscut, including the
2 Left Section, and remove from the mine the know methane accumulations. The lack of
air prohibited safe and timely completion of the recovery operations.”57
The Scotia disaster was a clear example of how underground operators’ quest for
increased production conflicted with effective health and safety enforcement. As the
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Scotia Company’s production steadily increased, safety standards in the mine declined,
resulting in the loss of 26 lives. The underground coal mines that managed to survive
throughout the 1970s perpetuated unsafe working standards, despite the existence of
legislation to protect workers. When President Jimmy Carter entered the White House in
January 1977, however, he responded immediately to the labor and environmental
injustices of the coal industry. During his single term in office, he signed legislation to
strengthen the Federal Mine Act of 1969 and to regulate surface mining.

Legislative Solutions: The Policies of President Jimmy Carter
After winning the 1976 presidential election, President Carter entered the White
House with a reform-orientated perspective. According to Charles O. Jones, author of
The Trusteeship Presidency, Carter viewed his role as that of a trustee, that is, “an official
entrusted to represent the public or national interest, [who downplayed] short-term
electoral considerations.” Carter favored national over local issues, but he adopted a
micro-management approach to his presidency, handling key issues in a comprehensive
manner.58 In addition, he appointed staff members who were sympathetic to labor and
environmental issues. The environmental movement supported Carter’s decision to
appoint Cecil D. Andrus, formerly a two-term governor of Idaho, as Secretary of the
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Interior. Carter selected 48-year old F. Ray Marshall, a professor of law at the University
of Texas, for the position of Secretary of Labor.59
Carter’s policy goals included the reform of energy, employment, and tax
legislation. Several factors jeopardized the acceptance of his legislative agenda by
Congress. During his presidential campaign, Carter had criticized both the Republican
Party and the Washington political establishment. Therefore, many Congressional
representatives, particularly those who were newly elected, felt little obligation toward
Carter. Furthermore, many lawmakers were entering political office as a result of
professional experience, not political affiliation, which made their loyalty to Carter
questionable.

60
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independently from Congress. His ‘trusteeship’ approach excluded Congress from the
early stages of policy development. Carter believed that by relying on members of
Congress to formulate policy, he would be violating the public trust. He sought to enact
his original campaign promises with as little compromise as possible. His detached style
caused suspicion in Congress, which relied on personal communication to function
effectively.61
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In his first legislative session, President Carter introduced a number of legislative
bills to Congress. 62 Notably, he introduced bills to regulate surface mining, strengthen
mine health and safety, reform the federal black lung program, and address the energy
crisis. There was a strong connection between those issues, even though Carter addressed
each issue in a separate bill. He planned to achieve energy independence through coal
production, while limiting the human fatalities and environmental devastation caused by
the mining of the coal.
Carter’s focus on coal production extended the energy policies of his
predecessors, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. In the previous five years, coal production
in the United States had significantly expanded. Production increased from 598.6 million
short tons in 1973 to 670.2 million short tons in 1978. Surface mining accounted for
almost two thirds of all coal production in 1978. For Carter, developing energy
independence was not enough. He also believed that the United States needed to become
more energy efficient. In an address to the nation in April 1977, he cautioned, “We
simply must balance our demand for energy with our rapidly shrinking resources. By
acting now we can control our future instead of letting the future control us.” 63 He sought
to limit energy consumption, therefore, to ensure adequate coal reserves for the long-term
future.64
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To combat the environmental destruction caused by coal mining, Carter signed
the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act on August 3, 1977. The Surface Mine Act
depended on the cooperation of state governments and the federal government to prevent
the environmental abuses of surface mining, especially the pollution of soil and water and
operators’ abandonment of the land without adequate restoration. For Carter, the law
required balancing environmental protection with the country’s energy requirements. The
passage of the Surface Mine Act followed many attempts by previous administrations to
regulate strip mining.65
Most importantly, in 1977, the Carter administration reinvigorated the issue of
mine health and safety. Carter sought to strengthen legislation for mines in all mineral
industries, including the various metal industries. He particularly wanted to improve the
federal government’s enforcement of health and safety. The Mine Enforcement and
Safety Administration (MESA) had, in the past four years, provided more effective
enforcement than the Bureau of Mines, but its location in the Department of the Interior
limited its ability to reduce injuries and fatalities. Mine health and safety advocates,
particularly Ken Hechler (who was now Secretary of State in West Virginia), had long
proposed the transfer of health and safety enforcement to the Department of Labor. The
Department of the Interior’s original mandate included mineral production, but not the
protection of miners and mineral workers. In the summer of 1977, therefore, Congress
considered draft legislation to amend the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969. The focus of the Senate deliberations was bill S. 717, which brought all mines,
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including metal and non-metal mines, under uniform health and safety legislation. It also
mandated the transfer of health and safety enforcement from the Department of the
Interior to the Department of Labor, a measure that Hechler had advocated during the
legislative hearings on the Federal Mine Act of 1969. Further, it strengthened inspection
procedures, increased the penalties for violations, and proposed the creation of a Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission to oversee adjudicative matters connected
to violations of the law.66
Senator Orrin Grant Hatch (R-UT) led the opposition to the bill, arguing that coal
mines and non-coal mines could not be effectively consolidated under a single law. He
introduced a separate amendment to strengthen the health and safety provisions for metal
and non-metal mines, embodied in the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Act of 1966.
He commented, “It has for many years been recognized that although coal and non-coal
mining have one basic similarity, that is, extraction of minerals from the earth, the
similarity just about ends there.”67 Senator Harrison Williams (D-NJ) strongly criticized
Hatch’s amendment because it did not provide equal protection for all miners. He argued
that the original version of S. 717 “[corrected] the inadequacies and the injustice
currently suffered by our Nation’s hard rock miners, by establishing a single mine safety
and health law, with a single structure for enforcement and administration.”68
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) presented an amendment that permitted state
governments to develop their own health and safety standards in conjunction with the
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Department of the Interior. The amendment enforced a key provision of the 1966 Mine
Act, namely the freedom of the states to set their own laws for metal and non-metal
mining. Again, Williams condemned the amendment, complaining that it would result in
major discrepancies in federal enforcement.69 The Senate ultimately rejected both bills
along with several others. It did, however, incorporate an additional amendment to bill S.
717, proposed by Senator Hatch, that allowed interested parties to participate in appeals
hearings.70 On June 21, the Senate passed the bill by a clear majority of 78 to 18.71
The House of Representatives deliberated a similar bill, H.R. 4287. As with the
Senate negotiations, the key point of opposition was the bill’s incorporation of all types
of mine. Representative Ronald Sarasin (R-CT) was particularly vocal in his criticism,
arguing that placing coal mines and non-coal mines under the same legislation was not
only illogical, but also unsafe. He said, “All H.R. 4287 really does is to add additional
workers to a law that is in rather sorry shape, irrespective of their needs and interests. The
real tragedy is that metal and non-metal miners will now be included in a law that has a
lower success rate of preventing fatalities and injuries.”72 Referring to the 1966 Act,
Sarasin predicted, “They will be losing a law that has resulted in constant improvements
for them and that, with improvements, could rapidly enhance their chances to leave their
jobs each day safe and healthy.” He announced his intention to offer a substitute bill,
H.R. 7979, which focused solely on amending the Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Act.
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Notably, Sarasin’s bill retained enforcement powers in the Department of the Interior,
rather in the Department of Labor as specified by the original bill.73 Representative
Vonno Lamar Gudger (D-NC) presented a modified version of Sarasin’s bill that
transferred responsibility for enforcement to the Department of Labor.74 Both Sarasin’s
bill and Gudger’s modification of it failed to pass the House. The House, however,
approved amendments by John Murtha (D-PA) and Michael Myers (D-PA) to increase
the allocation of funding for enforcement of H.R. 4287. It also passed a further
amendment by Sarasin, which allowed operators to modify safety standards in
accordance with shifting underground conditions. The House passed H.R. 4287 in its
amended form by 244 votes to 88.75
In the autumn, the joint conference committee studied the discrepancies between
S. 717 and H.R. 4287 before producing a single legislative bill. The final draft
incorporated the Senate’s original proposal of creating a Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission to manage adjudicative issues, such as operators’ appeals against
penalty notices, while rejecting the House’s recommendation of retaining this function
with the Department of the Interior. The final bill also included many of the Senate’s
more stringent measures on standards setting, enforcement and inspection procedures,
and the review and appeals process. Many of the common elements of S. 717 and H.R.
4287 remained in the final conference bill, including their applicability to all types of
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mine and the transfer of health and safety enforcement from the Department of the
Interior to the Department of Labor.
The Senate voted on and approved the conference bill on October 6, 1977, while
the House passed it three weeks later, on October 27.76 On November 9, President Carter
signed into law the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. Before the waiting
members of Congress, he reflected on the importance of the act. Carter said, “I think that
every American knows that a major contributing factor to our own economy is the
courageous and sometimes dangerous miners who go deep beneath the earth to bring to
the surface, for our use, coals and other minerals.” He argued that one of the bill’s most
important aspects was its transferal of health and safety enforcement from the
Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor.77 The 1977 Mine Act formally
relocated the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) in the Department of
Labor, where it was renamed the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). The
Bureau of Mines, which was still located in the Department of the Interior, continued to
conduct research on coal production and technology at this time.
Four months later, on March 1, 1978, President Carter signed into law the Black
Lung Disability Trust Act. The new legislation was designed to improve significantly the
ability of miners and their dependents to obtain benefits and to reduce the processing time
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for claims. The act mandated a new tax on the coal industry, which would provide an
additional $100 million per year to fund the federal black lung compensation program.78
Carter’s approval of the act revealed that Richard Nixon’s original goal of moving
responsibility for black lung benefits to the states by 1975 had failed. Most state
legislatures, however, still did not have adequate mechanisms in their worker
compensation programs to provide black lung compensation. Emphasizing the link
between energy production and mine health and safety, Carter commented that the law
represented “a comprehensive federal effort to reduce the human and social cost of our
growing dependence on coal.” Under the terms of the new law, Carter continued, “more
miners and their families will receive the benefits they deserve.”79

The president

recognized both the significant impact that black lung disease had on coal miners and
their families and the failure of state workers’ compensation programs to provide
benefits. With the Black Lung Disability Trust Act, Carter extended the federal
government’s responsibility for providing black lung compensation.
The passage of the 1977 Mine Act and the Black Lung Act of 1978 coincided
with significant increases in coal production and the coal mine labor force. Coal
production in the United States had been steadily increasing over the previous eight
years. In 1969, total production was 569 million short tons, increasing to 660 million
short tons in 1977. In fact, production in 1977 was at its highest level since 1948,
primarily because of the prevailing energy crisis and increased production at surface
mines. The high level of production in 1977 occurred despite a prolonged miners’ strike
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that took place in the winter of 1977-78. Similarly, in the same eight-year period, there
was a notable increase in the coal mine labor force, from 95,000 miners in 1969 to
140,000 miners in 1977. The additional workers were necessary to meet the surging
demand for coal.80 Although there was a decline in underground production during this
eight-year period, 35,000 of the additional miners worked in underground mines. The
increased job security for miners led to additional strikes for better pay and working
conditions.
The Carter administration focused more on enforcement of federal legislation than
the Nixon administration. From 1978 to 1980, the Mine Safety and Health Administration
found ongoing support from the Carter administration, which increased its budget by six
percent. It also expanded its inspection force from 1,228 inspectors to 1,367 inspectors.
During the same period, the number of inspections of all types of mine increased, while
the number of violations recorded by inspectors declined. The number of citations issued
for recorded violations increased, as did the average penalty. In 1977, the average penalty
assessed was $122, while in 1978 it had risen to $177. By 1979, the average penalty for
violations was $207.81
Despite more rigorous enforcement, there were still weaknesses in the federal
mine health and safety program. The 1977 Mine Act did not result in immediate
improvements to miners’ health and safety. Although MSHA was supposed to enact
strong penalties against operators that repeatedly violated the law, it had the freedom and
autonomy to interpret each case on its own merits. Consequently, the agency rarely
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instructed operators to withdraw its workforce or cease operations entirely. Moreover,
when levying fines against operators, it rarely applied the upper limit of $10,000.82
During the tenure of the Carter administration, there was a fluctuation in the mine fatality
rate. In 1977, the fatality rate was 0.069 per 200,00 man-hours worked, the equivalent of
0.345 per one million man-hours. The following year, the fatality rate declined slightly to
0.055 per 200,000 man-hours, the equivalent of 0.275 fatalities per million man-hours. In
1979, there was a visible increase in the mine fatality rate, which rose to 0.066 fatalities
per 200,000 employee hours, the equivalent of 0.33 fatalities per million-man hours
worked. In 1980, the final year of the Carter administration, the fatality rate was 0.064
per 200,000 employees, the equivalent of 0.32 fatalities per million man-hours worked.
Overall, there was a slight drop in the fatality rate during the four years Carter was in
office. More importantly, there was a general improvement in mine health and safety.83
Overall in 1979, there were 144 coal mine deaths, a significant increase from the 106
deaths in 1978. While the number of men employed in the coal industry had increased
significantly over the previous two years, this hardly justified such a sharp acceleration in
the fatality rate.84
On July 15, 1979, Carter addressed the American public on the nation’s energy
crisis, the most significant domestic policy dilemma he had faced during his time in
office. As he had done in previous speeches, Carter framed the energy crisis in moral
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terms. He told his audience, “In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families,
close-knit communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship selfindulgence and consumption… We’ve learned that piling up material goods cannot fill
the emptiness of lives that have no confidence or purpose.”85 Carter further developed the
theme of morality, in particular emphasizing the country’s unbridled consumption of
energy over the past twenty years. “In little more than two decades,” he proclaimed,
“we’ve gone from a position of energy independence to one in which almost half the oil
we use comes from foreign countries, at prices that are going through the roof. Our
excessive dependence on OPEC has already taken a tremendous toll on our economy and
our people.”86 Carter assured citizens that he planned to resolve the energy crisis, by
preventing further increases in foreign oil imports and by allocating funds for developing
domestic energy sources such as oil shale and coal.87 Yet the safety of miners who
produced the coal, and the protection of the natural environment, did not factor into
Carter’s moral analysis in the speech.
For the most part, Carter improved health and safety and environmental
conservation in the coal industry. In 1980, however, Ronald Reagan was elected
president, marking the beginning of an extensive period of deregulation that would have
significant implications for the nation’s miners. The Reagan administration not only
significantly weakened federal regulation of health and safety, but also amended the
black lung benefits program to make it harder for miners and their dependents to obtain

85

Horowitz, Jimmy Carter and the Energy Crisis, 113.

86

Ibid, 115.

87

Ibid., 115-117.

333
benefits. In short, the administration eroded many of the gains that miners and their
supporters had achieved in the 1970s through sustained protest and grassroots activism.

Coal Mine Health and Safety in Decline: Ronald Reagan and Deregulation
During the 1980s, many of the improvements to coal mine health and safety
achieved by the Carter administration were eroded by President Ronald Reagan. In
November 1980, Reagan won the presidential election by a landslide majority, defeating
Jimmy Carter and independent candidate John Anderson. Reagan’s political values were
entirely incompatible with maintaining strong federal enforcement of health and safety.
He believed that regulation was economically destructive, linking it with reduced
productivity and economic decline.88 In accordance with that belief, his administration
brought deregulation into every sphere of government. In many cases, it did not actively
pursue legislative means to deregulation, but rather it ordered government agencies to
stop enforcing existing regulations. It also filled high-level positions with politicians
unlikely to interfere with the private sector.89 William Kleinknecht argues, “Reagan
changed the role of government from that of watchdog to lapdog without even bothering
to consult Congress… The Reaganites went after regulatory agencies with relish, starving
them of resources and staffing with officials committed to their destruction.”90
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Reagan targeted agencies such as the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA),

the

Occupational

Safety and

Health

Administration

(OSHA),

the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
for budgetary and staff cuts, with the intention of reducing government oversight of
private business.91 Reagan had targeted OSHA for cutbacks even before entering office,
supporting a legislative bill in 1979 that called for the agency’s abolition. During his
presidency, he did not succeed in abolishing it, but he did significantly reduce its power.
He appointed Thorne Auchter, the head of a Florida construction company, as director of
OSHA, despite the fact he had received numerous citations from OSHA for unsafe
working practices. From 1980 to 1986, there was a thirty percent drop in the number of
inspections of manufacturing plants by OSHA, and a drop in fines from $26 million per
year to $13 million per year.92
The Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief was responsible for the
administration’s deregulation program. Although Vice-President George H. W. Bush was
head of the agency, James C. Miller III, formerly administrator of regulatory affairs in the
Office of Management and Budget, assumed the key leadership role in the program.
Richard Williamson, assistant to the president for intergovernmental and regulatory
affairs, and C. Boyden Gray, the counsel to the Task Force, also made important
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contributions. They encouraged business and civic leaders to inform the task force of
their worst reform “horror” stories and even encouraged them to circumvent regulatory
agencies by taking complaints straight to the White House. The Task Force also made it
easier to enact changes to federal legislation. In some instances, regulations were
abolished immediately after meetings between industry officials and representatives from
the Office of Management and Budget, but Miller and Gary did not admit this explicitly.
The Task Force did not, however, afford the media and Congressional investigators the
same freedoms as private business. It carefully guarded information regarding the Reagan
administration’s implementation of its deregulatory program.93
The Reagan administration’s program of deregulation had significant and farreaching implications for the nation’s miners. Reagan gave little priority to miners’
working conditions, and consequently the Mine Safety and Health Administration
experienced significant reductions in its budget and staffing levels. The administration
delayed the appointment of its assistant secretary of labor for mine safety for several
months. In October 1981, the administration finally appointed Ford B. Ford to the
position. Formerly an occupational health and safety administrator from California,
Ford’s previous record further underlined Reagan’s commitment to deregulation.94
The following month, as part of its budget strategy for 1982, the Reagan
administration halted the power of the Mine Safety and Health Administration to inspect
certain types of coal mine. Ford then embarked on a major reorganization of the agency.
The MSHA was comprised of ten district offices, which were responsible for conducting
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inspections, and nine assessment offices, which determined the penalty for each health
and safety violation. If a conference between the MSHA and the operator was necessary,
then it typically happened at one of the assessment offices. Inspectors rarely participated
in these conferences, as they were designed to enable the operators to appeal fines and
could result in a conflict of interest.95 Ford merged the different functions by abolishing
the assessment offices and greatly expanding the role of the district offices. On May 30,
1982, the nine assessment offices closed permanently. While Ford argued that this would
enhance inspectors’ ability to improve miners’ lives, in reality inspectors now had to
divert time from safety enforcement to managing conferences and providing education
and training.96
Ford’s restructuring of the MSHA increased the risk of confrontation between
inspectors and coal operators. Under the previous system, managers at the assessment
offices, not the inspectors, were not responsible for determining and issuing fines. In the
restructured MSHA, inspectors who were active in the field became responsible for
issuing fines. Consequently, Ford’s restructuring reduced the chance of prosecutions
against serious health and safety violations. There were fewer prosecutions during
Reagan’s first term than during the Carter administration’s tenure; the same applied for
Reagan’s second term.97 In accordance with the administration’s stance on deregulation,
Ford B. Ford also sought to limit confrontation with the coal industry. From 1981 to
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1983, there was a decline in the number of citations issued by the MSHA, as well as in
the average penalty for violations.
Ford actively sought to limit confrontation between the Reagan administration
and the coal industry. In fact, according to Daniel Curran, the administration believed it
was important to cooperate with the coal operators. From 1981 to 1983, there was a
decline in both the number of citations issued by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration and the average fine for each violation. During this period, the number of
citations dropped from 129,921 to 112,283, while the average penalty per violation fell
from $136 to $58.98 Inspectors had more freedom to act independently and, following
orders from Ford, typically ignored minor violations. The Reagan administration’s
deregulation of health and safety enforcement thus led to an increase in the mine fatality
rate. In 1981, there were 155 fatalities in the coal industry, twenty-two more than the
previous year and the highest rate since 1975.99
The administration made significant reductions in the budget allocated to MSHA.
From 1978 to 1980, under President Jimmy Carter, the average annual budget was $166.3
million, reaching a peak of $172.8 million in 1979. Throughout Reagan’s two terms in
office, in contrast, the average annual budget declined sixteen percent, to $140 million by
1988. More specifically, there was a nine percent decline in the funds allocated directly to
coal mine health and safety. Under Carter, these averaged $73 million per year, whereas
the Reagan administration provided an average of $67.6 million per year. Overall, budget
allocations for MSHA in the early 1980s were less than those for MESA in the mid98
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1970s. The workforce at the Mine Safety and Health Administration also was affected by
ongoing deregulation, particularly when Reagan ordered massive staff cuts at the agency.
In 1978, there were 1,940 employees at MSHA. A decade later this number had fallen to
1,519. Inspectors faced a larger workload, with responsibility for additional paperwork,
assessing fines for violations, and inspecting more mines.
At a Congressional hearing on February 19, 1982, Director Ford refuted
accusations that cuts in MSHA staffing and funding had contributed to more deaths.
Testifying before the Safety Subcommittee in the House of Representatives, he explained
that, before the reorganization of MSHA, the central assessment offices and the district
inspection offices had failed to communicate. While Ford claimed that operators violating
the law would be subject to harsh sanctions, he downplayed the federal government’s
responsibility for enforcement, stating his belief that health and safety should be the
combined effort of industry, labor, and government.100 The mine inspectors who testified
at the hearing spoke of their declining influence in the coalfields. Hugh Smith recounted
an incident when a mine superintendent mocked him in front of a group of miners, telling
them, “Gentleman, you’re looking at a third class citizen – he won’t be around much
longer.” David Coleman revealed that one of his colleagues had been held hostage at
gunpoint after issuing an operator with a citation. Representatives from the United Mine
Workers, meanwhile, informed the committee that the Reagan administration was
reversing years of progress. Safety director Joe Taylor, noting the increase in the fatality
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rate, commented, “There is no other way of looking at it. There is a relationship between
the fatalities and decline in inspections.101
On May 20, 1982, MSHA announced new rules for violation penalties. In
addition to introducing a fixed penalty of $20 for less serious violations, it would give
“good faith credit” to operators who rectified violations within the time frame set by the
government. The agency also stated that it would impose fines of up to $10,000 for more
serious violations, but its performance under Reagan suggested it was unlikely to levy
substantial penalties against operators. The UMW voiced its concern that the new law
would enable operators to avoid paying fines, rather than prompting them to correct
violations. Two weeks earlier, the union’s new president, Sam Church, had announced
the miners would strike if MSHA enacted the new rules. Despite support from the
bargaining council, Church abandoned his plan for a walkout.
Assistant Secretary Ford downplayed the significance of the changes,
commenting, “Our aim in making these changes is to provide more incentives for mine
operators to maintain safe and healthful conditions for their employees. We’re
streamlining the assessments process by reducing time and resources associated with
processing less serious violations. The rule is focused on the prevention and correction of
all hazards to miners and operators will still face serious consequences for noncompliance.” The changes significantly reduced the deterrent value of financial penalties.
By the end of 1983, 73 percent of all assessed violations fell into the $20 category. 102
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Miners and their families were most angered, however, by President Reagan’s
plan to reduce funding for the federal black lung program. In a 1981 memorandum, the
administration announced its plan to cut $2 billion from the program over the next five
years. The Reagan administration attributed the insolvency of the black lung program to
poor management by previous administrations, which, it argued, had led to an “automatic
pension” for most coal miners. As the foundation for this contentious claim, the Reagan
administration used a study by the General Accounting Office (GAO).103 According to
James Brady, the White House press secretary, the study found “that an incredible 88
percent of all claimants certified as eligible were either not disabled or else could not
prove to have black lung disease.”104 The GAO study was based on a report in the
Journal of the American Medical Association.. Bennett Judkins notes that, despite flawed
research methods in the original American Medical Association report, the General
Accounting Office study provided the administration with justification for making
substantial cuts to the black lung program.105
The Reagan administration refused to acknowledge that the problems with the
black lung program were attributable mostly to the coal companies’ failure to make
contributions as required by law.106 Under the 1972 Black Lung Amendments Act, the
coal industry had been required to absorb the full cost of the program by 1976. When
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they failed to meet this obligation, Congress, under Carter’s leadership, imposed a
mandatory tax on the coal industry in the Black Lung Disability Trust Act of 1978. Yet,
by the early 1980s, the federal government was still providing most of the funding for the
program. President Reagan believed the federal government could no longer absorb the
high costs of the program. Like Nixon before him, he believed that the federal
government should not be responsible for compensating the victims of occupational
disease. Reagan’s decision to reduce funding for the black lung benefits program
highlighted the detrimental impact of federal bureaucracy on recent legislative gains in
health and safety.107
By the time Reagan entered office in January 1981, 77,500 miners were receiving
federal black lung benefits. During the fiscal year that started in 1981, the federal black
lung trust fund paid $824 in benefits, $549 million more than the $275 million it had
received in contributions from the coal industry. Under federal law, the Department of
the Treasury was compensating for the industry shortfall by providing additional money
in the form of loans. The Reagan administration feared that, before 1995, the department
would pay up to $9.5 billion that it could never reclaim. The president intended to end
what is perceived as the “automatic pension” for miners, by rejecting questionable
compensation claims and tightening the eligibility requirements for black lung benefits.
Along with the budget cuts, the administration planned to increase taxes on the coal
industry.108
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In late February 1981, the leadership of the United Mine Workers called on the
union’s 170,000 members to hold a two-day strike on March 9 and 10 in protest of the
Reagan’s proposed cuts to the federal black lung compensation program. Although
operators and the union were in the process of negotiating a new contract, a walkout was
permissible under the miners’ existing contract. The union had only used two of its ten
“memorial days,” essentially days of unpaid leave granted to the miners for the express
purpose of strike action. UMW President Church asserted that the Reagan administration
had no understanding of black lung disease, accusing it of making statements that
bordered on slander. He informed the media that the March strike was directly targeted at
the administration, although indicated that it might bring the union more credibility in the
ongoing contract negotiations. He commented, “We will call for all coal miners in this
nation, union and non-union alike, to lay down their tools and walk away from the
country’s coal mines if the administration attempts to gut this most humane and
necessary program.”109
The United Mine Workers transported miners by bus from seventeen of the
nation’s twenty-two mining states for the two-day strike in Washington. According to the
Federal Park Police, 5,000 people participated in the strike. On the first day, both active
and disabled miners expressed their contempt for Reagan. Winfield Maxwell, disabled by
pneumoconiosis, said, “I wish I could give my black lung to Ronald Reagan.” His wife
commented, “I’ll bet Reagan’s never seen anyone die of black lung, like I saw my father
die. All he’d have to do is see that once or twice, and he’d think different.” Thousands of
miners listened to anti-Reagan speeches at the United Mine Workers headquarters, before
109

Washington Post, February 25, 1981, D8.

343
marching past the White House. Lane Kirkland, the head of the AFL-CIO, was one of the
featured speakers. He drew cheers by commenting, “Your brothers of the AFL-CIO are
behind you all the way. This is an important one, but there will be other fights. Any man
who would take black lung benefits from miners would stop at nothing.”110
The following day, March 10, as the strike continued, the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources approved an increase of $149 million for the black lung
program in the next fiscal year. The Committee passed this measure largely through the
influence of Senator Jennings Randolph (D-WV), who had tried to dilute the Senate’s
mine health and safety bill in 1969. The committee made its decision as Reagan signed
the budget proposals he was submitting to Congress for approval. The committee also
rejected the president’s plans to cut low-income fuel assistance, legal assistance for the
poor, and education programs for people with disabilities.111 The miners’ demonstration
did not prevent Reagan from making changes to the black lung program. In December
1981, he signed the Black Lung Benefits Review Act. The new legislation increased the
excise tax on coal operators, with the intention of reducing the insolvency in the Black
Lung Disability Trust Fund, and provided much stricter regulations and eligibility criteria
for applicants. Reagan claimed the bill had been created with the cooperation of the
United Mine Workers; but with its stricter eligibility requirements, it did not represent the
interests of the rank and file.112 During the Reagan administration’s time in office, there
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was a decline in the number of approvals for black lung compensation for miners and
their dependents. Furthermore, although the number of coal mine fatalities declined, there
was a significant increase in the number of serious and non-serious injuries.
At first glance, the conservatism of the Reagan era gives the impression of a
significant departure from the legislative reform of the 1970s. As historian Jefferson
Cowie argues, however, the political landscape of the 1980s did not mark a clear break
from the 1970s; rather, it represented a logical transition. In his article, “Portrait of the
Working Class in a Convex Mirror,” Cowie argues that the 1970s were a bridge between
the 1960s and 1980s, marking an economic and cultural shift in American society. The
shift not only exposed the limits of the progressive order, but created profound dilemmas
for labor.113 For example, argues Cowie, President Jimmy Carter deviated from the bluecollar policies that the Nixon administration had embraced, abandoning class coalitional
politics and aligning himself with the middle class. Carter’s omission of the working
class from the national political rhetoric occurred as economic inequality was on the rise.
Furthermore, economics were becoming less influential in determining people’s voting
choices and political affiliations, leading to the detachment of class and politics. In the
early 1980s, the political Right gained working class support on cultural grounds, as
unions became disorganized and business interests grew increasingly aggressive. Based
on Cowie’s analysis, then, Carter’s approval of mine health and safety and black lung
legislation was not, like Nixon, based on his goal of obtaining additional blue-collar
votes.
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Cowie argues that the power of the working class had been declining long before
Nixon entered the White House in the late 1960s. He notes that strikebreaking had been a
common tactic used by employers since the 1930s. Carter contributed to the decline by
abandoning blue-collar workers in his political agenda and presiding over the
deregulation of the trucking industry, which led to lower pay and longer hours for truck
drivers. When Reagan entered office, then, he was able to capitalize on a process already
in motion. His extensive deregulatory policies were not new or a sharp break from those
of his predecessors.114

Conclusion
During the 1970s and 1980s, coal mine health and safety was marked by both
progress and decline. From the early to mid 1970s, operators focused more on increasing
production to meet the demands of the energy crisis than adhering to health and safety
and environmental legislation. The declining standards were illustrated in the Buffalo
Creek disaster, which demonstrated that the hazards of coal mining were spreading
beyond the confines of underground mines to local communities and the surrounding
environment. The rapid growth of surface mining in the 1970s further jeopardized both
miners and the natural environment.
From 1977 to 1978, President Jimmy Carter addressed the problems in the
industry by signing several laws, including the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, and the Black Lung Disability Trust Act.
Those laws significantly improved miners’ conditions, and addressed many of the failures
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of federal regulation earlier in the decade. From early 1981, however, miners’ conditions
declined sharply, after Ronald Reagan entered the White House. Reagan’s extensive
program of deregulation had a negative impact on both federal regulation and the
distribution of black lung benefits. Regulatory agencies saw significant cuts in their
budgets and, by the administration’s order, did not fully enforce rules governing health
and safety. Despite their efforts to use strike action to defend their benefits, miners and
their communities did not, as in the previous two decades, engage in extensive grassroots
protest to challenge the decline. By the end of the decades, the injury rate in coal mining
industry had increased significantly, while miners found it more difficult to obtain black
lung benefits.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusion
Robert C. Byrd and Black Lung Benefits
In early December 2009, members of the U.S. Senate were engaged in debate
over a legislative bill (H.R. 3590) on health care reform. The bill represented the Barack
Obama administration’s goal of making health insurance compulsory for all American
citizens and legal residents. It included proposals to subsidize medical insurance for those
unable to afford it and to prevent the health care industry from denying insurance to
people with pre-existing medical conditions. The bill was a modified version of a
legislative bill on health care reform passed by the House of Representatives in October
2009.
On December 3, 2009, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) added an amendment to the
Senate bill to reform the federal black lung compensation program. Byrd’s amendment
stipulated that coal miners with fifteen consecutive years of experience were eligible for
benefits if they could provide medical evidence they were suffering from totally disabling
lung disease. It also required mine owners to provide stronger evidence to contest
compensation payments to individual miners and provided benefits for widows and
dependents of miners who died from black lung disease. Byrd’s amendment restored to
the federal black lung program many of the provisions that had been eradicated by the
Ronald Reagan administration in the early 1980s. The terms of the amendment applied
retroactively to 2005.1 On December 24, the Senate passed bill H.R. 3590, entitled the
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Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act, with Byrd’s amendment intact,
paving the way for a conference committee debate with the House to establish the final
terms of the legislation. The passage of the legislation was by no means assured, as the
Republican Party had unanimously opposed both the House and Senate bills.2
Byrd’s addition of the black lung amendment echoed his actions in the Senate
forty years earlier. In 1969, he introduced a separate health bill to the Senate Labor
Subcommittee on behalf of the United Mine Workers that provided federal compensation
to the victims of black lung disease. At the time, the federal government did not provide
such compensation, and few state legislatures included the disease in their worker
compensation programs. The majority of black lung victims were unable to obtain
financial relief, despite the chronic suffering they endured. While the Senate rejected the
bill in favor of S. 2917, which did not include compensation measures, it added black
lung compensation to S. 2917 in a separate amendment. In the House version of the coal
mine bill, a black lung compensation provision by Representative Phil Burton (D-CA)
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ensured that when Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, it
contained strong measures to provide federal compensation for black lung victims.3
Byrd’s amendment to the 2009 Senate health care reform bill emphasized the
failure of the federal black lung compensation program. Furthermore, in an official press
release to publicize his amendment, Byrd implied that the weak enforcement policies of
the Bush administration had contributed to a recent increase in the prevalence of black
lung. He recognized, however, that the disease was in long-term decline, largely as a
result of the efforts of the Mine Safety and Health Administration during the Clinton
administration. Senator Byrd commented:
Equitable access to benefits is absolutely necessary -- but prevention must remain
paramount. The incidence of black lung finally reached an all time low during the
1990s, thanks to the longstanding leadership of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration, many coal miners, physicians, and other advocates. Although the
incidence of black lung disease has rebounded recently, I believe that, together
with our continued commitment, we can reverse course. We can, and must, ‘end
black lung,’ and move the vital work of coal mining to a brighter, healthier,
future.’4
Byrd’s main priority, therefore, was not just improving the federal black lung
compensation program, but eradicating black lung disease from the coal mining industry.
Despite Byrd’s emphasis on preventing black lung and making coal mining a
healthier occupation, his amendment faced strong opposition. In mid-January 2010, Steve
Roberts, the president of the West Virginia Chamber of Commerce, stated, “It’s a job
killer. The cost of this could approach $1 billion.” According to Roberts, the bill would
3
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have negative financial implications for insurance companies and the coal industry.
Under the terms of the Black Lung Disability Trust Act of 1978, both had a stake in
funding the federal black lung program. Roberts argued, “[The amendment] could cost
the very coal companies that are struggling to keep miners working multi-hundreds of
millions of dollars, all to address a problem that no one has proved exists.”5 Roberts was
referring to his conviction that there was no evidence that the federal government was
wrongfully denying compensation to sick coal miners. He continued, “Medical science
can determine who actually has black lung, and if a person has black lung we want them
to get benefits. What we don’t want is a blanket presumption that if you worked in
mining, you are entitled to a benefit for which you may not medically qualify.”6 Like
many of the opponents of Byrd’s amendment, Roberts presented the mistruth that it
provided automatic compensation to miners with fifteen years of experience. He
neglected to mention that miners were still required to provide evidence of totally
disabling lung disease.
Roberts’ comments were reminiscent of the strong opposition to automatic
compensation that had plagued the legislative debates on coal mine health and safety in
the late 1960s and 1970s. Roberts represented a significant faction of interests, including
mine owners, insurance companies, and Republican Party members, who sought to limit
the provision of black lung benefits to miners. George Burton, the president of Brick
Street Mutual Insurance, commented, “We have the utmost respect for Senator Byrd and
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all he has done for West Virginia but respectfully disagree with the ramifications of the
retro piece of the legislation.”7 Byrd defended his proposals in another press release, in
which he stated, “These black lung benefits have been promised to miners who come
down with totally disabling black lung disease. But too often the coal companies and the
insurers have chosen to elude their responsibility to these ailing miners by out-lawyering
and literally out-lasting them.”8
There were other obstacles to the implementation of Senator Byrd’s black lung
compensation measures. In early January 2010, the House and the Senate were unable to
reach an agreement on the final terms of the health care bill. The election of
Massachusetts Republican Scott Brown to the Senate on January 19, 2010 further
jeopardized the passage of a unified health care bill, by ending the Democrats’
supermajority in the Senate. Brown was strongly opposed to the health care reform.9
In an effort to bring the House and the Senate to an agreement, the Barack Obama
administration released its own legislative proposals on health care reform.10 The House
of Representatives decided to resolve the dispute, however, by voting on the Senate’s
health care bill (H.R. 3590) and devising a separate reconciliation bill that provided
amendments to H.R. 3590. On March 21, 2010, the House passed H.R. 3590 by a
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majority of 219 to 212. The same day, it also passed H.R. 4872, known as the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, which modified certain provisions in
H.R. 3590 and provided measures to reduce the cost of higher education.11 The Senate
agreed to the amendments embodied in H.R. 4872, passing it by a narrow majority on
March 25. President Barack Obama signed H.R. 3590 into law on March 23, 2010, and
he signed H.R. 4872 into law on March 30, 2010.12 Crucially, Byrd’s black lung
amendment remained intact when the House passed H.R. 3590, and it remained
unaffected by the legislative amendments in H.R. 4872. With the passage of the health
care legislation, coal miners and their dependents gained a more equitable, less
discriminatory federal black lung program. Senator Byrd commented, “This bill is very
welcome news for those who have been treated unjustly over the years, and should
provide some comfort knowing that their benefits will be forthcoming in the future.”13
As with the 1969 debate on health and safety, Byrd’s addition of the black lung
amendment to the health care legislation affirmed the importance of Congressmen and
senior legislators in effecting legislative change. More importantly, Byrd’s campaign for
more equitable black lung benefits emphasized that, to some extent, miners were still
11

New York Times, March 22, 2010, 1. For the House of Representatives’ amendments to
H.R. 3590, as embodied in bill H.R. 4872, see U.S. House, An act to provide for
reconciliation pursuant to section 202 of the concurrent resolution on the budget for
fiscal year 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2010, http://docs.house.gov/rules/
hr4872/111_hr4872_reported.pdf (accessed March 23, 2010).
12

New York Times, March 24, 2010, 1; New York Times, March 31, 2010, 1; William
Branigin, “Obama signs higher-education measure into law,” Washington Post, March
30, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/obama-signs-higher-educationm.html (accessed April 9, 2010).
13

U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, “Byrd Applauds Inclusion of Provisions to Help Victims
of Black Lung in Health Care Bill,” March 22, 2010, http://byrd.senate.gov//mediacenter/
view_article.cfm?ID=615

353
experiencing the same health and safety issues as they had in the late 1960s, despite
significant legislative advances. A series of coal mine disasters in 2006 and 2007 further
emphasized that federal regulation had not eradicated the hazards of coal mine labor. In
early January 2006, an explosion at the Sago mine in West Virginia resulted in the deaths
of twelve miners. The miners died after inhaling toxic fumes released by the explosion.14
The disaster prompted the George W. Bush administration to sign the Mine
Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act in May 2006. The act was
designed mostly to improve accident preparedness and the emergency response to coal
mine disasters. It also contained a new penalty schedule for health and safety violations,
and gave the Mine Safety and Health Administration the power to request an injunction
against operators who refused to pay fines.15 The Bush administration’s implementation
of the MINER Act reiterated one of the key trends in the evolution of coal mine health
and safety laws. Typically, changes to legislation only occurred in the aftermath of major
disasters. The same month as the Bush administration passed the MINER Act, five
miners died in an explosion at the Darby mine in Kentucky. Investigators later
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determined that an accumulation of methane gas in the mine caused the explosion.16 The
futility of the MINER Act in preventing coal miner disasters was emphasized by a coal
mine disaster in August 2007. Six miners died when a roof collapsed at the Crandall
Canyon mine in Utah. During the rescue operation, three rescue workers were killed
when another section of the roof collapsed.17
In the past forty years, health and safety in the United States coal industry has
improved. Recent disasters, however, combined with the ongoing problem of black lung
disease and the recent decline in the federal black lung compensation program,
demonstrate that today’s coal miners face the same health and safety problems that their
predecessors fought so hard to eradicate. While coal miners and their supporters achieved
significant legislative change through community activism in the late 1960s and 1970s,
an inefficient and industry-orientated federal bureaucracy undermined their achievements
by failing to provide adequate enforcement of the legislation. The same federal
bureaucracy is responsible for many of the problems in the coal industry at present.
Recent events, therefore, provide a foundation for summarizing the key issues of this
dissertation.
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Grassroots Activism and State and Federal Legislative Reform
The disaster at the Farmington mine in West Virginia in November 1968 was the
turning point for coal mine health and safety in the United States. It sparked the outbreak
of grassroots protest in the coalfields, as miners and their supporters engaged in
community-based activism to campaign for stronger health and safety legislation and
compensation for the victims of black lung disease. The disaster also prompted the U.S.
Congress to conduct hearings on the reform of coal mine health and safety legislation,
and convinced President Richard Nixon of the need to strengthen coal mine legislation,
although Nixon’s eventual approval of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was
more about his own political ambitions than it was about protecting and compensating
coal miners. Coal miners continued to engage in grassroots protest even after Nixon
signed the Federal Mine Act. The U.S. Bureau of Mines and the Social Security
Administration (SSA) were encumbered by red tape and upheld the interests of the coal
industry over those of the miners. Although community-based protest led to further
legislative change, most notably the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, the federal
bureaucracy continued to limit the improvement of health and safety. There was a
particularly noticeable decline in federal enforcement of health and safety legislation
during the Ronald Reagan administration. In particular, miners and their dependents
found it increasingly difficult to obtain black lung benefits.
In the aftermath of the Farmington disaster, community activism was crucial for
promoting and achieving legislative change. This was particularly true in the state of
West Virginia. While the explosions at the Farmington mine highlighted the immediate
safety risks that coal miners faced while laboring underground, Dr. Isidore Buff, Dr.
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Donald Rasmussen, and Dr. Hawey Wells capitalized on the disaster to publicize the
long-term health risks of coal mining. Buff exploited the presence of the national media
at the Farmington mine to convey the impact of black lung disease on miners, particularly
the acute suffering and shortness of breath. He highlighted the West Virginia legislature’s
failure to provide workers’ compensation to the victims of the disease. In early January
1969, the three doctors, who had become known collectively as the Committee of
Physicians on Miners’ Safety, and a small group of rank and file miners formed the West
Virginia Black Lung Association (BLA). The BLA led a campaign of intensive
grassroots protest in pursuit of state compensation for black lung victims. The rapid
growth of the organization was reflected by the black lung rally in Charleston in January
26, Congressman Ken Hechler, the Committee of Physicians, and thousands of coal
miners. The rally emphasized the Black Lung Association’s ability to mobilize coal
miners’ frustration over the lack of an adequate compensation program. Furthermore, it
emphasized miners’ rejection of the national leadership of the United Mine Workers,
which they believed was unconcerned with the issue of health and safety.
In the weeks that followed, the black lung movement intensified its campaign for
workers’ compensation for black lung victims. In mid-February, it instigated a strike in
the West Virginia coalfields, which quickly expanded to become the largest strike in
response to a health and safety issue in American history. By the beginning of March,
over 40,000 miners across that state had walked off the job to protest the governor’s
failure to add pneumoconiosis to the state’s list of compensable occupational diseases.
During the strike, on February 26, hundreds of miners, joined by their families, miners’
widows, and activists, marched along Kanawha Boulevard to the state capitol building in
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Charleston. The strike, which virtually halted coal production in West Virginia,
compelled the state House of Delegates and Senate to pass legislation that granted
benefits to black lung victims. Governor Arch J. Moore signed the legislation in midMarch, less than three months after the formation of the Black Lung Association. The
events in West Virginia in early 1969 provide clear evidence that community activism
was instrumental in effecting legislative change in coal mine health and safety.
In early 1969, the United States Congress opened hearings on the reform of coal
mine health and safety laws. The hearings confirmed that the federal government only
made significant changes to legislation in the aftermath of major disasters, not in
response to the many individual deaths that resulted from roof falls, minor explosions,
and equipment failures. More importantly, however, the hearings emphasized the role of
community activism in the improvement of the country’s coal mine health and safety
laws. In the House of Representatives, Ken Hechler (D-WV) exerted influence on the
Labor Subcommittee and the Committee on Education and Labor to produce a strong
legislative health and safety bill that included a dust standard of three milligrams and
many stringent safety provisions, such as the prohibition of smoking underground.
Hechler’s representation of a coal mining district in West Virginia, combined with his
key role in the Black Lung Association, meant he was well placed to represent the
interests of coal miners and their families. The final draft of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969 was, to a large extent, Hechler’s work. Representative Phil
Burton (D-CA) also made a significant contribution to the act by devising its federal
compensation program for black lung victims. The evolution of the Federal Mine Act was
attributable to a few committed Senators and Congressmen who sought to improve both
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coal miners’ working conditions and the federal government’s response to occupational
disease in the coal industry.
The passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was dependent on
the support of the Nixon administration. President Nixon’s support of the act, however,
was by no means assured, especially given its inclusion of an extensive compensation
program for black lung disease. Nixon believed that compensation for workplace injuries
and occupational disease was the responsibility of the states, not the federal government.
Moreover, in accordance with his political philosophy, he supported the interests of
business and private enterprise over those of labor and the environment. When Nixon
signed the act on December 30, 1969, it was not through an altruistic desire to provide
sick miners with benefits, but rather as a result of his own political ambitions and
objectives. First, with only four dissenting votes across the House and Senate, he risked
alienating Congress by rejecting the act. Nixon could not afford to do this, as he needed
to obtain the support of the Democrats for his foreign policy and defense programs.
Earlier in the year, he had delayed firing Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary to
obtain Democratic backing for his Anti-Ballistic Missile program.
Second, Nixon sought to increase his blue-collar support for the next presidential
election in 1972. Yet, by signing the Federal Mine Act (and the subsequent Black Lung
Benefits Act of 1972), he went beyond the measures he planned to adopt in the pursuit of
working class support. As historian Jefferson Cowie shows, Nixon centered his plan to
obtain blue-collar votes by focusing on workers’ moral and political ideals, rather than
providing funding for social and welfare programs. In fact, Nixon originally hoped to
increase his working class support without additional federal programs. His goal was not
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to improve the economic conditions of the working class, but to rely on this group to
solve major issues such as crime, drugs, and defense. Nixon believed that blue-collar
voters were the key to solving the nation’s moral crisis. He was convinced that, if
workers felt respected, they would be more likely to support his administration.18 His
reluctant support of the Federal Mine Act, then, went beyond his original policy
aspirations with regard to the working class, especially given the compensation
program’s projected annual cost of $140 million.19
To a lesser extent, community activism also influenced Nixon’s decision to sign
the bill. In late December, Ken Hechler paid for several widows of the Farmington
disaster to travel to Washington D.C. Although Nixon did not meet with them directly,
their presence reminded him of the importance of signing more effective health and
safety legislation into law. For Nixon, the immense human suffering and physical
discomfort caused by black lung, not to mention the loss of earning capacity that miners
experienced when they were too sick to work, was not a major factor in his signing of the
legislation. He signed the Federal Mine Act for political reasons, rather than moral ones.
Yet, he signed into law the most comprehensive and stringent coal mine health and safety
law to date.
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Coal Miners and the Problems of Federal Enforcement
As the story of Robert Byrd’s black lung compensation reform plans shows, an
inefficient and industry-orientated federal bureaucracy undermined the legislative
advances in the Federal Coal Mine Act of 1969. In the months after the passage of the
legislation, at least half of the nation’s black lung victims were unable to obtain
compensation, while there was an increase in coal mine fatalities. Miners and their
supporters approached this problem by extending their campaign of community-based
activism. Throughout 1970, rank and file miners, with the support of their families,
widows, and retired and disabled miners, conducted demonstrations and work stoppages
to protest the federal government’s weak enforcement of the Federal Mine Act. They
were, to a large extent, also protesting against the United Mine Workers, which they
believed was not doing enough to promote safe working conditions in the mines or to
provide hospital care and pensions to retired or disabled miners. Coal miners and local
and district union leaders expanded the grassroots campaign in the coalfields by writing
letters to their Congressmen about the inefficiency of the Bureau of Mines, particularly
its failure to inspect non-union coal mines. By late 1971, the Bureau’s enforcement of
health and safety in the coal industry had started to improve.
From 1971, the Black Lung Association expanded into several other states and
protested against the central office of the Social Security Administration, with the
intention of improving its management of the black lung compensation program. The
BLA also engaged in an extensive lobbying campaign in Washington D.C., in an effort to
persuade legislators to strengthen the legislation governing the benefits program. Again,
the BLA demonstrated the effectiveness of community activism in generating significant
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legislative change. In May 1972, Congress passed the Black Lung Benefits Act, which
Nixon signed into law the same month. Despite the liberal provisions of the act, which
included less stringent eligibility criteria for miners and the provision of benefits to
double orphans, thousands of claimants still failed to obtain compensation. By 1977,
when President Jimmy Carter entered the White House, the federal government’s failure
to provide an adequate compensation program for black lung disease was evident.
The Carter administration provided further confirmation that the federal
government typically reformed health and safety legislation in response to major mining
disasters, not the persistent hazards, such as roof collapses, that killed miners on a daily
basis. In 1977, the administration used a major disaster at the Scotia mine in Kentucky in
March 1976, which killed 26 miners, as the basis for strengthening the Federal Coal Mine
Act. Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, which provided
comprehensive health and safety measures for all types of mine, including those in the
metal and non-metal industries, in October 1977. Carter signed the act into law shortly
afterwards. On this occasion, however, President Carter was not responding solely to the
Scotia disaster. By signing the legislation, he was also acknowledging the declining
health and safety standards in the nation’s mines during the energy crisis. In 1978, Carter
also signed legislation that created the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.
Although designed to improve significantly conditions in the nation’s coal mines,
the Federal Mine Act of 1977 did not fulfill its potential. When Ronald Reagan became
president in 1981, he began an extensive program of deregulation. His massive staff and
budgetary cuts to the Mine Safety and Health Administration, responsible for
enforcement under the 1977 Act, led to an increase in black lung disease and injuries.
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Furthermore, his administration’s overhaul of the black lung compensation program
meant that miners and their dependents again struggled to obtain benefits. Reagan’s eight
years in office provided clear evidence that federal bureaucracy restricted the scope of
legislative change in coal mine health and safety.
From 1968 to 1988, coal miners and their supporters engaged in community
activism to obtain significant advances in coal mine health and safety legislation.
Through grassroots protest, they pushed legislators to pass laws at the state and federal
levels that improved working conditions and provided compensation for the victims of
black lung. At the national level, they were assisted by President Nixon’s support of their
cause, although Nixon was motivated more by his own political goals than the welfare of
the country’s miners. Weak federal enforcement of the new legislation, however,
undermined the achievements of the grassroots protest movement. Initially, miners and
their supporters addressed the failures in the federal bureaucracy by extending their
community activism. Ultimately, however, federal management of health and safety
enforcement and the black lung compensation program went into decline.
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My dissertation focuses on coal mining and occupational health and safety in the
United States from 1968 to 1985. In the late 1960s, coal miners faced the constant risk of
injury, occupational disease, and death. The dangerous conditions in the coal industry
resulted in a massive explosion at the Farmington mine in West Virginia in 1968, which
killed 78 miners. The Farmington disaster spurred miners to campaign for the reform of
state and federal coal mine health and safety laws in the United States. They rejected the
national leadership of their union, the United Mine Workers (UMW), which they
perceived as corrupt and inattentive to their concerns. Instead, they engaged in activism
at the local level, with the support of their families, activists, liberal politicians, and
progressive physicians. They sought improved preventative legislation and compensation
for the victims of pneumoconiosis, or ‘black lung,’ a debilitating, work-related
respiratory disease.
My study emphasizes the importance of community in the miners’ campaign for
the political reform of coal mine health and safety laws. I argue that sustained community
activism enabled miners to achieve legislative change, including improved protective
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laws and compensation programs, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Coal miners and
their communities played a significant role in the passage of a black lung compensation
law in West Virginia in March 1969 and in the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969. They continued to engage in grassroots protest when they
realized that the agencies responsible for upholding the new federal legislation, the U.S.
Bureau of Mines and the Social Security Administration (SSA), were not fulfilling their
responsibilities. The Bureau of Mines failed to enforce the health and safety measures in
the Federal Mine Act, while the SSA denied federal black lung benefits to tens of
thousands of miners. The campaign of sustained activism by miners and their supporters
led to the passage of the Black Lung Benefits Act in 1972. Furthermore, it enabled a
reform organization called Miners for Democracy to win democratic control of the
United Mine Workers in 1972. In the early 1970s, coal miners demonstrated that they
were not passive actors, but rather determined, conscious protestors. Ultimately,
however, an inefficient and industry-orientated federal bureaucracy undermined the
activists’ achievements and led to a decline in coal mine health and safety.
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